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Abstract 
The economic or political economy of conflicts and civil wars in Africa is an expanding field 
with an increase in research and literature especially in the last few decades. However, less 
attention has been devoted to the role of political economy in peacebuilding 
operations/interventions. This dissertation examines the extent to which political economy, 
specifically its elements in terms of interests, incentives and institutions shapes the 
conceptualization, design and implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) and the prospects for sustainable peace. The Niger Delta Amnesty (NDA) 
is used as an empirical case study.  
The objective of the dissertation was to empirically analyze the Niger Delta Amnesty Program 
as a response to resistance within the framework of political economy. The research uses the 
verticality of neoliberalism and neopatrimonialism as frameworks for analysis within the 
political economy and DDR debates. Content and discourse analyses were used to analyze a 
variety of qualitative secondary sources and semi-structured in-depth interviews.  
Evidence generated from the study demonstrated that the conceptualisation, design and 
implementation of DDR must take due cognizance of the impact of institutions, interest and 
incentives. Failure to recognize these political economy variables undermine the overall 
implementation and success of the DDR process. Key findings show that a top-down minimalist 
DDR approach in contrast to a bottom-up, community-driven peacebuilding, has raised 
concerns and contradictions about the sustainability of peacebuilding projects. Thus, the thesis 
concluded that for DDR to contribute to a successful war to peace transition, those that are 
responsible for its local conceptualization must understand how the elements of political 
economy that shape the conflict can affect and undermine DDR. 
Keywords: Nigeria, Niger Delta, Political Economy, Peacebuilding, Amnesty, Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, Reintegration, Interests, Incentives, Institutions, Neoliberalism, 
Neopatrimonialism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
The Nigerian State, oil corporations and resistance movements in the Niger Delta have 
struggled for decades over control of resources. In this Ph.D. I will consider related debates on 
peacebuilding, rentierism and the so-called “resource curse” to discuss the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Program in its context. The thesis is furthermore informed by theoretical debates on Nigeria’s 
political economy and the relations between different interest groups and institutions and how 
they frame the Niger Delta Amnesty (NDA) and Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) Program. 
1.1 State of the art 
1.1.1 The political economy of peacebuilding 
To understand the concept of the political economy of peacebuilding (PEP) in the Niger Delta 
region, it is of prime importance to briefly explore the political economy of conflict in the region. 
The political economy of conflict in the Niger Delta, particularly oil conflicts, centers on links 
between resource scarcities, unequal resource distribution and political marginalization 
(Ballentine & Sherman, 2003, pp. 1-2). In Nigeria, economic factors play a key role in fueling 
conflicts in the Niger Delta Region. This is as a result of inequalities that exist in the access, 
allocation and distribution of resources (Berdal & Malone, 2000, pp. 1-3). Bannon and Collier 
(2003), proposed that most resource endowed countries are prone to conflicts and that it is very 
easy for an oil producing country to be unstable. Other scholars have evidenced the fact that the 
availability of lucrative natural resources has a grave consequence for conflict dynamics 
(Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005, p. 5). The case in the Niger Delta region portrays key factors 
such as politics and economics that have fueled social unrest and conflicts in the region. This 
is chiefly as a result of the interplay between the economics of oil and the influence of politics 
on the management of resources. In addition, the political economy of conflict illustrates how 
acting components such as transnational companies migrate to underdeveloped regions and 
exert influence on the political class, to legitimize their occupation of viable resources in these 
territories (Lebillon, 2003, p. 68). This framework relates conflicts systematically to a few 
economic conditions such as dependency on primary commodity exports and low national 
income (Collier & Hoeffler, 2006). The management of oil has become very complex in Nigeria 
with the control of politicians represented by the local, state and federal government elites 
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(Ogege, 2011). The oil industry has always been under heavy influence from politicians and 
foreign Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) (Eluka, Uzoamaka, & Ifeoma, 2016). The 
Niger Delta area accounts for about eighty percent of the country’s revenue through the sale of 
crude oil (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 75). The Niger Delta region is in the limelight as many 
politicians want to secure and defend their interest in the regional economy. This has made the 
area a hot spot for violent uprisings and agitations by indigenous people who live in the constant 
fear of being dominated by both national politicians and multinational agents (Igini, 2011, p. 
1). The majority of these conflicts are caused by lingering grievances surrounding the 
management of oil (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012). The violent uprisings in the region has directly 
affected oil production and management (Ebiem, 2014). 
The intervention of the Federal Government in the crude oil business has created animosity and 
friction in the Niger Delta region. Anatsui and Fagbemi (2014) illuminate this fact:  
In Nigeria, the Federal Government is both a key player in oil and gas leasing/mining 
as well as a referee. It collects all revenues generated in the country and disburses a 
maximum of 13%, or as it pleases, to the states from which the resources are derived. 
By the recent Supreme Court decision on offshore lands, the Federal Government now 
takes everything while coastal states are entitled to nothing, not to talk of ecological 
impact, infrastructural wear-and-tear, and coastal communities’ development, which 
constitutes the major causes of crises in Niger Delta (p. 288). 
The intervention of MNOCs in the oil business has also been a source of instability, making the 
precious commodity more of a divisive product than a factor of unity and stability in Nigeria 
(Ngomba-Roth, 2007). Just like the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), MNOCs do have 
their own economic interests. In highlighting the overwhelming presence of MNOCs in 
Nigeria’s oil industry, Ubhenin (2013) holds that these transnational entities were present at the 
inception of the oil business in the country. Today a plethora of transnational companies 
dominate oil production and exploration (p.181). They include Shell, ExxonMobil, 
ChevronTexaco, Agip and Elf with the Federal government retaining about 55 and 60 percent 
shares represented by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Bergstresser, 
2010, p. 19; Uzoma, Kalu, & Nwakego, 2015, pp. 71-75). In most cases, and in order to protect 
its strategic interest, the Federal Government intervenes by signing legislations, public policy 
and the use of the military to shift outcomes in favour of these transnational companies (Omeje, 
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2006, p. 479), leaving the local population feeling abandoned and betrayed by its own 
government (Aworawo, 2013).  
Economic factors are important in understanding any conflict and peacebuilding settings. In 
Nigeria, the influence of the mix of various political and private economic interests and 
practices on the economy is what we call political economy (PE). In this context, PE is 
concerned with how political forces influence the economy and economic outcomes in Nigeria 
(Poulton, Douarin, & Buss, 2019, p. 18). The overbearing influence of politics on oil has left 
the people of Niger Delta embittered and frustrated (I. Udoh, 2013, p. 64). Scholars like Hudson 
and Leftwich (2014) argue that political economy has become the economics of politics instead 
of political analysis. They argue that the political economy approach has increasingly focused 
on how interest, incentives and institutions shape and explain the entire political process and 
practices that affect development outcomes (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 6). Australian AID 
(AusAID) (2011, p. 92) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2003, p. 10) analyze 
political economy as economic incentives, political interest and concentration and networks of 
power framed by institutional structures and norms (be it formal or informal) that influence 
development outcomes. This framework is particularly useful in understanding Nigeria when 
examining the interests and influence of different groups and how their power is exerted within 
state institutions. It also provides a deep understanding of how power is contested and the ways 
in which wealth in Nigeria is distributed (Udoh & Chijioke, 2017). 
The UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) defines political 
economy as “concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: 
the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the 
processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (DFID, 2009, p. 4). 
Taking a close look at this definition, it is imperative to say that the case in Nigeria is a portrayal 
of politics in relation to contestations and negotiations between interest groups with competing 
claims over rights and resources in the Niger Delta. It also involves the economic processes that 
produce wealth and thereby influence how political choices are made in the country (Selby, 
2008). This definition helps illuminate our understanding of the motivations of the actors. 
Just as violence and instability often serve a range of political, economic and social functions 
for individuals, so too do peacebuilding initiatives (Pugh, Cooper, & Turner, 2008). A political 
economy of peacebuilding relates to the transformation of war-torn societies into a map 
captioned ‘the liberal peace project’ that, in its economic dimensions requires convergence 
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towards market liberalization (Pugh, 2005, p. 23). It focuses a high priority on stabilizing peace 
by fostering security, rule of law and democratic norms (Pugh, 2011). In the context of the 
Niger Delta region, a political economy of peacebuilding specifically centers on the role that 
elements of political economy such as interests, incentives and institutions play in framing the 
NDA and DDR Program as a peacebuilding project. The political economy of peacebuilding in 
the Niger Delta region illustrates how power and resources are distributed and contested in 
different settings. It yields understanding into principal interest, incentives, rules and 
institutions regarding how these interacting factors come together to explain issues of justice, 
security and development (Haider & Rao, 2010, p. 4). Also, it focuses on the policies that are 
implemented in post-conflict environments that have framed and shaped the conceptualization, 
design and implementation of the NDA and DDR program with profound implications on the 
outcome of peace in the region. The PEP in the Niger Delta could be seen through the 
perspective of the politics of economic projects with the liberal peace framework especially the 
DDR program (Munive, 2014; Pugh, 2005, p. 24). The environment in the Niger Delta shows 
how politics and the institutional structures, policy choices, and economic outcomes arise from 
various types of political competition related to conceptualization, design and implementation 
of the NDA and DDR program (Adam & Dercon, 2009). This political economy of the Niger 
Delta Amnesty and DDR consists of existing interests amongst contesting groups over the 
control of oil. The incentives influence the behaviours of competing groups in the region. 
Furthermore, formal to informal institutions are all competing over the method of intervention 
and models of implementation with a bearing implication on the strategies, design and outcome 
of the peacebuilding initiative (Hodgson, 2006; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014).  
The implication herein is that peacebuilding can lead to profit making (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 
2005, p. 14). Little attention has been paid to the economic motivations and processes that have 
contributed to generating and sustaining contemporary peacebuilding. As such, the political 
economy of peacebuilding in the Niger Delta posits that economic considerations often shape 
the calculations and behaviours of the parties participating in peacebuilding as well as those 
parties, which mediate the conflict (Pugh et al., 2008). Although political and social factors fuel 
many conflicts and ethnically driven civil unrest in Africa, more often the reasons behind 
perpetration and re-perpetration of violence is chiefly influenced by economic interest (Paris, 
1997). As a result, if a peacebuilding process is not flexible in terms of accommodating 
domestic, cultural, ideological, social and political dynamics of the conflict in question, there 
will almost certainly be a relapse of violence (Paris, 2004). 
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1.1.2 Institutions in rentier states  
The rentier state political economy concept applies mostly to states dependent on one resource, 
in most cases mineral and oil. The rentier approach was first developed in a scientific study by 
Mahdavy (1970) who examined structural changes in several petrol-producing countries during 
the 1950s and 1960s in a study of the Persian economy, which entirely depended on oil exports. 
This concept was further popularized by two political scientists, Beblawi and Luciani, in 1987. 
According to them, a rentier state exists when rent situations are predominant and only a few 
are engaged in the generation of rent (wealth), while the majority are only involved in the 
distribution and utilization of it (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; Beblawi, 1987, p. 385). Rents are 
most commonly royalties or other payments for oil and gas exports, but other income such as 
fees and aid typically are considered rents as well (Gray, 2011, p. 1). This concept constitutes 
one of the premises of the resource curse or paradox of abundance phenomenon. In evaluating 
the sectoral performance of the Libyan economy, economists Birks and Sinclair (1984) focus 
on all the fundamentals of a rentier economy. In their view, many developing regimes utilize 
oil wealth to subsidize inefficient and unwise economic ventures. These rentier regimes are 
guided by unwise and ill-advised economic policy, which is wasting and squandering natural 
resources, particularly oil that in the long run has ruined the economy (Holsinger, 1986, p. 108). 
In his discourse on the rentier state in Gabon, Yates (1996) argues that most rentier states are 
exaggeratingly reliant on oil revenues. Within this scope of argument, Elsenhans (1984) posits 
that economic dependence is a key characteristic for many rentier states.  
In their definition of a rentier state, Bagagi et al. (2011) propose two basic features of such a 
phenomenon. Firstly, a rentier state fosters the formation of political patronage networks, 
essentially advancing a form of clientelism, which reduces avenues of political pluralism and 
diminishes democracy. This is certainly the case in Nigeria, where most politicians are 
sponsored by oil moguls and businessmen who have benefitted from the oil wealth from the 
Niger Delta, directly or indirectly. These corporate economic giants sponsor political protégées 
who advocate policies in their favour once voted into office; a practice widely known in Nigeria 
as “political godfatherism” (Oyebode, 2014, p. 139). 
Secondly, that the abundance of wealth generated by the oil rent makes it possible for the 
government to operate a friendly taxation system. In Nigeria’s case, the government operated a 
taxation system that was lenient towards taxing the wealthy, thereby helping the elite evade 
giving back a portion of their wealth to the public. Here again is an example of how oil rents 
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build a closed-circuit of top-class political elites who become distanced from the local 
population and unaccountable to them.  
Another aspect of the rentier state political economy is how it is tied to different actors 
interacting within institutions. Hudson and Leftwich (2014), define institutions as follows: 
Institutions provide the necessary social infrastructures to harness and channel self-
interest: they act as the coordination mechanism for mutually productive outcomes. 
Institutions provide peace, justice, and stability for the economy and polity to function 
without disruption. They are the glue that holds society together. Without institutions 
providing and upholding laws, contracts, property rights, and trust, economic activity 
would not be able to function smoothly. But – from an economic perspective – their 
critical role is as incentive structures (p. 32). 
Djoumessi (2009), who writes extensively about the resource curse and power struggles, takes 
a cue from Mahdavy (1970) in his 2009 book, in which he acknowledges the fact that most 
petrol producing countries in the world are now rentier states including some African countries 
like Nigeria and Angola. The income in Nigeria and Angola and especially their foreign 
exchange relies on the exploitation of crude oil by multinational corporations paying rent to the 
respective local governments, thereby providing the major source of revenue to these nations 
and becoming the livewire of their economies. 
Just like Djoumessi, Omeje (2013) opens his discourse by focusing on the resource curse 
concept. A resource curse is when a country is richly endowed with natural resources but 
characterized by violent low-intensity conflicts, militia insurgency, criminal predation, and 
obstruction of operations as a result of conflict over the management of natural resources. 
Omeje asserts that in most African countries with mineral resources, there exists rising waves 
of conflict alongside alarming rates of poverty. He cites Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan as examples. Omeje contrasts the situation in the above-mentioned 
countries with the conditions in countries like Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and 
Botswana where the availability of resources exists but has not dragged the country into violent 
conflicts and abject poverty of the majority of the population. 
Omeje (2013) considers resource curse and rentier state as the same thing. To him, resource 
curse countries are good examples of rentier states. A similar assertion is made by Djoumessi 
(2009) who affirms that all resource curse countries are suffering from rentier state syndrome 
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whereas not all rentier states are suffering from resource curse. He points out that a country like 
Qatar has used its oil wealth to develop the country with little environmental degradation, 
meanwhile it solely depends on oil rents.  
According to Gray (2011) the rentier state theory explains the effect of external payments (rent) 
on state-society relations and governance. Nigeria, for example, is considered a rentier state 
because the country derives a larger portion of its revenue from external rent: eighty percent of 
government revenue in Nigeria comes from the sale of oil. Gray surmises that the presence of 
oil in Nigeria actually impedes democratic prospects. Gray’s analysis views Nigeria as a 
country that generates a large proportion of its income and revenue from rent, rent being a form 
of externally derived, unproductively earned payment (Gray, 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, the 
author argues for the existence of a link between rentierism and neopatrimonialism, reasoning 
that only a very small but important group within society is involved in the generation of rent 
and in the sustenance of the ruling elite. 
The rentier state political economy approach attempts to answer some of the most central 
questions about the political economy of Nigeria as an oil exporting country. It also explains 
the shortcomings of democracy in the country and illuminates the development obstacles that 
Nigeria encounters due to the nature of elite politics and wider state-society interactions. In 
combination with other data, the rentier state analysis focuses Nigeria’s strong reliance on oil. 
The pressure to succumb to the external influences, which have had an impact on the socio-
political landscape of the wealthy Niger Delta. 
Bagaji et al. (2011) further argue that even though the rentier state concept was developed and 
experimented in the Middle East, it succinctly fits the Nigerian situation. Since the discovery 
of oil in 1956 and the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria has abandoned the agricultural industry 
that used to be the mainstay of the country’s economy and shifted instead to rely on rents from 
a lucrative commodity (oil) which is now the main source of revenue (Abubakar, Ahmad, Sani, 
& Jinjiri , 2016). The country’s dependency on oil is on the increase as it accounts for about 97 
percent of all foreign exchange earnings and 80 percent of government revenues (Asagunla & 
Agbede, 2018, p. 64). 
Nigeria’s economy sees but a fraction of the amount of profit that is generated abroad from its 
natural resources. Due to the constantly changing price of oil abroad, Nigeria’s economy is 
subject to constant instability. Nigeria does not have the capacity to exploit its own oil resources 
and depends on others to provide oil rents and consume their resources. In this way, Nigeria’s 
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dependency on oil producing countries has strengthened. Politics within Nigeria and its 
economy are resultantly affected and influenced by the country’s dependent relationships on 
rich western countries, represented in Nigeria by multinational oil corporations. In the Niger 
Delta the oil extraction activities of multinationals has widened community poverty and 
unemployment gaps (Obi, 2010, p. 220). For example, in the oil producing states of Akwa Ibom 
and Bayelsa, the unemployment rates hovers at 38.4 percent as opposed to the 19.7 percent 
national average (Tambari & Imoh, 2016, p. 9). 
The Nigerian economy is rentier-reliant on external rent sources and is evolving into an 
allocation state. The Nigerian government is the principal recipient of rent in the country and 
the generation of rent is centered on a few, mirroring the input-output imbalance of the rentier 
economy seen in class structures, institutions and politics. In their discourse on how developing 
countries depend on oil rents, Amin (1976), Frank (1972) and Dos Santos (1970) argue that 
multinationals exploit Third World economies by extracting surplus resources for export to 
their respective metropolises, thereby benefiting “the haves” while depriving “the have-nots” 
and thus creating distinct inequality. Amin, Frank, and Dos Santos further posit that the 
economic activities of multinationals are distinctly imperialistic and exploitative. Amin (1976) 
goes even further to argue that capitalists’ economic tendencies have led to the 
underdevelopment of the periphery of society and that as a result the relationship between rich 
and poor demographics in Nigeria has not changed (p. 38).  
Others, like Frank (1972), posit that, 
Contemporary underdevelopment is a continuation of the same fundamental processes 
of dependence, transforming economic class and class structures, and lumpen bourgeois 
policies of underdevelopment, which have been in operation throughout our history (p. 
92).  
To Amin, Frank, and Dos Santos, Nigerian political elites who form tactical alliances with these 
corporations are their intermediaries and subordinate allies in all processes of exploitation. 
Santos, Amin, and Frank (1969) unequivocally agree that the local bourgeoisie in Nigeria use 
government positions and institutions to establish imperialistic economic joint cooperation with 
multinational oil corporations in the Niger Delta region. Conversely, they argue that 
competition amongst investors is an opportunity to make economic gains (p. 174). In the Niger 
Delta for instance, Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and others are competing to make surpluses, 
which will be exported to their home countries. Worth noting is the involvement of 
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multinationals in the lucrative economic sector in Nigeria, which is very central because, in 
such a case, the Nigerian state becomes a rentier state. 
Social scientist Bamiduro (2012) looks at the situation in Nigeria from both environmental and 
socioeconomic angles. He asserts that hydrocarbons in general cannot be friendly to the 
environment and so Nigeria with vast quantities of hydrocarbons is severely suffering from 
environmental degradation. Severe corruption, says Bamiduro, has made it impossible for the 
people on the ground, especially those suffering from air pollution and environmental spoilage, 
to benefit from the oil rents and wealth. He goes on to caution Ghana (a nation new to the oil 
business) not to follow in the footsteps of Nigeria, lest they find the newly discovered crude oil 
reserves will create more problems to the peaceful country than blessings. Botswana has proven 
to be one of the least corrupt countries in the world even though endowed with enormous 
mineral resources. Mining in Botswana is mostly performed by private companies in which the 
government maintains a significant shareholding. Good governance and accountability have 
made it possible for the country to use mineral wealth and move from a poverty-stricken country 
to a middle-income country as opposed to the situations seen in its lest well-run neighbors 
(Bamiduro, 2012, p. 13).  
The above-mentioned writers, although coming from different generations and whose works 
were published over a span of years, all echo in unison that in rentier states, there is less 
accountability since they are ruled by autocratic regimes and the oil rent is used to put out any 
dissent and buy off political opponents. In the case of Chad, rentierism extends to maintaining 
a military force that is showcased in regional conflicts whereas the masses are hungry (Pemunta 
& Tabenyang, 2016). This would imply that the rentier state phenomenon generally guarantees 
stability to authoritarian regimes, and in the case of Nigeria, rule by a few who form coalitions, 
strategies and tactical alliances.  
Nigeria is without a doubt one of the most corrupt country in the world, rife with corruption in 
the oil and gas sector. Rentierism in Nigeria illustrates the dynamic relating oil industries and 
authoritarianism as well as the linkage between oil and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta 
region. More crucially, substantial examination of authoritarianism has been made by scholars 
like Ross (2001). Ross underlined three causal mechanisms in his work, rentier effect, 
repression effect, and modernisation effect, to explain the nexus between oil exports and 
authoritarian rule in the Middle East. In the case of the “rentier effect”, governments use their 
oil revenues to alleviate social pressures in order to avoid demands from greater accountability. 
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This implies that when governments make enough gain/benefit from oil revenues, they tax their 
populations low or not at all. As a result, the public is likely to demand less accountability of 
their leadership and institutions. That is, in turn they would gain the public’s political 
acceptance or concession. Ross argues that “repression effect” is visible when resource wealth 
enables authoritarian governments to spend more on internal security and obstruct the 
population’s aspirations to democracy. Wealth from rents has enabled the state to acquire 
repressive state apparatus and institutions and to keep the tensions of democratization within. 
While, “moderniization effect” is the linkage between development and democracy due to 
wealth per se. These concepts are clearly applicable to situations in extractive countries like 
Nigeria where rents have been bolstered and autocratic, undemocratic governments have 
maintained power. Ross’s three casual mechanisms are visible in the case of Nigeria. The 
“rentier effect” helps the government utilize fiscal measures to keep the people of the Niger 
Delta and the larger public politically demobilized. The “repression effect” focuses on the use 
of force by the Nigerian government to keep the communities in the Niger Delta demobilized. 
The “modernization effect” highlights the social forces in place that have kept the communities 
in the Niger Delta demobilized (Ross, 2001, p.332-337). 
There is an argument in literature that rent has long been the driving force in fostering socio-
political impediment, thereby promoting underdevelopment and hindering democracy (Ross, 
2001, p. 337; 2003). In Nigeria, resource-based wealth has led to the establishment of a large 
military force. Driven by self-interest, elites and the ruling political class in Nigeria have 
developed effective ways to arm themselves against popular pressures from the Niger Delta and 
the government has used military force to help maintain order. The concentration of oil in one 
geographical region of the country (the Niger Delta) that also happens to be populated with 
ethnic minorities alongside intense resource extraction has aggravated ethnic tensions while 
federal, regional and local actors with vying interests compete for the Niger Delta’s oil right 
(Ross, 2001, p. 336). 
In contemporary times, rentierism has painted a clear image of the economic importance of oil 
in Nigeria. The injection of wealth has created an absence of democracy in the country. Instead 
of guaranteeing greater stability and security in Nigeria, oil and the wealth it generates has 
destabilized the oil states in the Niger Delta region and done nothing, according to Gray, to 
reduce or address instability (Gray, 2011, p. 9). In fact, Gray posits that the absence of 
democratic processes and institutions in Nigeria is an outcome of rentierism. 
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Just like Gray, Beblawi (1990) and Luciani (1990) critically analyzed the connection between 
oil wealth and the absence of democracy in Nigeria, later in the scholastic timeline, in 
buttressing this pre-existing discourse, Ross (2001) further illustrates the nexus between oil and 
the absence of democracy in Nigeria. The above academics concluded that misallocation of 
wealth, corruption, waste and inefficiency in government institutions form a matrix of elements 
that have resulted in blurring democracy in Nigeria. Bagaji et al. (2011) went as far as to dwell 
on the fact that the violence in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria is an ugly manifestation of a 
country suffering from resource curse. They argue that because the exploitation of indigenous 
resources did not benefit the local population, the locals decided to take up arms against the 
Federal Government and the numerous multinational companies operating in the region. 
Despite thorough coverage of issues in the Niger Delta up until this point, however, most of the 
aforementioned writers refrained from discussing topics related to the Amnesty and DDR 
program.  
1.1.3 Resource curse discourse and interests 
Since the 1970s oil boom in Nigeria (Bagaji et al., 2011, p. 34), the country’s economic position 
as Africa’s breadbasket mutated drastically. Nigeria moved from being a food self-sufficient 
nation to a heavy importer of foodstuffs from its neighbours, especially Cameroon. Within a 
rapid period of time, Nigeria shifted from an agriculturally based economy to an economy 
entirely sleeping on the laurels of crude oil. Despite being the continent’s primary crude oil 
exporter, the boom of the oil industry in Nigeria has brought with it many misgivings and has 
not placed the country as the most “blessed” nation in Africa (Amnesty International, 2009). 
The resource curse discourse has become a bedrock for political economy analysis. In his book 
entitled Six Books of a Commonwealth, Bodin puts forward his own definition of resource curse 
as a situation “where men of a fat fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; 
whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity and by consequence 
careful, vigilant, and industrious” (Ross, 1999, p. 309). Bodin sees countries with riches in the 
soil as embroiled in an atmosphere of laziness and mismanagement of their resources, chalk 
full of leaders who think only of the present and never of the consequences, and insupportable 
to the men and women who live in the common land enduring havoc caused by the elite class 
and politicians. 
In his pursuit of a broader definition of the concept of the resource curse, Djoumessi (2009) 
writes that most of the deep soil resources in Africa have brought bad luck to their countries. 
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He argues that in some cases, such as in Nigeria and Sudan, these resources are the primary 
source of conflict, while in other cases they help to encourage the growth of conflicts (such as 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo) leading to a larger debate on the roles of greed and 
grievance in the political economy. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Keen (2012) assert that 
greed and grievance are the motivations behind contest and competition between different 
groups. This indicates that varying interests, a key element in political economy, is what 
motivates different groups to contest. Hudson and Leftwich (2014), define interest as the 
predominant driver of behaviour and outcomes (p. 32). In Nigeria, for instance, they point out 
that politicians focus on getting elected or staying in power forever while bureaucrats are 
motivated by intensifying their power, duties, staff and budgets. This, as in any society, is an 
obvious competition of self-interest (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 32). 
The resource curse discourse looks at the socio-economic development and related concepts 
such as poverty and economic decline in resource abundant countries (Basedau & Lay, 2005, 
p. 12). In discussing the resource curse debate, Ross (2003) argues that it is paradoxical that 
resource rich countries like Nigeria develop at a slower rate than resource poor countries. One 
critical factor that defines the way in which resource wealth impacts a developing nation is the 
degree of external rent misuse and possible wrongful allocation of funds by state institutions 
(Lay & Mahmoud, 2005, p. 47). This could be the driving force behind why the abundance of 
natural resources in Nigeria does not produce the expected blessings but instead manifests as a 
curse (Basedau & Lay, 2005). This idea is corroborated by Lay and Mahmoud (2005) who 
contend that Nigeria is considered to be suffering from “resource curse” because the country 
has not used its oil rents to finance public investments but has instead used its rents for private 
gains. 
Natural resources play an important role in contemporary Africa. According to authors like 
Gary and Karl (2003), Ross (2003) and Lay and Mahmoud (2004), natural resources cause 
economic distress, impair other economic sectors (like mining), affect other sources of 
economic growth, performance and development, drive misguided economic policies, and 
expose the economy to economic stagnation. This is what Karl (1997) refers to as “the paradox 
of plenty”. In Nigeria for instance, the abundance of natural resources has caused, triggered, 
aggravated and prolonged violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. The “curse” can be traced from 
the beginning of when oil was extracted and produced in the Niger Delta communities (Basedau 
& Lay, 2005, p. 9). Engel (2005) contends that Nigeria experiences the blessings and curses of 
oil riches at same time. The country’s ‘sweet oil’ has reinforced state formation and created 
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wealth on the one hand while on the other hand, it has been a key driver for violent conflicts (p. 
90). 
Nigeria has neglected to invest in the development of human resources because the country is 
carried away by misuse of wealth brought by oil and gas into the economy, suffering from what 
Basedau and Lay termed “Dutch disease”1. The oil boom in Nigeria was followed by a surge 
of capital appreciation that caused other tradeable sectors in the economy to collapse and non-
tradeable sectors to multiply (Basedau & Lay, 2005, p. 14). The agricultural industry, for 
example, completely collapsed following the oil boom in the 1970s. The resulting lack of 
diversification in Nigeria’s economy makes it prone to unhealthy dependence and is largely in 
part responsible for the resulting vulnerability of the economy, which is of course also a 
hinderance to growth (Basedau & Lay, 2005, p. 14). 
For decades, the presence of crude oil deposits in Nigeria has caused violent uprisings and 
serious environmental degradation in the Niger Delta (Ogege, 2011, p. 249). On this paradox 
of abundance to crude oil, Bannon and Collier (2003) maintain that the discovery of oil in low-
income countries increases the risk of conflicts. 
Nigeria is regarded as suffering from the “resource curse” because the state is unable to manage 
its natural resource abundance (Mähler, 2010). The country is endowed with many natural 
resources, including oil, gas, solid minerals, marine resources, agricultural produce and arable 
land2. It is, however, one of the greatest ironies of the country that all these resources have been 
associated with intense conflict, sometimes of tragic dimensions. Despite the enormous wealth 
that has accrued from these resources, Nigeria is yet to experience any significant economic 
development (IMF, 2011). In the midst of this, controversies over the crucial question of natural 
resource control remains one of the main challenges that currently confronts the country (van 
de Ploeg, 2011).  
                                                 
1 The term was introduced in the Netherlands in the 1960s when foreign revenue increased dramatically following 
the discovery and exploitation of gas for commercial purposes in the Province of Groningen and later on in other 
areas of the country. There was massive recruitment in the gas sector as many workers abandoned other sectors of 
the economy to the more profitable gas division. Even though it was first highlighted in the gas sector, the Dutch 
disease has transcended into other mineral sectors including crude oil. The Dutch Disease is also a result of the 
paradox of plenty or resource curse. 
2 Besides oil, Nigeria has over 40 billion tons of solid mineral deposits. Among these are: 1 billion tons of gypsum 
spread over many states; 42 million tons of bitumen; 3 billion tons of proven reserve of coal; over 7.5 million and 
700 million tons of bentonite and baryte respectively; 1.5 million tons of rock salt; one of the world’s best 
gemstones deposit and an estimated 3 billion tons of kaolin and lots more such as aluminum, bauxite, columbite, 
copper, diamond, gold, phosphate, tantalite, tin, uranium and zinc (Khan, 1994). 
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1.1.4 Wealth distribution and incentives 
The Niger Delta area existed even before the British created the Nigerian protectorate. 
According to Ngerebo-A (2013) the Niger Delta is one of the most richly endowed regions of 
the world with about 34 billion barrels of crude oil and falls amongst the seven biggest crude 
oil producers globally. The region also produces Bonny Light, one of the finest forms of crude 
oil in the world. Ariweriokuma (2009) asserts that the prowess of Nigeria is not limited to crude 
oil but extends to gas and with a deposit of 187 cubic feet (TFC). Awumo (2009) attributes all 
of the nations’ oil and gas to the Niger Delta, writing that the Niger Delta region holds 100 
percent of all gas and oil deposits in the country making it the economic heartbeat of Nigeria. 
Gboyega, søreide, Minh Le, and Shukla (2011) give a global pictorial ranking by attesting that 
Nigeria has the largest crude and gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. According to 
Ariweriokuma (2009), oil production is mostly handled by multinational companies and the 
Federal Government as represented by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
Shell produces about 50 percent of Nigeria’s crude oil and operates the largest joint venture 
while the other joint ventures belong to Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, ENI/Agip and 
TotalfinalElf (Odularu, 2008, p. 8). Most of Nigeria’s crude oil goes to the United Kingdom, 
after which the United States is Nigeria’s largest trading partner (Odularu, 2008, p. 4). Despite 
trading with two of the wealthiest nations on the globe, the people of the Niger Delta fall 
amongst the poorest in the world because the revenue from crude oil and gas is not well 
distributed and managed. 
In discussing how distribution has become a key factor in the conflict over oil in Nigeria, it 
must be noted that the term “distribution” can fall into several distinctly different categories. 
The first category is distribution of revenue coming from these resources while the second is 
the distribution of privileges and third is the distribution of positions (employment seats in 
positions of power) (Garuba, 2003). The distribution of revenue is most directly and 
problematically rooted to the general controversies surrounding revenue allocation in Nigeria. 
The form of revenue allocation gives the impression of unfair treatment to the people of 
Nigeria’s oil-producing regions who are often captured in the appellation of “the goose that lays 
the golden eggs” (Garuba, 2003, p. 127). The reward being sought in their struggle is an increase 
in diverted oil revenue to them, with many in the region asking for up to 50 percent of dividends. 
The unanimity of Niger Delta people on this issue was demonstrated in 2005 at the National 
Political Reform Conference (NPRC) when regional representatives demanded that the 
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implementation of the 50 percent formula should start immediately at 25 percent with 
successive annual increases of 5 percent for another five years. This was a strategy to mitigate 
the possible negative effects the diversion of funds would have on Nigeria’s financial status. 
The second level in the controversies over revenue sharing focuses on the distribution of 
privileges associated with oil. Different ethnic groups in the Niger Delta are engaged in the 
controversies and the discussion consists chiefly of two complaints. The first are complaints 
voiced by different oil producing communities that the government has built up public 
amenities in places where the community has produced far less oil, whereas their own 
community has been neglected. Communities making these claims often argue that there is no 
fairness in the ways that the government disburses these “privileges” coming from oil. Recent 
efforts to address the alleged imbalances can be pinpointed in the establishment of the Federal 
Government’s interventions in communities in Nigeria’s oil producing states – i.e. the now 
defunct Oil Mineral Producing and Development Commission (OMPADEC) and its successor, 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The second major complaint by oil producing 
communities against oil-multinationals is that the latter are not giving enough back to the 
communities, compared to what they take and destroy in that process, thereby failing to embody 
a spirit of corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
The third layer of controversy is tied to the distribution of positions. This problem also surfaces 
in two different forms: the first being the distribution of positions at the senior management 
levels in the various institutions created by the government to facilitate development in oil 
producing areas. This is true especially concerning the Oil Mineral Producing and Development 
Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). There are 
often rivalries between different ethnic groups as to who should hold positions at the senior 
levels of these bodies, a tension which trickles down to local communities. The Isoko Youth 
Movement, for example, specifically wrote in their manifesto that their condition for peace is 
based on inclusion of an Isoko indigene into positions at a reconstituted OMPADEC. This also 
played out at the state level in 2007 when Governor Emmanuel Uduagha of Delta State objected 
to the Federal Government’s chosen candidate to represent Delta State on the NDDC Board, 
arguing that he was not the state government’s nominee for the position. In the wake of the 
creation of a Niger Delta Ministry in January 2009, the news went around to the effect that 
some ethnic groups within the Niger Delta opposed the appointment of Chief Ufot Ekaette 
(former Secretary to the Government of the Federation under President Obasanjo administration) 
by President Yar’Adua as minister for the new Ministry.  
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The second major manifestation of conflict over distribution of position has been based on 
persistent clamour by Niger Delta youths that their region is not being offered positions at the 
senior management levels by multinational oil companies. This again is an issue that has existed 
for quite some time. Many oil-companies, in response to this complaint, have argued that the 
youths are not qualified for the position they seek, and that the technical nature of the oil 
extraction business makes it unwise to employ incompetent men in a bid to satisfy ethnic and/or 
sectional interest. It is in this sense that the Bayelsa State Government is currently committed 
to pursuing youth-targeted human capital development programs (enshrined in the Education, 
Empowerment and Enforcement strategy) (Garuba, 2003, pp. 127-128). 
Wealth distribution forms part of incentives in the political economy. Ostrom, Schroeder, & 
Wynne (1993) argue that incentives are produced within institutions. Accordingly, the existence 
of effective institutions will incentivise coordination, generate wealth, and vice versa. To them, 
incentives are the external stimuli of rewards and punishments that are related to certain types 
of actions (Ostrom, Gibson, Shivakumar, & Anderson, 2002, p. 6). This is centrally important 
as actors/agents always act according to their self-interest. In this regard, the institutional 
structures of a state can produce incentives for people to behave in a certain way, to invest or 
not invest, and to act out of public interest or involve in clientelistic behavior (Hudson & 
Leftwich, 2014, p. 32). Therefore, good institutions are key to creating incentives. 
In Nigeria, the distribution of resources follows certain patterns within state institutions 
including the Federal Government, the states and the local government (Gboyega et al., 2011; 
Ikeji, 2011). Despite clear cut patterns, there have always been misgivings regarding the 
distribution of revenue in terms of what the Federal Government retains and what goes to the 
state and local governments. Omeje (2013) confirms that since oil became the backbone of the 
economy, revenue distribution has been consistently rocked by politics. He claims that the 
government retains obsolete laws and implements the said laws only when defending the 
interest of political elites in the economy. For example, by law, all land is State land, meaning 
that all resources belong to the state instead of the communities where they are located. The 
Federal Government only allocates 13 percent of revenue from petrol and gas resources to their 
regions of origin. Ngerebo-A (2013) breaks it down as follows: the Land Use Act of 1978 and 
the Petroleum Act of 1969 gave full control and ownership of both land and sea and all 
constituents therein to the Federal Government of Nigeria.  
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In essence, all revenue from oil exploration and exploitation belongs exclusively to the Federal 
Government under the shrouded guise of its political elites. However, with the demand for more 
from the oil producing states in the Niger Delta, contestations have developed between the 
Federal Government (backed by politicians and multinational companies) and the local 
communities. In a bid to manipulate and divert the attention of the population of the Niger Delta 
away from oil, Kalejaiye and Alliyu (2013) argue that political elites have provoked inter-ethnic 
disputes and political upheavals.  
Ikeji (2011) presents a startling revelation, concurrent with this argument, that in the struggle 
for control of oil and gas resources, the Federal Government seized the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria and in April 2002 passed a ruling that excludes revenue from offshore drilling in the 
calculation of the revenue attributed to the oil producing states. Odularu (2008) alleges that the 
situation is even more pathetic with about 80 percent of oil wealth benefitting about one percent 
of the population. This one percent, according to Omeje (2013), is a faction of the political 
elites who dominate all sectors of power especially at the Federal level. This one percent forms 
tactical alliances and coalitions with multinational companies and other powerful individuals 
in order to evade taxes and would do anything to support dysfunctional institutions so that they 
themselves cannot be held accountable, giving rise to an atmosphere of political clientelism in 
Nigeria. 
Gboyega et al. (2011), also support this claim. They write that representatives of political and 
military elites have huge bank accounts in foreign countries fattened from oil wealth and that 
these same elites gained access to their oil wealth via participation in politics. Meanwhile, as a 
result of very weak institutions which cannot hold people accountable or defend the rights of 
the marginalized, Odalonu (2015) argues that there has been an increase in illegal oil business 
involving expatriates as well as nationals in the form of oil theft, which has become very 
lucrative and has sustained an illegal economy. This oil theft (“oil bunkering”) has taken on a 
globalized character and contains serious negative consequences for the economic performance 
and reforms in Nigeria Garuba (2010). 
1.2 Research question 
This research is informed by the following research question: How has the political economy 
shaped the implementation of Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program and its prospect for 
sustainable peace in the region? Specifically, how have elements of political economy such as 
interests, incentives and institutions helped or hindered the peacebuilding goal of the Amnesty 
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Program? The main objective of this study is to empirically analyze the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Program as a response to resistance within the framework of political economy. It specifically 
investigates the roles of interests, incentives and institutions (political economy). 
1.3 Problem statement 
For decades, competing claims over access, ownership and control of oil has fueled violent and 
non-violent uprisings and resistance in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The discovery of oil 
in 1956 at Oloibiri with its attendant dividends has created disputes among local communities 
in the Niger Delta region, the Nigerian State and the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 
concerning control over oil rents, environmental degradation, infrastructural neglect and 
underdevelopment (Agbonifo, 2018, pp. 1-2; Ahonsi, 2011, p. 28; Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 76). 
Over the years, efforts by the government, MNOCs, international development agencies and 
other stakeholders to manage the conflict have resulted in unprecedented violence and militancy. 
Attempts to diffuse conflict have been arbitrary and often reliant on the deployment of the 
military because peacebuilding efforts have been unstainable and intractable.  
In 2009, the Federal Government Amnesty Program (FGAP) was launched in the Niger Delta. 
In line with the FGAP, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) granted amnesty to armed 
militias in the Niger Delta region. The amnesty program, which was part of a larger framework 
of the Nigerian government’s efforts to resolve conflict between the Nigerian State, the 
multinationals, militant groups, and the Niger Delta communities as well as a response to the 
terrible security conditions prevalent in the Niger Delta, granted pardon to militants who were 
willing to lay down their arms in exchange for willingly allowing the continuation of oil 
exploitation in their communities. The sixty-day-long amnesty initiative included a 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) component which led to the successful 
agreement of hundreds of Niger Delta militants to hand over more than five hundred weapons, 
fourteen gunboats, and dozens of rocket launchers and mortar bombs that were in their 
possession (Reuters, 2009). According to a BBC report (2009), the amnesty that took place in 
Yenagoa, west of the oil city of Port Harcourt saw the relinquishing of hundreds of assault rifles, 
a number of rocket launchers, and at least twelve gunboats. The same report, however, mentions 
that it was not exactly clear how many heavy weapons were handed over, and that many of 
those presented appeared to be old and rusty, thereby casting doubts on the true efficacy of the 
initiative. Vanguard Newspaper (2009), also reporting on the Amnesty, recounts that on August 
22, 2009 the Kula community (which was home to militants) in Akuku Toru Local Government 
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gave back 42 rifles, 371 rounds of ammunition and 14 dynamite explosives.3 The Amnesty 
Program was a great harbinger of peace and security to the Niger Delta region and was highly 
applauded by the regional and international community. 
Despite initial excitement and broadly acclaimed acceptance of the amnesty and the DDR 
program, disagreements have been raised by various scholars, analysts and critics over the 
sustainability of the program. Having examined the Niger Delta Amnesty Program (NDAP) 
from its successes and failures, many of the above-mentioned analysts have voiced skepticism 
in the program’s continuing ability to address questions of stability, peace and development in 
the region. Some scholars even contend that the program was a mere subterfuge reminiscent of 
a change in continuity of the exploitation of the Niger Delta oil resources, as they variously 
viewed it as “cash for peace” (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2016), “cash for arms” (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 
387; Ushie, 2013, p. 36), “fragile peace” (Eke, 2015, pp. 756-757; Osah & Amakihe, 2014, p. 
2321), and “peace for oil” (Nwobueze & Inokoba, 2017; Obi, 2014, p. 250). These same 
scholars understand the Amnesty Program as an oil-driven response to the conditions seen in 
the Niger Delta and view the resulting peace from the program as a short-term solution. Others 
have held the opinion that both programs have led to a reduction in crime, violence, militancy, 
and sustenance of stability and security in the region (Ajibola, 2015; Akinwale, 2010). 
According to them, hostilities in the Niger Delta have subsided below the pre 1990-2009 level. 
In this regard, the Amnesty Program has incentivized peace in the region to some extent. To 
this end, government officials and the leadership of the Presidential Amnesty Program and the 
Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN)4, celebrated the 2009 Amnesty initiative as 
the ‘most successful demobilisation ever held the world over’ (Obi, 2014, p. 250). The Post-
Amnesty Program (PAP) followed the initial sixty-day disarmament period and began the 
second and third phases of the program: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The 
debate remains ongoing, centered around questions about the effectiveness of the PAP and the 
possibilities PAP contains for the creation of sustainable peacebuilding in the region (Obi, 2014, 
p. 250). 
The purpose of this research is not to decide on the validity of the arguments in the emerging 
debate or determine whether the program was successful or not; instead, it seeks to point out 
the lack of attention paid to the political economy in the analytical discourse surrounding the 
                                                 
3 For more information see: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/09/amnesty-and-militants-arms-surrender-how-
far/. Accessed on June 26, 2018.  
4  The organization coordinating consultancies for post-amnesty training. For additional information see: 
http://www.fehnnigeria.org. Accessed on June 26, 2018.  
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Amnesty and DDR program in the Niger Delta. While authors like Nwokolo and Aghedo (2018), 
Agbonifo (2018), Ebiede (2017), Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016), and Dudu and Odalonu (2016) 
have investigated the program from mainly security, environmental, development and socio-
political perspectives, yet, very little attention has been paid to the importance of political 
economy (Mohammed, Robinson, & Aliyu, 2014; Obi, 2014; Udoh & Chijioke, 2017). 
Recognizing the absence of this perspective, this dissertation seeks to contribute towards filling 
the research gap in terms of analyzing the political economy components of the Amnesty and 
DDR Program. A reading of scholarly reports on these subjects demonstrate that the political 
economy aspects have not been adequately explored.  
The study further analyses the different approaches used to deal with contestations in the Niger 
Delta and how these approaches come to form tactical alliances, coalitions and strategies that 
become entangled in the debate on the political economy of peacebuilding (PEP). A political 
economy of peacebuilding allows us to understand it as a basis of competing political and 
economic interests and contending relations of power in which hegemonic powers seek to 
describe the character and outcome of the struggle for peace (Obi, 2014, p. 252). PEP focuses 
on the politics and economics that play in framing peacebuilding initiatives and development 
outcomes in war-torn societies (Pugh, 2005, p. 24). PEP illuminates how actors’5 agencies6; 
their incentives and institutions dictate and affect the pattern of peacebuilding (i.e. transforming 
societies that emerge from conflict). It examines the construction of the political economies of 
peace processes and peacebuilding, with emphasis on war-torn societies and the wider impact 
of the economy and shifts in the positionalities and construction of security and development 
(Pugh et al., 2008, p. 390). This certainly connects with the power imbalance that reinforces the 
project of liberal peacebuilding, and securitization in conflict contexts. The argument is that 
economic systems and economic behavior can be changed by the actors’ agency to fit a 
securitized model of development and peacebuilding interventions can be hampered to achieve 
this (Pugh et al., 2008, p. 391). It looks at the state capitalist peacebuilding and development 
strategies in the Niger Delta (Shaw & Aluko, 1984, p. 13). This analysis emphasizes on the 
politics of the Amnesty and DDR Project within the liberal peace framework, drawing concrete 
example from Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. It argues that elements of political economy such 
as interests, incentives and institutions cannot be ignored in the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR 
                                                 
5 An actor denotes not only individual people but also any organization that possess the capability to make and 
execute decisions (Lewis P., 2002, p. 18). 
6 Agency is understood as the capacity to act upon situations (Hindess, 1988, p. 44; Sibeon, 1999, p. 139) or entities 
that are able to formultae and implement decisions (Lewis P., 2002, p. 17). 
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as a peacebuilding program. Contemporary concerns in international studies point to the 
existence of correlations between politics, economy, conflicts and peacebuilding. These 
concerns are visible in the growing tendency to discuss contemporary security events in a rentier 
state in the logic of a global political economy (GPE) (Gilpin, 2001, p. 9). Therefore, 
peacebuilding activities are not neutral in their normative orientation. Thus, this thesis examines 
the political economy of the Nigerian Government Amnesty Program (2009-2018) and its 
implications for peacebuilding in the region. 
This study will analyze the key elements of a political economy, taking a critical look at 
institutions, interests and incentives that frame the Niger Delta Amnesty (NDA) and the DDR 
program as a peacebuilding project. The study utilizes three primary concepts of political 
economy as analytical framework: interest, incentives and institutions. Interests refer to 
contesting groups over the control of oil; incentives refer to due influence on the behaviours 
and actions of diverse groups; and institutions refer to formal institutions (state institutions); 
and informal institutions (non-state institutions) competing over oil rents in the Niger Delta. 
This research angle has been previously employed by scholars such as Hudson and Leftwich 
(2014) who wrote that a perspective on political economy emphasizes how interest, incentives 
and institutions frame and interpret the behaviour of agents and political processes and practices 
that affect peacebuilding outcomes (p. 6). Scholars like McLoughlin (2014) further support this 
assertion through a political economy based examination of the significant impact on 
development resulting from fundamental political and economic processes in society 
particularly, the incentives, interactions (connections), distribution, and contestation of power 
between different groups and individuals. The political economy paradigm provides an 
invaluable lens through which to understand the motives and drivers of the amnesty program. 
This lens will be used to specifically place focus on analyzing interactions between different 
groups in the Niger Delta such as the Government and political elites, MNOCs, militias and the 
Niger Delta communities to study how they compete to exploit oil for private gain.  
1.4 Overview of research methodology 
1.4.1 Structural framework of the political economy approach 
The political economy approach first surfaced in academia at the beginning of the 1980s in 
what was projected to be a critical response to neoliberal theory (Engel, 1994, p. 13). Shaw and 
Aluko (1994), one of the proponents of the political economy approach, argued that 
neoliberalism is characterized by an “essentially super-structural and not sub-structural” level 
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of analysis, a “descriptive not critical” mode of analysis and, a “behavioural not a materialist” 
method (p. 10). Shaw and Aluko focused on “modes and relations of production, the division 
of labour and inequalities and contradiction”. They anticipated that the implications of such a 
method would tend towards “revolution” rather than “reformation”, “towards disengagement 
and self-reliance rather than renegotiation and incorporation”. They further posit that the 
political economy perspective is radical, entailing a fundamental reassessment of Africa’s place 
and potential in the global system. Political economy according to him is the “economic” 
substructure taken to be central in explaining “political” or diplomatic superstructure” (p.11- 
17). 
Manning (1975) refers to political economy as socio-economic analysis of the production and 
utilization of an economic surplus (p. 24). He views this from an anti-capitalist perspective 
where new patterns of investment by large private firms concentrate on production and use of 
capital-intensive techniques. The surplus (excess of output over socially necessary consumption) 
ends up being mostly exported from the periphery to the centre and is also consumed in part by 
the African employees of these firms, but it is not focused on productive investment (Manning, 
1975, p. 25). This has resulted in a stagnant economic growth and/or growth without 
development with the rise of an elite or sub-elite class, which dominate the bureaucracy. 
Hudson and Leftwich (2014) on their part present a vivid analysis of political economy, 
building their discourse on three generations of political economy. Their argument is that 
political economy has become the economics of politics instead of political analysis. They posit 
that political economy is the way political and economic processes interact (p. 6). 
The first generation of political economy, according to them, focuses on governance challenges, 
particularly issues related to good governance. This is seen from a highly technical, 
administrative, managerial, capacity building and, subsequently, public sector management 
perspective in the 1990s. Hudson and Leftwich’s (2014) second generation of political economy 
concentrates on historical, structural, institutional and political features that frame the settings 
within which actors and agents work. Hudson and Leftwich evidence this position using the 
DFID Drivers of Change, Sida’s Power Analysis, and the Dutch Strategic Governance and 
Corruption Analysis (SGACA) frameworks. Finally, Hudson and Leftwich’s third generation 
of political economy is focused on the premises in which institutional incentives frame their 
behavior to create intentionally positive or dysfunctional developmental outcomes. Existing at 
the end of the process, the center of third generation political economy pays more attention to 
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how interest, incentives and institutions, shape and justify how agents behave, as well as places 
emphasis on political processes and practices that affect outcomes (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014). 
According to the authors, the third-generation political economy is the economics of politics. 
All three generations of political economy contain a common ground: their analytical 
approaches concentrate on institutions, structure, agency, ideas, contingency and above all else 
power (p. 6). 
This research makes use of the conceptual tool and analytical framework made available by 
third-generation political analysis in an attempt to better understand the contested dynamics of 
political and peacebuilding processes. More specifically, employing third-generation political 
analysis can help also broaden our understanding of how institutions generate opportunities and 
resources that agents/actors use and create space for manoeuvre (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 
10). In the case of Nigeria, the third-generation political analysis approach provides the 
possibility for understanding how political elites in Nigeria interact and contest not only 
amongst themselves but also against the structural and institutional contexts in which they 
operate in, exploiting and manipulating the very same resources and opportunities they create.  
A deep analysis of the political economy of the Niger Delta might reveal how power and 
resources are distributed and disputed by taking into consideration three principal elements into 
(interest, incentives, and institutions) and mobilizing these elements to provide explanations 
about issues of justice, security and development in the region. In order to effectively interpret 
these elements, the study builds its analysis on two basic approaches to the political economy 
of peacebuilding in the Niger Delta: the neoliberal and the neopatrimonial approaches. These 
two approaches serve as the foundations to guide comprehension of information surrounding 
the contestations, tactical alliances, coalitions and strategies that exist in the Niger Delta and 
subsequently how these elements blend together to form a mirror for the conception of justice 
in the region. Finally, adopting the political economy approach in studying the Niger Delta 
further allows us to analyze the tendency of actors to manipulate available institutions in order 
to reinforce, support, safeguard or protect their interest and what they perceive as justice. 
1.4.1.1 Neoliberalism Approach 
The neoliberal approach focuses on democracy and market economy. The dominant paradigm 
in contemporary peacebuilding is liberal peace, which is a neoliberal idea. Pugh et al. (2008) 
identify five predominant components of liberal philosophy on the political economy of peace 
processes. The first component argues that states should liberalize their economies and embrace 
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globalization, which will promote sustainable peace. The second states that the promotion of 
regional cooperation will foster bilateral peace settlements as well as regional economic and 
political integration. The third posits that, apart from the direct causal impacts of commercial 
interdependence, globalization engenders various new styles of politics and identity. This 
indirectly supports peacemaking through the blurring of state boundaries and disintegration of 
traditional nation-states and a rise in the flow of global flows of goods, capitals and people. 
Further, globalization has contributed to increasingly complex governance in nation states. It 
has also helped facilitate the decline of traditional-state-centric national identities while 
fostering a concomitant upsurge in new forms of sub-national, ethnic and religious identities, 
thereby witnessing profound effects on peace processes as a result. The fourth predominant 
component rests that contemporary liberal philosophy views poverty as an existing relative to 
conflict and thus poverty is a problem that must be addressed for security reasons as well as 
development reasons. The fifth component relies on the assumption that business actors are a 
powerful and principally positive constituent for peace and that growth in private sector 
investment (both foreign and domestic) is vital to help conflict prone countries achieve peace 
(Pugh et al., 2008, pp. 16-19). 
While sensible, Pugh et al.’s framework for liberal peace framework contains some 
contradictions. First, it is not proven with certainty that a positive relationship between 
commerce and economic openness on the one hand yields peace and peace processes in the 
other. At odds with this idea is the fact that amongst the world’s most economically open and 
globally penetrated societies are many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America that are also 
persistently home to civil and cross-border violence (Pugh et al., 2008, p. 20). The second major 
pitfall in Pugh et al.’s model is its silence towards questions of economic inequality, uneven 
distribution and the political implications of both (Paris, 1997; Pugh et al., 2008). For our 
purposes, when applied to the case of Nigeria, Pugh et al.’s approach shows the contradictions 
surrounding the neoliberal peacebuilding used by the Nigerian state.  
Neoliberal economic policies usually promote external economic assistance in management and 
reconstruction of conflict in vulnerable communities. In the case of Nigeria, however, these 
policies have failed. Neoliberalism forms the component of a hegemonic project seeking to 
concentrate power and wealth in the hands of elite groups in Nigeria by transferring state-owned 
assets to private individuals and Trans-National Corporations (TNC) (Hahn, 2015, p. 143). It is 
evident from a global perspective that international development agendas have more to do with 
political and economic interests than with benevolent pro-poor development and peacebuilding 
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(Hahn, 2015, p. 144). Furthermore, neoliberal peace initiatives have demonstrated over time 
that peace support operations are big businesses for the leading state funders of UN missions 
(US, European Union member states, Japan, Canada and Australia) (Tom, 2017, p. 40). In this 
way, it can be argued that it is likewise beneficial for these UN actors to participate in 
peacebuilding efforts in conflict prone regions. The underlying interests behind liberal market 
reforms and natural resource mining contracts in the aftermath of deadly conflicts and foreign 
direct investments in the strategic mining sectors – post-conflict (Bavinck, Pellegrini, & Mostert, 
2014). 
In his book After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) contends that states choose policies that reflect 
the aggregate preferences of the dominant societal coalition. In the case of Nigeria, this 
dominant societal coalition is comprised of multinational oil companies, the Federal 
Government, and wealthy elites. This group stands outside the governed population, which 
Keohane and Nye (1987) both agree that State-created institutions mostly rely upon. They also 
argue that foreign investment is not an uncontested blessing for developing countries. Instead, 
Keohane and Nye both contend that neoliberal economic programs are geared towards 
promoting domestic economic and political objectives.  
Taking a look at Nigeria, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) argue that governments in 
developing countries are rationally-minded and operate according to a changing global 
economic and political environment. Bergsten et al. view the Nigerian government as rational 
but characteristically influenced by certain global conditions such as an increase in market 
competition among investors in the Niger Delta (p. 374). Liberals like Keohane and Nye (2001) 
assert that the Nigerian government has provided absolute gains for the Niger Delta 
communities, be it economic wealth or military security. In short, the Nigerian state becomes 
the key actor and acts to promote its own interests and interpretations of national interests. The 
liberal political economy looks at the fairness of the world economy and its benefits: they 
believe in freedom of private powers rather than public powers and see the market as a socially 
embedded institution. 
By building upon the different debates and positions raised by liberals, this research seeks to 
expose controversies produced by the type of neoliberal peacebuilding introduced by the 
Nigerian State between 2009 and 2018. It will be of great use throughout this paper to question 
the politics that surround most peace deals in Africa, particularly the amnesty program in the 
Niger Delta. In the Niger Delta, neoliberal peacebuilding approaches were not well suited to 
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tackle socio-economic grievances and instead became part of the factors influencing conflict 
and violence. This thesis argues that neoliberal peace does not represent an emancipatory peace 
strategy (Fukuyama, 1989; Doyle, 1986) and as such, in the Niger Delta, subjugation rather 
than emancipation continues to be injected into the politics of peacebuilding. The Niger Delta, 
rife with contradictions, in fact becomes a critique of neoliberal thinking and peacebuilding. 
It must be stressed that using international intervention approaches which insist on liberal 
constitutions, democracy, human rights and justice, separation of power, rule of law and 
development failed in Nigeria (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 175). These government 
policies have instead fostered historical injustice and inequality in the Niger Delta. The 
arguments are offered in the spirit of legitimacy where the government of Nigeria, uses 
legitimate liberal instruments such as the law (that is amnesty to Niger Delta militants) to foster 
their agenda. This can hence be described under the law as “masking”. 
Interrogating the model of neoliberal peace opens up the possibility to reflect on the 
objectification of violence in the Niger Delta region and the rationale for the political economy 
of peacebuilding. Neoliberal peace has been responsible for global capitalism in the region 
through the presence and influence of foreign multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta 
exploiting oil at low cost with cheap labour. The neoliberal model has also ignored the socio-
economic problems these communities now face, such as environmental pollution and 
degradation as well as aggravated vulnerability in the Niger Delta region. It is unarguable that 
the search for global capital by multinational oil companies resulted in inequalities, 
unemployment, and poor health conditions including abject poverty. As such, the Niger Delta 
region finds itself within a vicious cycle of poverty, desperation and violence (Tom, 2017, p. 
74). 
The case of Nigeria illustrates that peacebuilding is for the most part interest-driven. Neoliberal 
peacebuilding in Nigeria has not promoted the democratic institutions and norms it advocates 
for, yet it promotes the shared interests of the African political elites and external free market 
entrepreneurs (H. Gray, 2015, p.69; Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 616-617). Frequent relapses into 
violence and poor levels of peace in the Niger Delta warrant the need for a strong questioning 
of the neoliberal peacebuilding practices in the Niger Delta. The collective memory of the 
people of the region, as evidenced in the interviews conducted as part of this research, point out 
the significant gravity of returning to armed hostilities to uphold political order. The neoliberal 
theory will be used in this research to show how different perspectives and practices of 
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peacebuilding tend to project different vested interests and how this has affected communities 
in the Niger Delta.  
1.4.1.2 Neopatrimonialism approach 
Gray (2011) defines neopatrimonialism as the technique by which the allocative state distributes 
oil wealth and manages the elite relationships that substitute for wider legitimacy or electoral 
mandates (pp. 6-7). Gray also contends that rentierism is linked to the concept of 
neopatrimonialism because in rentierism, it is a very small but important group within society 
that is involved with the generation of rents and in the sustaining of ruling the elites. In other 
words, neopatrimonialism is a post-independence method of distributing resources (Tom, 2017, 
p. 29). Erdmann and Engel (2006, p. 18) refer to the concept of neopatrimonialism as a mixture 
of two partly-interwoven coexisting types of domination, namely patrimonial and legal-rational 
bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between the ruler and the 
ruled (political and administrative) are personal relations; there is no differentiation between 
the private and the public realm. Under neopatrimonialism, however, the distinction between 
the private and the public at least formally exists and is accepted, and public references can be 
made to this distinction. 
The Nigerian state is said to be a neopatrimonial state (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). The 
behavior of the government is rentier-neopatrimonial. The government has claimed ownership 
over all-natural resources and distributes them based on patron-client to political elite relation 
(Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, & Stedman, 1999). Existing discourses on 
neopatrimonialism allow us to examine and question how resources and power in Nigeria are 
being distributed. The rentier-neopatrimonial nature of the state has reinforced political 
dynamics and pervasive rent-seeking within economic policy (Lewis, 1994, pp. 437-438). 
Social scientist Mcloughlin (2012) concurs with the debate that neopatrimonialism undermines 
the functioning and institutionalization of formal political systems in fragile states, particularly 
such as Nigeria. Young (2004) also writes that the establishment of politics combined with the 
neopatrimonial nature of reciprocity and exchanges in Africa is ‘the instrumentalization of 
disorder’. This idea, however, has been disputed since there exists some sort of correlation 
between neo-patrimonialism and economic growth. Nigeria is a system of patron-client rule 
wherein elites and political leaders exploit public resources and distribute these resources to 
their political followers in exchange for their loyal support during elections (Isaksson & Bigsten, 
2017, p. 621). The situation in Nigeria demonstrates controversially that patrimonialism does 
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not necessarily preclude state citizen accountability (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 63). The 
country possesses what German sociologist and philosopher Max Weber calls patrimonial 
authority7 (Pitcher, Moran, & Johnston, 2009, p. 126). The economy is highly entrenched by 
politicians who influence this key sector, which depends on oil rents from the Niger Delta, and 
promotes corruption, rent-seeking, predation and patronage in the country. All these actions are 
in line with the spirit of patrimonial authority (Tom, 2017, p. 29). 
The neopatrimonial concept argues for a particular style of leadership in Nigeria where the 
leader is at the centre of the elite network, surrounded by humble subaltern elites that are 
obedient to their leader yet still manage to encourage an atmosphere of competition (this is to 
monitor any potential rivalry for power) (Bill & Springbord, 2000). All government groups in 
Nigeria consist of leaders and a small portion of strategic elites. These groups bargain with 
others to form tactical alliances, which grow into a larger elite network that supports the 
government. This elite network strengthens traditional forms of privilege and builds new elite 
dynamics as conditions impose the need. These elites establish their own patron client networks 
in the Niger Delta into the neopatrimonial systems, institutions and social entities in Nigeria 
(Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Zolberg, 1969). They also act as a vector through which resources, 
political order, and power are centrally distributed to different groups and forces in the country, 
along with the passage of political information and demands for patronage down from the top 
(Gray, 2011, p. 7). 
In their discussion of the phenomenon of “political clientelism”, Bagaji et al. (2011) point out 
that clientelism in Nigeria is embedded in an oligarchic network of bureaucracy in which 
oligarchs sponsor political candidates in favour of contracts and economic benefits (Bach & 
Gazibo, 2012). Voting in Nigeria is also often based on particularized loyalties based on kinship 
and ethnic ties. As a result of clientelism and patterns of voting, material incentives accrue to 
the loyalty groups instead of being dispersed towards broad-based accountability (Lemarchand 
& Legg, 1972; Kura, 2014). Aderonke and Awosika (2013) approach the issue of political 
clientelism from the perspective of a syndrome called “political godfatherism which is 
undermining genuine democratic exchange in Nigeria. Godfathers select candidates for 
political parties, sponsor them, and in turn, these elected officials pay homage to their 
godfathers who control both the electorates and the parties in the country. Godfatherism is an 
advanced form of clientelism and neopatrimonialism. It is believed to be a cultural element 
                                                 
7 Contrasting ways ruler may establish authority by securing consent from their subjects. 
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where the ancestors are believed to communicate with the living and respect of the elders and 
their authority is applied without any challenge (Oyebode, 2014, pp. 138-139). 
Writing on the same subject, Omobowale (2011) sees political “patronage” as the link between 
the government and the governed while Omeje (2013) and Garuba (2010) highlight the aspect 
of domination by political elites in oil transactions. Erdmann and Engel (2006) approach the 
debate from the perspective of the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic 
elements of domination. Their investigation goes further towards constituting elements of 
hybrid structures caused by patrimonial domination and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. 
These hybrid structures often take the shape of obscure public and private domains, provoking 
insecurity and uncertainty about the conduct and role of both institutions and agents in the 
country (pp. 10-17). Neopatrimonial dynamics are prevalent in Nigeria, especially in the Niger 
Delta. This dynamic serves the elite by actively strengthening alliances and solidarity, 
managing oil rents, and controlling business interactions thereby strengthening new forms of 
capitalism irrespective of the impact of the changing market and global environment 
(Schlumberger, 2008). 
The neopatrimonial state of elite behavior in the Niger Delta, (including struggles between 
significant elites within government institutions as well as lower-level sub-elites) has been the 
driving force behind misguided political and economic policies in the country. In the Niger 
Delta, patrons appoint clients who obtain rent privileges from the state at the detriment of the 
masses who see no benefit from the profits generated from oil rents (Erdmann & Engel, 2006, 
p. 22). The misallocation of wealth, corruption, waste and inefficiency in government 
institutions have blurred democracy in the country. Such neopatrimonial behaviour provides 
room for Nigerian elites and their patrons to reinforce new economic opportunities for 
themselves and their clients, thereby creating a large framework of clientelism and 
neopatrimonialism in the country as a rentier state (Médard, 1982, p. 165). Eisenstadt (1973), 
however, see clientelism and neopatrimonialism as essentially the same thing, connected by 
their shared “uncertainty’ of public institutions and different only because they exist as 
individual and collective goods. Thus, clientelism involves individual benefits from patron to 
client while neopatrimonialism entails collective benefits from an individual to a larger group 
(Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 21). 
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1.4.2 Comment on sources 
1.4.2.1 Research design 
- Case Study 
This research will be operationalized through a single case study. The case in question is a 
contemporary issue. The research intensively explores the Niger Delta region and the entire 
Nigeria polity for analysis. The choice of a case study is to focus on a “bounded case” in order 
to better understand and gain deeper insights into the amnesty program and the DDR while 
taking caution not to generalize. Hence, insights within this bounded case study enable us to 
understand these programs from the point of view of a social actor. This method is used to 
understand the social relations between diverse groups in the Niger Delta with particular focus 
placed on three elements of political economy (interests, incentives and institutions) that 
motivate peacebuilding. I am aware that various actors (local, regional, national and 
international) interact at multiple scales. This makes the Niger Delta region to be connected to 
the macro-global political economy through its oil wealth and the interaction of various actors 
at multiple scale. 
1.4.2.2 Research method 
- Qualitative research method 
A qualitative research methodology was used to generate the data for this study. This research 
methodology was selected because this research seeks to understand certain investigations and 
phenomena from the point of view of people who were directly affected by the Amnesty and 
DDR Program. The research is grounded in the philosophical underpinning of Max Weber’s 
“verstehen” (understanding social action) which seeks insight into understanding an actor’s 
action from his point of view (Emmet & Macintyre, 1970, p. 10). It is also the understanding 
of the actions of actors in terms of their motives and goal. To Weber, verstehen is “subjective 
interpretation” as it enables us to find out what actors mean in their actions, in contrast to the 
meaning, which this action has for the actor’s partner or neutral observer (Abel, 1948; Emmet 
& Macintyre, 1970). Verstehen illuminates our understanding of social reality as experienced 
by the people of the Niger Delta in their daily lives (Abel, 1948). In terms of qualitative data, 
the research relied on thick data gathered from interviews and a variety of secondary data 
sources to provide a broader understanding of how elements of political economy are reflected 
in the Niger Delta. Content and discourse analyses were used to analyze secondary sources. The 
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selected methods of analysis show how contestation can radiate into interest, incentives and 
institutions. The analysis also specifically investigates how political elites manipulate 
legislations, the police, and the court systems to advance their own interests and agenda. 
Likewise, content and discourse analysis are employed to understand how the political elites in 
Nigeria use legitimate instruments such as the law to mask their actions. The overall goal of 
analysis is to identify policy and practice gaps in the available literature as well as generate new 
valid knowledge. 
- Sample Size 
Credible respondents were selected which enabled me to get reliable and valid information for 
my research in order to validate my own observations. The respondents selected had special 
experiences, expertise and were knowledgeable and familiar with the socio-economic and 
political depictions of my case study. Purposive sampling was used to choose the respondents. 
Another technique I adopted was to use various networks. In this regard, I employed snowball 
sampling where I was recommended to other resource persons and people who had a broad 
knowledge on my subject matter. I also used facilitators who assisted me to get access to certain 
institutions and actors. They were both state and non-state facilitators and enabled me get access 
to militants, government officials, NGOs and academic experts. 
1.4.2.3 Data generation method 
I deployed best conduct with the political economy approach to determine the interest, 
incentives and institutions that framed the Niger Delta Amnesty Program and DDR. 
- Secondary sources 
As my research subject touched upon contested issues in the Niger Delta region, secondary 
sources to support this research necessarily took different avenues. First, I analyzed the 
government Gazette (including General Notices and Statutory Instruments in Nigeria) which 
proved to be valuable. Next, came the analysis of government legislations (such as the Nigerian 
Government National Assembly Revenue Allocation Derivation Law, The Nigerian Petroleum 
Decree and Bill, The Land Use Decree, Offshore Oil Revenue Decrees, the National Inland 
Waterways Authority and the Amnesty legislation) to draw observations on policy versus 
practice. It is worth stressing that written sources originating from within the government are 
usually difficult to access due to bureaucracy except when addressed for the national or 
international public. However, the research includes government sources, including public 
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statements made by different successive governments on the problems of the Niger Delta and 
the Amnesty, official reports (report from: the Willink Commission; the Belgore Commission 
report; Ministry of Niger Delta; the Technical Committee on Niger Delta report; report from 
the Presidential Commission in charge of the Amnesty Program, etc.). In addition, I make use 
of records that could help to create a better understanding of Nigerian political economy (such 
as internal policy papers, memoranda, protocols of deliberations in parliament, staff lists, 
declarations, meeting minutes, briefing reports training reports, DDR Program reports, etc.) 
which will be released by the National Archives of Nigeria. This policy related data is 
significant to the institutions that enact laws and provide oversights on these laws and is thus 
critical to my research because the information contained is very authentic. 
Second, I explore an array of documentary analysis and archival information obtained from 
Nigerian newspapers, both pro-government and critical to the establishment. General 
articulations on Amnesty are included, such as programmatic speeches covered by local media 
and interviews found in international newspapers. A thorough analysis of the contents of 
Nigeria’s media was, therefore, inevitable. This made allusions to the government-influenced 
daily Guardian, Business Times, Herald, Channels, and NTA etc. Furthermore, this refers to 
privately-owned weeklies such as Nigerian Tribune, the Punch, Vanguard, Daily Trust, Sahara 
Reporters, and Premium Times, all published in Nigeria. I made additional use of transcripts 
from radio and video broadcasts in Nigeria and other African regional stations outside of 
Nigeria like VoxAfrica, BBC Africa, RFI and Africa Magic news etc. I also employed reliable 
summaries of World Broadcasts from sources such as the BBC, CNN, France 24, and Al Jazeera. 
These secondary data sources are to an extent used as a substitute for a lack of unbiased primary 
sources. They are also included to give perspectives into contestations that exist in Nigeria and 
how people conceptualize the government with regard to the political economy (interest, 
incentives and institutions). These sources also enable us to see how the Nigerian government 
situates itself between the boundaries of peacebuilding and justice. 
Third, the research employed social commentaries obtained by crowdsourcing information on 
social media networks. Networks analyzed include blogs, YouTube videos, documentaries and 
chats, Facebook content, and Twitter posts related to the Niger Delta conflict and the amnesty. 
Although these sources have been criticized for ethical reasons, they still fit within the purposes 
of my study to analyze how different groups perceived and received the Amnesty and DDR 
program. These portals are also relevant because they share new and recent developments 
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regarding the Niger Delta with the world, thereby enabling us to see how policy and practices 
are shaped. 
Finally, I was able to gather information from both international and local think tanks and other 
institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Kingdom 
Department For International Development (DFID), African Development Bank (AFDB), 
Amnesty International (AI), Transparency International (TI), United Nations (UN), 
International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Watch (HRW), United States AID (USAID), 
African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and non-
government organizations (NGOs). These sources are reliable because they are critical 
institutions that write and document on conflict, peacebuilding, political economy and issues of 
justice in the Niger Delta. In addition, I also perused information from books and journal articles. 
The analysis of published secondary sources alone could certainly have established a sound 
basis for an interpretation of the discourses on how amnesty is instrumentalized for personal 
gain. It was therefore important to apply these sources because they are cost-effective and easily 
accessible to the public. 
- Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
The research used semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group discussion sessions to 
complement myriad secondary sources. The choice to include interviews was important because 
respondents provide unique understanding of their attitudes, opinions, perceptions, feelings, 
and sentiments regarding the subject matter (the Amnesty program and DDR). Conducting 
interviews allowed me to gain additional contact information of individuals who are known to 
have broad knowledge in this area. Personal relationships forged with interviewees made it 
easier to get hold of documents, which are not often accessible to the public, some that would 
usually be referred to as “confidential” such as reports and mission statements. 
The study used an interview guide. In this case, a list of specific issues for exploration was 
established depending on the category of respondents and the issues they were likely to be 
knowledgeable about. This gave me the flexibility to probe and prompt respondents. Altogether, 
forty (40) respondents were interviewed. These respondents are represented on the table below 
(see tab. 1.1). 
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Table 1. 1: Number and Types of Respondents Interviewed and with whom I had Focus 
Group Discussion (FDGs) sessions with.  
 Type of Respondents Interviewees 
1 Ex-Militants 5 
2 Community Elders 5 
3 Nigerian military/Security Forces 3 
4 Staff of the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on the 
Niger Delta 
1 
5 Staff of the Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs 3 
6 Staff of the Niger Delta Development Cooperation in Port 
Harcourt 
2 
7 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 10 
8 Academia 11 
9 Total of Respondents 40 
10 Two FGDs 6 and 5 
participants 
per group 
 Source: Author’s compilation 
- Focus group discussion sessions (FGDs) 
Information was collected through the interaction of groups relating to the Amnesty and DDR 
program. Two focus group discussion sessions were held: one in Abuja with a group of six (6) 
youth leaders from the Niger Delta, one of them being an ex-militant commander, and another 
discussion held at Okrika village with a group of five (5) elders comprising of three (3) women 
and two (2) men. The FGDs provided a platform for individuals and groups to narrate their 
experiences while facilitating our understanding of factual and insightful accounts into the 
events that took place in the region. Thus, it provided understanding on the cultural, ideological 
and social narratives of why and how people became militants, their impact on the entire region, 
as well as their motivations for accepting the amnesty offer. 
FGDs were also complemented by observation. This was backed by “verstehen” which allowed 
the researcher to observe the behaviors of the actors. It also enabled the researcher to understand 
the actions of actors in terms of their motives and goals.  
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1.4.2.4  Method of data analysis 
Qualitative data collected was analyzed using thematic content and discourse analysis. This 
allowed me to analyze the most important content. As a result, all thick data was reduced into 
categories. First, the thick/raw data collected was organized by classifying and labelling 
according to the names, dates, times, and places and where the interviews were conducted. This 
eased the transcription of the interviews. Second, I adopted the immersion approach. I listened 
to the audio recordings of the interviews several times. Each day an interview was conducted, 
I replayed the audio and listened to them while still on the field. Immersing myself into the 
thick data allowed me to gain insight into interpreting the research questions. Third, I generated 
different categories and themes to code the data. Fourth, I coded the data into categories and 
themes relating to the opinions of respondents on the causes of conflict, the management of the 
conflict, the designing and implementation of the Amnesty and DDR Program as well as related 
interests, incentives and institutions associated with the program. After coding the data, I jotted 
down key points that helped guide my analysis and interpretation. This was later followed by 
offering a broad interpretation of the coded data. I did compare and contrast the different parts 
of the data analyzed. This was done through inferences and deduction. Furthermore, after 
deducing, I employed alternative understanding as part of my analysis. I looked for multiple 
sources and points of views to draw conclusions on the political economy of armed conflict, 
the amnesty program and DDR. The last process was to write the final report of the case study, 
which seeks to contribute by highlighting that elements of political economy such as interests, 
incentives and institutions should not be ignored during Amnesty and DDR. 
1.5 Challenges in the field 
I faced several challenges during the course of my research trip. First and foremost, were the 
obvious challenges relating to personal security and instability in the area. General safety was 
a constant concern. Looming over the basic logistic challenges of travelling in Nigeria was the 
political atmosphere of Nigeria at the time: the country was locked into a political stalemate 
and confronted with multiple national security challenges such as extremism from Boko Haram, 
right to self-determination by the new Biafra uprisings as well as the conflict between Fulani 
herdsmen and farmers in the middle belt, making safety a huge concern in Abuja. The Niger 
Delta region is a war zone and poses great risk to researchers who willingly subject themselves 
to the risks associated with being in proximity of constant crimes, robbery, kidnapping, human 
trafficking and piracy endemic to the region. In the few areas I could access, I hired a local 
security guard and a guide to take me around. There was traffic and bad roads in both Port 
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Harcourt and in the villages, and the cost of hiring taxis were very expensive. As a result of this 
insecure environment and the risk associated with it, I could not access the entire region. It is 
expensive to conduct field studies in a war-torn region situated in the difficult swampy 
mangroves of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and ultimately, I was also confined by limited 
financial resources. 
Furthermore, I also faced difficulties related to the administrative and bureaucratic nature of the 
state and various institutions. It was challenging to book an audience (interviews) with state 
and local government officials, and to get authorization to access offices. I was often confronted 
with the long waiting times and cancellation of appointments at short notice. Another interesting 
complexity was linked to trust and suspicion from both the government and the public. Taking 
into cognizance the sensitive nature of the oil sector and the Niger Delta in Nigeria, I was 
perceived as a spy and many people, especially the government officials, ex-militants and 
respondents were not receptive to my probes. This was mitigated by me taking informed 
decisions on how best to approach them, gaining familiarity and cooperation with the 
population, in order not to create suspicion and mistrust. In tandem with standard social research 
ethics, respondents were debriefed and had the option to withdraw their participation at any 
point in time and without consequences. In this written report, the names of places and 
individuals have been anonymized using numbers to protect their identity and to maintain 
confidentiality. 
1.6 The structure of the dissertation  
This dissertation is structured into six chapters. Each chapter is divided into subsections. 
Chapter One, the introductory chapter, gives a general background to the study. It presents the 
key research question, objective, methodology, methods of data collection and analysis. The 
chapter introduces the emerging debates relating to the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program 
through the use of theoretical and empirical assumptions that are further analyzed in the 
following chapters. Most importantly, the section frames the debate by reviewing relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on political economy related to conflict and peacebuilding. 
This presentation of information exposes the gaps in currently available research.  
Chapter Two explores the origins and dynamics of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The first 
section lays out a historical timeline of events spanning precolonial, colonial, independent and 
post independent Nigeria and discusses the different government responses used to manage the 
conflict. The second section critically examines the Nigerian political economy. Empirical and 
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secondary literature evidence a rentier economy in Nigeria, which relies on oil, rents as the 
main source of revenue for the country. Here we interrogate the nature and character of the 
Nigerian state which is rentier-neopatrimonial as is suggested by supporting literature. It 
specifically focuses on how the rentier-neopatrimonial character of the state has significantly 
contributed to contestations amongst different groups in the Niger Delta. 
Chapter Three analyzes the role of institutions. Specifically, the chapter investigates the agency 
of actors as well as the people operating institutions in Nigeria and how they create 
opportunities and resources that agents/actors manipulate, specifically in regard to the Amnesty 
and DDR Program. The first section examines state institutions and how they interact amongst 
themselves, while, the second section takes a critical look at non-state institutions. The third 
part analyses the interaction between state and non-state institutions and how they produce the 
program. The fourth section of the chapter discussed the different encounters between state, 
non-state and international institutions. The last section discusses empirical and secondary 
literature evidencing the impacts of these institutions on the implementation of the Amnesty 
and DDR Program. This leads to a discussion of how the actors that control these states, non-
state and international institutions tend to manipulate the institutions that are available in order 
to reinforce, to support, safeguard or protect their interests. In examining the interaction of these 
institutions, the chapter gives a vivid portrayal of the character of these institutions and how 
this has affected the outcome of the type of DDR that was implemented in the Niger Delta 
Region.  
Chapter Four examines the different actors and interest groups in the Niger Delta. It further 
looks at the significant role that interest plays as an accelerating driver of the conflict in the 
region. Section one identifies the key actors, their correlations, capacities, resources, strategies 
as well as their incentives to continue the exploitation and control of oil rents in the Niger Delta. 
Section two captures the various contested interests and social encounters of actors and how 
the common interest of various groups (the government, MNOCs and Oil communities) come 
together to form networks of patronage and tactical alliances as well as to defect or break the 
alliances in order to pursue their agendas. Literature is referenced that illustrates how the 
interest over resources creates alliances. This leads to a discussion of how interest has 
incentivized decisions and strategies to address the conflict that the Amnesty and DDR Program 
addresses.  
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Chapter Five provides a detailed analysis of the Amnesty and DDR program from the 
perspective of the neoliberal peace approach. The first section analyses the different processes 
of conceptualization, negotiation and implementation of the DDR program. Furthermore, 
empirical literature indicated that in conceptualizing the DDR Program, the Nigerian 
government adopted a minimalist approach, which focused on addressing insecurity and 
instability instead of a maximalist approach, which encompasses the latter, as well as enhance 
development opportunities in order to address the root causes of the conflict. The second part 
of the chapter describes how the Nigerian government shifts its position in implementing the 
program from a neoliberal approach to a neopatrimonial perspective especially whenever it fits 
the interest of the government. This is backed by literature that revealed that Niger Delta DDR 
is a mix of a neoliberal-neopatrimonial peacebuilding program. 
Chapter Six concludes the study and shows how the case study has been able to answer the 
main research question. The chapter also mentions the theoretical contributions of the research 
as well as exposes the gaps in the research and points out possible areas for further study on the 
Niger Delta.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICIZING OIL CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION 
2 Introduction 
This chapter covers the history of oil conflict in the Niger Delta region through an examination 
of natural resources, ethnic conflict and political developments in this region of Nigeria. The 
goal of this chapter is to communicate a brief yet thorough history of the historical situation in 
Nigeria over time and the country’s transition into economic dependence on oil exports. The 
first part of the chapter analyzes the origins and dynamics of conflict in the Niger Delta region. 
It presents the different issues that span the pre-colonial, colonial, and independent eras in the 
Niger Delta.  
In the first section, we trace the presence of militancy in the Niger Delta by identifying the 
current primary militarized operators, who these parties have been in the past, what their 
interests are, how they operate, and how their interactions have impacted Nigeria’s history and 
continue to affect the oil economy in the Niger Delta region. In the second part of the chapter, 
the nature and degree of influence of the Nigerian government is also considered through an 
examination of the role that civic institutions play in determining the dynamics of armed 
conflict. The final section of the chapter brings together the previous topics and combines them 
into a comprehensive presentation of Nigeria’s political economy. This analysis places specific 
emphasis on the solidification of Nigeria’s current rentier-neopatrimonial state by discussing 
how Nigeria’s economy suffers from both internal and external shock factors, such as the 
decrease in the global price of oil and sets the groundwork for understanding Nigeria’s political 
economy as it moves into the future.  
2.1 Analyzing the Origins and dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict 
The Niger Delta has a history of agitation. A review of the area’s past reveals definite patterns, 
which fall into three distinct time periods: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. Throughout 
all three periods, a blend of three main factors form the conditional basis for the agitation and 
conflict in the Niger Delta. The first factor is state authorities within Nigeria but outside the 
Niger Delta exerting control to the Delta region; the second factor is the presence of lucrative 
commodities (availability of oil in the Niger Delta); and the third factor is resistance to 
exploitation by the people of the Niger Delta (World Bank, 2008, p. 4).These three factors play 
key roles in understanding the history of oil conflict within the Niger Delta. It is important to 
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note that the first two factors share the similarity of existing as institutions while the third factor 
remains constant and unchanging throughout the last two periods (colonial and independent).  
Since the entrance into the area that is today known as the Niger Delta by non-indigenous 
peoples, there have been fairly regular to intermittent conflicts between (and amongst) local 
ethnic groups, British colonialists, and the post-colonial Nigerian state. From the onset of 
contact with Europeans, it has been clear that the demand for human rights, justice and 
entitlement is the main cause of quarrels between the people of the Niger Delta (Ifedi & Anyu, 
2011, p. 80).  
2.1.1 The Geography and People of the Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta region is one of the world’s largest wetlands and is home to most of Nigeria’s 
natural biodiversity; it is also the area where the largest quantities of Nigeria’s oil are found, 
with over 80% of the country’s revenue being generated from oil extraction sites in the Niger 
Delta. The Niger Delta region has a population of approximately 32 million people, covers a 
land area of about 112,000 square kilometers, and a core delta of 75,000 square kilometers 
(Francis, LaPin, & Rossiasco, 2011, p. 10). The people live in several large cities and over three 
thousand small and often remote village communities in the Delta’s mangrove swamps and 
lowland rainforests (Omene & Obaebor, n.d.). The indigenous people of the Niger Delta mainly 
depend on fishing and farming as their primary self-sustaining economic activities, while those 
who reside in urban centers mainly depend on commerce and oil industry related enterprises 
for their livelihoods (Francis et al., 2011, p. 10).  
 
The Delta terrain is extremely difficult, and a large swatch of the area falls under what is termed 
“the world’s fragile ecosystem” (Okonkwo, Kumar, & Taylor, 2015, pp. 452-453). Many Delta 
communities are located along the creeks and are only accessible by boat. Due to their “fragility,” 
these Creekside communities are particularly vulnerable to climate changes, vagaries of the 
weather, and human-made disasters such as floods, sea encroachments, and oil pollution 
(Akaruese, 2018, p. 361). The Niger Delta consists of a number of ecological zones: sandy 
deserts, coastal ridge barriers, brackish and saline mangroves, fresh water areas, permanent and 
seasonal swamps, forests, and lowland rain forests. While being home to twenty estuaries, the 
whole area is crisscrossed by many rivers, streams, and creeks (Okonkwo et al., 2015, pp. 452-
453). 
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The Niger Delta area is supplied with water from the Niger River and the Benue River, which 
conjoin in Lokoja and then break up again at Abutor where they split into the Nun River and 
the Forcados River and empty out into the sea. The Niger Delta proper is the landmass and body 
of water traversed by the Nun and the Forcados rivers and their tributaries. On a cartographical 
map the Niger Delta covers the area of land located north of Aboh, west of the Benin River 
estuary, east of Imo River estuary, south of Palm Point, and below the Akassa and Nun River 
estuary. Prior to the discovery of oil, when the Niger Delta was redrawn with new borders, the 
Niger Delta was split into the old Ahoada, Degema, Opobo, Ogoni (Rivers), Brass, Yenagoa 
(Bayelsa), and Warri (Delta) divisions (Asuni, 2009, pp. 5-6; World Bank, 2008, p. ix). 
The Niger Delta contains a wide array of 40 different ethnic groups speaking a wide spectrum 
of 120 languages and dialects and cultures across the region. Among these are the Ijaw people 
in the eastern, western, and central parts of the Niger Delta who form the largest ethnic group. 
Others involve the Ogoni, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ikwere, Ibibio-Efik and Igbo people in the 
eastern areas (Austin, 2005, p. 74). After independence in 1960 and with the discovery of oil, 
conflicts emerged between the local communities, oil multinationals, and the federal 
government of Nigeria. 
2.1.2 Pre-colonial Niger Delta and the Emergence of European Trade in Nigeria 
(1444 – 1850) 
Early contact between Europeans and the people of the Niger Delta was dominated by the slave 
trade. As the contact increased, so the slave trade had increasingly become predominant (Flint, 
1960, p. 9). The introduction of profitable international slavery framed the conflict, rivalry and 
cooperative efforts amongst the many ethnic groups living in the Niger Delta region who vied 
against one another to gain an economic and political upper hand (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 76). 
Starting in the late fifteenth century and spanning over three hundred years, the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade sat as the most significant part of the life of the people of the Niger Delta as well as 
their primary mode of production (ICG, 2006, p. 2). Slavery had become a fundamental feature 
of the Niger Delta’s political economy, as it made Nigeria to enter the international system of 
market of exchange (Ohles, 1985, p. 154). During this period, the West Coast of Africa provided 
the slave labour supply for West Indian sugar plantations (Flint, 1960, p. 9). Contacts with 
Europeans transformed slave trade from a marginal feature of society into a central institution 
and mode of production (Ohles, 1985, p. 154). The slave shipment records made by English 
slave traders estimated that 1,010,000 slaves from Bonny and Old Calabar, approximately 24.1 
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percent of the total population of West Africa, left the ports of Bright of Biafra between 1650-
1800 (Lovejoy, 2012, p. 81). These records also document that between the years 1690 and 
1807, English traders reportedly shipped 1,069,100 slaves – 40 percent of their total trade – 
from port cities in the Bights of Benin and Biafra (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 77; Lovejoy, 2012, 
p. 18). During this time, Portuguese and British slave merchants (and later Dutch, French, and 
Swedish) traded with local elites (ICG, 2006, p. 2). Payments were made in the form of iron or 
copperbars, cowrie, shells or “Manilla” bracelet currency Disputes over payment occasionally 
resulted in pitched gun battles between African and European traders and skirmishes between 
the different groups were rife (ICG, 2006, p. 2). After 1807, when Britain abolished its slave 
trade, and 1815, when Britain sought to suppress the trade by other nations, the sale of humans 
and the magnitude of human trafficking from West Africa decreased dramatically (Graham, 
1965. pp. 329-331). 
The collapse of the slave trade prompted merchant groups from Liverpool that had been 
previously engaged in the slave trade to shift their business towards other Niger Delta exports, 
such as palm oil, a key ingredient needed for the production of soap and candles (ICG, 2006, p. 
2). Palm oil soon supplanted slavery as the primary good traded in the Niger Delta, ushering in 
a new phase of Niger Delta history (ICG, 2006, p. 3).  
2.1.3 Colonial Considerations: Increasing Agitations, Palm oil Production and the 
Discovery of Oil (1851 – 1960) 
With the abolition of the slave trade in the 19th century, the exploitation of palm produces (palm 
oil and palm kernel) became paramount to the British traders. The industrial revolution and the 
development of railways across Europe necessitated the need for palm oil as a lubricant 
(Aghalino, 2000, p. 9). Trade and politics had always been jointly interrelated in the regions 
around the Niger River. The trade was organized as trade from Liverpool and the Niger Delta 
(particularly in towns such as Bonny, and Old Calabar) (Lynn, 1981, p. 333). Liverpool the old 
slave port was pre-eminently the palm oil port throughout the century (Lynn, 1992, p. 89; 
Tibbles, 2000). The profound quest for palm oil, largely dominated by wealthy British smuggler 
George Dashwood Taubman Goldie (Flint, 1960, p. 9). Within two years of visiting the Niger, 
Goldie established a trading empire on the river. Goldie managed to convince Britain’s four 
main commercial groups to merge as a single enterprise under his leadership. This merger 
formed the United African Company (UAC), later renamed the National African Company 
(NAC). Under Goldie’s leadership, the United African Company entered into many treaties 
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with chiefs and kings in the Niger Delta (ICG, 2006, p. 3). The transition from trade in slaves 
to trade in palm oil culminated in what Hopkins (1973) calls a “crisis of adaption in the coastal 
states of West Africa”. 
In 1884-1885, after the Berlin Conference, European powers partitioned Africa into designated 
areas of their control, and the British laid claim to the lower Niger area. One year later, in 1886, 
the British government in London granted Goldie a Royal Charter and renamed his company 
the Royal Niger Company (Flint, 1960, p. 34). Backed by the British crown, the Royal Niger 
Company now had its own administration in the Niger territory, customs courts, prisons, police, 
and secret service (Lugard, 1937, pp. 379-81; Pearson, 1971, pp. 73-79). Unlike the dynamic 
between today’s oil companies and the present-day Nigerian government, the institutions put 
in place by the Royal Niger Company protected the company’s interests and enterprises. In an 
effort to bring about a monopoly on the palm oil trade in the Niger Delta, The Royal Niger 
Company incited agitation in many trade entities and shipping merchants in Europe as well as 
in the Niger Delta (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, pp. 79-80). The monopolistic policy was of itself a new 
narrative to renewed competition. Competitions increased and merchant groups tried to break 
the middleman’s monopoly and get directly to the interior (Lynn, 1981, p. 338). Having bought 
out their competitors, the Royal Niger Company cut out the need for middlemen in the Niger 
Delta and effectively deprived any smaller traders of their livelihood by imposing a prohibitive 
tariff system (Flint, 1960, p. 34). Colonial capitalism hindered the establishment of local 
industries to consume the products, instead, they were exported to Britain (Fayemi, Amadi, & 
Bamidele, 2005, p. 11). During this period, the way in which the British traders had penetrated 
the Niger Delta and the attitude that the British Government had adopted towards their activities 
heightened tensions in the region (Baker, 1997; Ukpabi, 1987).  
The environment was characterized by resistance, agitation and disloyalty by the people for the 
power the colonial state exerted and had (Fayemi et al., p. 8). Further ruthless punitive efforts 
were organized and led in the Niger Delta by the Royal Niger Company against dissident 
indigenous institutions and leaders such as King Jaja of Opobo and Nana of Ebrohimi (Itsekiri), 
accused of attempting to establish trade monopolies of their own (Onwumere, 2002, p. 174). 
External oppressive efforts by the British and the Royal Niger Company resulted in reactions 
from Niger Delta natives who began to attack company officials in a manner reminiscent of 
today’s attacks on oil companies’ operating in the Delta (ICG, 2006, pp. 3-4). One such attack 
involved a raid on the Royal Niger Company headquarters in Akassa. During the raid, 24 people 
were killed and 68 were taken prisoner, most of whom were company employees from Liberia. 
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The Nigerian attackers later released some prisoners, but not before killing 48 in total. The 
Royal Niger Company retaliated against the attack by sending armed forces to the Nembe 
Kingdom (located in the modern day state of Bayelsa) and losing five British officers in the 
ensuing battle (ICG, 2006, pp. 3-4; Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 80). The entire incident prompted a 
British government inquiry into the activities and trading conditions of the Royal Niger 
Company (RNC), which was losing favor with the British government. The firm soon sold its 
commercial interests to the Lever Brothers and another merger led it to be renamed the United 
Africa Company Limited (AUC) and it pushed for the modernization of the palm oil industry 
(Aghalino, 2000, p. 23). After the demise of the Royal Niger Company, the British government 
continued to carry out punitive expeditions in order to disempower resistant natives in the Niger 
Delta. This retaliatory behavior continued well after 1914, when Southern Nigeria and the 
Northern Protectorate region of Nigeria became amalgamated to form one administrative unit 
in 1914 (Afigbo & Falola, 2005, p. 232). 
Around November 1929 to January 1930, general discontent about the regularly pervasive 
colonial intrusions on ethnic life in the Niger Delta (i.e. political, economic and social 
participation in local communities) as well as strong opposition to the ruthless punishments 
dealt by British control led to a revolt by women in the eastern communities of the Niger Delta 
(predominantly Igbo, Ibibio, Ogoni and Andoni women) (Paddock, 2018). The revolt, sparked 
by gossip of the introduction of a direct new tax which the British intended to levy on their 
income, resulted in the death of over 50 indigenous women when British troops opened fire on 
crowds of demonstrators in Opobo, Utu Etim, Akpo and Abak (M. Robinson, 2001). This 
incident, like the previous hostage raid on the Royal Niger Company, prompted additional 
government inquiries and triggered the British government to impose without the consent of 
the people, a warrant system of autocratic chiefs (Afigbo, 1972, p. 61). Warrant chiefs became 
the link between local communities and local government. The new system included the 
addition of native courts and a native authority system; designed with the intention of 
incorporating local Nigerian governing hierarchies, although still led British officers or local 
chiefs appointed by British authorities (Adewoye, 1977, p. 33). This flamed opposition within 
the region. The women’s war significantly contributed to redefine women’s position in the 
colonial state (Paddock, 2018). Resistance to colonial rule continued and women were 
prominent in anticolonial resistance. The resistance took different forms of strategies including 
removing the cap of office from warrant chiefs, looting factories, burning down native court 
buildings, blocking train tracks, cutting telegraph wires, releasing prisoners from jails and 
destroying or confiscating colonial property (Paddock, 2018). In an echo of the violence, the 
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colonial government resorted to lethal force. Consequently, the women war forced the British 
to abandon the warrant chief system and establish a new system of village councils. The war 
played a decisive role as it marked the start of a transition in Eastern Nigeria from mainly 
localized ethnic-based resistance to British colonial rule, to resistance movement that 
transcended ethnicity and class (Paddock, 2018). 
During this time, the lack of proper participation in their own governance, underdevelopment, 
unsatisfactory living conditions, and increasing distrust of outsiders fueled continually growing 
discontent amongst the people of the region. The people of the Niger Delta saw opportunity for 
self-governance arise as British administrators in Nigeria began to prepare the country for 
independence (Badmus, 2006; Nixon, 1972)). Regional leaders in the Delta persuaded British 
government officials to grant small measures of local autonomy within Nigeria’s federal 
governing structure. These efforts, however, proved to be futile. In the 1950s, several 
indigenous leaders from the Niger Delta traveled to London in further attempts to convince the 
British government to grant regional autonomy to the Niger Delta people, but again, the 
attempts failed (World Bank, 2008, p. 57). These failed efforts at achieving autonomy resulted 
in an uncomfortable sociopolitical climate in the Niger Delta, an atmosphere in which feelings 
of political dispensation and persistent neglect of the region by institutional forces set the stage 
for a series of events that would shape the politics in the Niger Delta when the train of post-
independence Nigeria arrived (Obi, 2011).  
The major event to cross the horizon was the discovery of oil in Nigeria at Oloibiri in the Niger 
Delta in 1956 (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 4). The large quantity of oil discovered marked a turning 
point in Nigeria’s economy as the country became one of Africa’s major oil producing countries. 
In 1908, a British oil company named the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation had started operation. 
However, oil exploration began in the 1930s in communities in the Niger Delta and oil 
prospectors in Nigeria had managed to locate and steadily yield quality oil products, slowly 
transitioning economic and political focus in the area away from its previous trade, just as the 
palm oil industry had done earlier when it replaced slave trade (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 80). By 
1958, the first shipment of Nigerian crude oil arrived in Rotterdam (Steyn, 2009, p. 249). This 
rapidly transformed the relationships that evolved between the colonial state and the 
communities (Umejesi & Akpan, 2013, p. 111). The dominance of the major oil companies like 
Shell D’Arcy a pioneer explorer, remained a significant characteristic of the Nigerian oil 
industry well into the 1990s (Steyn, 2009, p. 249). The British hegemonic colonial state 
centralized and monopolized the production and distribution of oil as a community through the 
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declaration of the colonial ordinance Edict in 1945. This gave full control of all minerals, 
mineral oil and lands to the Crown (Omoruyi, 2001). However, when Nigeria was granted 
independence in 1960, such rights were transferred to the post-colonial state and the latter has 
implemented the same political culture till date (Omoruyi, 2001).  
2.1.4 Independent and Post Independent Nigeria and the Foundations of the Oil Conflict 
(1960 – Present)  
Shortly after Nigeria’s independence, the new state was plunged in conflict over resource 
control (Ogunbadejo, 1980, p. 751). Colonialism formed the foundations of the evolution of the 
present and past independent Nigeria and the Niger Delta. Colonial legacy has deep-rooted 
implications for the present conflict in the Niger Delta. One of the major legacies of colonialism 
in Nigeria is the enclave nature of the oil sector within the wider Nigerian economy and the 
relevance of oil as a national concern (i.e. revenue distribution) (Lynn, 1981, p. 250). Another 
important legacy that was evident in the new state is the myopic geographical and ethno-
numerical configuration of the Nigerian state, where the geospatial and population size of 
Northern Nigeria strategically gave it more political advantage to influence and marginalize 
other regions after independence (Osha, 2007, p. 24). This has been the basis for the North-
South divide and the failed federation which increased during the 1960s and 1970s (The 
Economist, 2015). The divide is sparked by political dominance of the North and the economic 
inferiority of the South that has been at the root of the unwillingness of the Northern elite to 
rely upon market techniques or to give up control over the distribution of oil revenue (The 
Economist, 2015). This resulted in the mobilization and vociferous oppositions of the Niger 
Delta people against the contradictory nature of the federalism (Osha, 2006, p. 17). 
Crude oil became a decisive commodity in not only the Niger Delta but also the entire nation. 
The entire nation became inextricably connected to the Niger Delta (Osha, 2006, p. 17). This 
transformed the relationship that evolved between the new post-colonial state in alliance with 
multinational capital and the communities. Petroleum became the largest source of National 
income under successive military governments and the question on shared revenue accruing 
from mining rents and royalties on an equal rate became constant since independence (Gboyega 
et al., 2011, p. 13). Just like their predecessors, the post-colonial state centralized and 
monopolized the oil economy. The suddenly booming trade in crude oil set local communities 
in the Niger Delta against the economic interests of the Nigerian government just as palm oil 
production had put the Niger Delta communities against the Royal Niger Company in the past. 
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The legal institutional framework for oil operations favored the oil explorers (multinationals) 
which followed through contemporary Nigeria (Umejesi & Akpan, 2013, p. 111). This has 
resulted in socio-ecological dislocation and local opposition. As had happened already in the 
past with palm oil, the Nigerian state and the communities of the Niger Delta found themselves 
locked in on-going and sporadic violence directly tied to arguments over the allocation, 
distribution of proceeds from oil, as well as the damaging environmental impact of oil extractive 
activities in the region. Oil exploration rapidly transformed the Nigerian economy into a rentier 
state dependent on oil rents (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 4).  
The state emerged as a rentier-neopatrimonial state, as was constructed as a means for private 
accumulation by an indigenous neopatrimonial ruling elite that negotiated independence from 
the British colonial masters (Graf, 1988, pp. 11-12). The colonial politico-administrative 
apparatus was adopted by the emergent ruling elite which strengthened its oppressive 
mechanisms of domination (Osha, 2006, p. 20). This period marked two related events: first, 
the discovery of oil and second the country was granted independence. These events laid 
another basis for conflict as the people in the Niger Delta began to see themselves as second 
class citizens in the new state which the British created (SDN, 2018). The people of the Delta 
started to raise concerns about their marginalization in the new state. These concerns were 
raised by the Ijaws, the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta (Okolo, Akpokighe , & Igbokwe , 
2014). Their demands started to mount pressure and tension over unfair distribution of the 
wealth that accrues from oil extraction and production in the region (Obi, 2001, p. 19). This led 
to open conflicts between the local communities and the state. At its incipient stage these 
conflicts were mostly nonviolent and consisted of pressure groups lobbying for greater 
representation for the people of Niger Delta. Between 1960 and 1967, Niger Delta elites formed 
pressure groups, which centered on coalitions demanding for a separate state of their own. In 
other situations, they joined the struggles for power at regional and federal level (Obi, 2001, p. 
19). Marginalized minority groups also joined the struggle for power and resource control at 
the Federal and state level (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 5). The struggle for power and shares of oil 
wealth between rival political and military factions resulted in the militarization of the 
government. This fueled several regional and ethnic tensions. The worsening tensions and 
increasing violence between different ethnic and political groups culminated in the Biafra quest 
for self-determination in 1967. This incident sparked a bloody civilian war in Nigeria (SDN, 
2018). 
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The impact of oil production on the environment and the economy of the Delta was 
environmentally destructive compared to slave trade and the trade in palm oil (Fayemi et al., 
2005, p. 13). The presence of multinational oil companies could be clearly seen as disturbing a 
naturally fragile landscape used for hundreds of years to support fishing and farming (Jike, 
2004). Production resulted in endemic poverty, environmental destruction and the loss of 
traditional livelihoods of the people. To understand the extent of the damage from oil spillage 
in the Niger Delta ecosystem over the past 50 years, ecologists equate the damage incurred in 
the delta region to be roughly equivalent to the same amount of oil lost in one “catastrophic 
spillage” (such as the Exxon Valdez incident) per year (i.e. up to 1.5 million tons of oil, 50 
times the pollution unleashed in the Exxon Valdez tanker disaster) (Independent, 2006). The 
basic causes of the agitation, frustration, poverty, lack of development and prevalence of 
violence in the Niger Delta are obvious. The resistant approach of the government and 
multinationals to address the demands of the people has resulted in the mobilization of radical 
armed groups, cults and confraternities, gangs, vigilantes and militias (Asuni, 2009, pp. 8-9). 
2.1.5 Militant Movements in the Niger Delta in the Recent Past (1990s – Present) 
The first rebellion by the Niger Delta peoples over unhappiness with their status in independent 
Nigeria was masterminded by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro on 23 February 1966 (Joab-Peterside, 
2007, p. 3). Boro coordinated this struggle under the banner of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
(NDVF) (Financial Times, 2006). He was a former military officer whose dissatisfaction with 
the economic and social conditions of the region provoked him to stage a secessionist attempt 
and proclaim an Independent Niger Delta Republic for the Ijaw ethnic group (Abidde, 2017, p. 
23). Just six years after independence, Isaac Adaka Boro with about one hundred and fifty 
fighters, orchestrated a guerrilla warfare against the federal government over injustice and 
marginalization of the Niger Delta people (Sahara Reporters, 2011). It was a “twelve-day 
revolution” in the region which resulted in a bloody confrontation between Boro’s forces and 
the Nigerian military (Sahara Reporters, 2011). With the outbreak of the Biafra war, Boro and 
his followers were granted amnesty by General Yakubu Gowon and eventually recruited into 
the Nigerian army (Bourne, 2015, p. 7). However, Boro’s rebellion marked the beginning of 
post-independent gun violent arms agitation in the region (Sahara Reporters, 2011). This 
transformed to political activism in August 1990 with the formation of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).  
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Against this backdrop, in 1990, MOSOP under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an 
environmental activist, concentrated efforts to campaign for social, environmental and 
economic justice on behalf of the Niger Delta people, specifically the Ogoni (Ejovi & Ebie , 
2013, p. 131). In 1991, MOSOP launched the Ogoni Bill of Rights regarding the control and 
ownership of oil. The bill demanded “political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the 
Republic as a distinct and separate unit” (ICG, 2006, p. 4). Ken Saro-Wiwa’s group protested 
against the pollution of the environment through gas flaring and constant oil spillage and the 
neglect of the communities over the years by the government and MNOCs. MOSOP became 
the platform for the collective action of the Ogoni people against state-MNOCs alliance (Bob, 
2002, pp. 139-142; 2005, pp. 61-70). In response to the outcome of MOSOP’s activities, 
General Sani Abacha in November 1995, issued the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa together with 
eight other environmental activists (Premium Times, 2018). The death of these activists 
heightened and increased violent agitations across the Niger Delta region (Ejovi & Ebie, 2013, 
p. 131). As a result, patterns of protest and agitations led to direct confrontations with MNOCs 
and the state alliance resulting in destruction of oil installations, hostage taking of oil workers, 
robbery, rape, and capsizing of boats (Onwuazombe, 2017, p. 118). This internationalized the 
struggle by communities as well as their resistance against oppressive government interventions. 
MOSOP’s activities also drew international attention to the Ogoni peoples’ demands for 
political and economic empowerment at the inception of the contemporary Niger Delta strife 
for resource control (ICG, 2006, p. 4).  
Following these trends, in response to high levels of agitation and feelings of exploitation by 
the government and MNOCs, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) of the Ijaw National Congress led 
by Isaac Adaka Boro on 11 December 1998, convened a conference in Kaima. The outcome 
was the Kaima Declaration 1999 (Ukaga, Ukiwo & Ibaba, 2012, pp. 2-3). The Kaima 
declaration was the final ultimatum ending 31 December 1998, given to MNOCs to leave 
Bayelsa State because their exploration activities had led to environmental degradation in the 
communities. The declaration stated that all land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory 
henceforth would be fully controlled by Ijaw communities and cease to recognize any laws that 
deprive them from the right to ownership and control of their resources (Ibaba, 2008, p. 13). In 
this vein, this was followed by the stoppage of oil exploration and production, the banning of 
all oil workers from oil locations in the Delta state, and the attack of oil vehicles owned by 
MNOC and Federal Government from accessing the East-West road. The outcome was a violent 
approach from the government-MNOC alliance who deployed the military and police to Kaima 
and led to confrontations and the loss of lives and property boats (Ejobowah, 2000, p. 36; Ukeje, 
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2011). At present, twenty years after the Kaima Declaration was formally announced, the 
demands put forward by the Ijaw people have not been met or even considered seriously (Sahara 
Reporters, 2017). Consequently, this snowballed into a full armed militancy against the 
government. This also marked the breeding grown for the rise of different protest groups and 
youth groups in the Niger Delta region, as many youths became aware of the social realities 
affecting them. For example groups such as: The Isoko Youth Movement, the Nembe Youth 
Movement, the Izon Youth Vanguard, Youth Movement of the Southern Ijaws, the Youth 
Movement of the Reparation of Ogbia (Fayemi et al., 2005, p. 52), Movement for the Survival 
of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Community Rights Initiative(CORI), Niger Delta 
Women for Justice (NDINJ), Chiiccoco Movement and Egbema National Congress etc. (Ejovi 
& Ebie , 2013, p. 131) among others, became the groups that waged protest and demonstrations 
against the government and MNOCs. Many of these youths joined these movements/groups for 
the reason of gaining a sense of belonging and importance, which they have been denied by the 
state and MNOCs (Ibaba, 2008, p. 20).  
These armed confrontations and struggles against the government and MNOCs can be linked 
to Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) debate on greed. They argue that armed conflicts are framed 
by greed and grievance motivated by the economic interests/agendas of the drivers of the 
conflicts (pp. 564-565). The conflict in the Niger Delta is prominent as severe grievances over 
the control and ownership of oil has been opportunities for creating armed groups and rebellious 
youth movements in the region. This reinforces our understanding of how rebellion generates 
economic opportunities for the youths. In support of this, Grossman (1999, p. 269) assumes that 
insurgents could be linked to revolutionaries rather than bandits and pirates as this relates to 
rebellion as a business that produces profits from looting.  
Also connected to the dynamics of militant and armed groups is cult groups. 2003 saw a rise in 
cults and gangs designed to protest social injustice in the region. Cults in the Niger Delta were 
group of young people committed to deliver security and economic opportunities for their 
members and their various communities (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye , & Okhomina, 2011, 
p. 21). To be a cult member, individuals have taken an oath of allegiance and secrecy, and rely 
on violence as a means to generate economic opportunities. There is a connection between cults 
and militias as most of the militia groups are close alliances to cult groups. In essence, to be 
qualified a militant, individuals must first be initiated to cultism8. For instance, in 2003, most 
                                                 
8 Respondents 07 and 09, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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cult groups in the region formed tactical alliances with either Asari Dokubo or Ateke Tom’s 
armed groups (Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) 
respectively) as the two commanders fought for the control of routes for oil theft. Consequently, 
they became the leaders and controlled the militant activities of these cult/gang groups 
(Osaghae et al., 2011, p. 21). In 2004, NDPVF, one of the largest Ijaw militant groups started 
a war against the Nigerian Government. Asari together with other militant leaders were granted 
amnesty and financial payments in exchange of their weapons by President Obasanjo, 
unfortunately, this was a failed attempt as Asari was later charged with treason and arrested 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).  
Against this background, 2005 saw a shift in the patterns of conflict from peaceful and unarmed 
protest and demonstrations to violent and full-blown militancy in the region. The shift was 
equally produced by heightened insurgency in December 2005 connected to the arrest, 
incarceration and trail of Asari Dokubo seen as the leader of Ijaw protest. The insurgent struggle 
resulted in the kidnapping of about 200 foreign oil workers, which forced oil companies to 
abandon their activities, close oil production and leave the region (Osaghae et al., 2011, p. 21). 
This period saw an increase in militia armed groups such as Egbesu Boys of Africa, Federated 
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), and community and warlord based militias including: 
the Ijaw Federation Fighters, Mobutu Boys, Niger Delta Freedom Fighters, The Atangbata 
Youths, the One More River to Cross Youths, the Olabrakon-Opre Youths, the Oweiesan-Ogbo, 
the Adaka Marine, the Ogbokore Youths, the Alagbada Youth of Kombo, and the Tomgbolo 
Boys etc. (Abidde, 2017, p. 23).  
The destabilization of NDPV led to the coalition of other independent militant groups to form 
a larger group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) under 
the leadership of Henry Okah (Badmus, 2006). MEND emerged as the deadliest, most 
sophisticated and powerful militia group in the region (Hanson, 2007). The group embraced the 
strategy of sabotage of oil pipelines and installations, kidnapping and oil theft (Abubakar D. , 
2001, p. 31). In January 2006, MEND positioned itself onto the international scene by claiming 
responsibility for the hostage of four foreign oil workers. Henry Okah was arrested on the 
grounds of conspiracy to commit terrorism to detonating explosives (BBC, 2013; Sahara 
Reporters, 2010). MEND’s activities drastically took the conflict to a whole new level. This 
negatively impacted oil production and revenue with destructive bearings for the MNOCs and 
the Nigerian rentier state (Ikelegbe, 2010, p. 40). MEND internationalized and drew the 
attention of the international community to the conflict in the Niger Delta. The group portrayed 
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a significant shift from the MOSOP period relating to their game of engagement with the 
Nigerian State from passive resistance/non-violent to violent resistance (Inuwa, 2017, p. 155). 
Between 2006 and 2009, the conditions in the region deteriorated. In November 2007, militants 
step up oil pipeline attacks and military crackdown continued amidst the stale security 
conditions in the region (IRIN, 2010).  
In addition to the trend of militancy, in September 2008, militants declared an “oil war” and 
attacked oil facilities and security forces, igniting the heaviest clashes in the region in two years 
(Tantua & Kamruzzaman, 2016, p. 7). The organized attacks by MEND caused over 300 deaths 
and 119 expatriates held hostage. Also, oil production decreased from 2.6 million barrels of oil 
a day to 700,000 barrels during this period. Furthermore, the government and MNOCs, spent 
close to $3billion dollars yearly on security to protect oil facilities (Tantua & Kamruzzaman, 
2016, p. 7). In order to quench the tensions, in September 2008, the government set up the 
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) mandated to propose a holistic approach that 
would address violence in the region (IRIN, 2009). In addition, in order to satisfy the interest 
of the rentier state, the government tried to “buy peace” by paying off different divisions of 
MEND and some of their leaders to allow oil operations. This is part of the pattern that has 
sustained the conflict in the region (Courson, 2011, p. 22). Following this assertion, scholars 
like Watt (2007) and Cuvelier et al. (2014) have argued financial inducement as a payoff to 
cooperative factional militant leaders is a game that serves the interests of political elites like 
governors. Such acts offer the elites the avenues to squander government funds without 
accountability with the motive of buying peace. It also provides political leaders the opportunity 
to improve their relationship with prominent militias and coalesce during elections (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2005). 
On 13 September 2008, Nigerian security forces allegedly raided three villages in Rivers state 
looking for Farah Dagogo a member of MEND (Financial Times, 2006). In 2009, just five years 
after the formation of MEND, violent tension levels rose in the Niger Delta dramatically, with 
countless incidents reportedly involving militant groups regularly attacking federal troops in 
random gun fights (IRIN, 2009). For instance, the attack of a civilian helicopter by militias; the 
demolition of the famous “Daroama militants” camp in Bayelsa state; the destruction of 
Chevron’s oil pipelines by MEND and the declaration of Amnesty and DDR for the Niger Delta 
Militants. The timeline of militant activities in the Niger Delta is summarized on the table 
below: 
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    Table 2. 1: An Abbreviated Timeline of Militant Events in the Niger Delta 
1990 
Formation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) 
1991 Ogoni Bill of Rights published by MOSOP 
1995  Hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian Government 
1998 The Kaima Declaration is made by the Ijaw Youth Council 
2003 Rise of violent cult/gang groups operating in the Niger Delta region 
2004 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) launched war against the 
Nigerian Government 
2005 
Nigeria enters a state of full-blown militancy 
- The Emergence of MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta) led by NDV, NDPVF, MEND, and the Egbesu Boys 
- Arrest of Asari Dokubo, leader of NDPVF 
2006 
Spiked increase in hostage taking of expatriates, sabotaging of oil 
pipelines and facilities, rampant kidnapping and oil theft by MEND 
2007 
- Surge in pipeline attacks by militant groups 
- Nigerian military begins crackdown on militancy in the Delta 
region 
2008 
- Declaration of “oil war” by militants attacking oil facilities 
- Arrest of Henry Okah (leader of MEND) 
- Brutal raids are conducted on three villages in the state of Rivers 
by government security forces  
- Creation of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) 
2009 
- Niger Delta militants attack a civilian helicopter for the first time 
- JFT demolished a prominent “Daroama militants” camp in 
Bayelsa state 
- MEND destroys Chevron’s oil pipelines 
- The Nigerian Government declares the Amnesty Program 
2013 
 MEND pulls of ceasefire agreement with the Nigerian Government and 
resumes an “all-out-assault’ mentality  
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2016 Re-emergence of Militancy by the Niger Delta Avengers  
 Source: Author’s compilation 
All efforts at peacekeeping in the region have been futile. Setbacks occur on all levels due to 
the inability to form agreements and the failure to effectively implement strategies. However, 
in June 2009, a presidential pardon was granted to all militants on condition they stop violence. 
The following year after amnesty was been granted, on January 30, 2010, MEND threatened to 
resume “an all-out assault” in the region by calling off its ceasefire (Reuters, 2010). In view of 
this, 2016 saw the reemergence of militancy in the region by a new militant group called the 
Niger Delta Avengers (Niger Delta Avengers, 2018; Reuters, 2019). The group on 14 February 
2016 claimed responsibility for the damage of Royal Dutch Shell’s Forcados Pipeline in Burutu, 
Delta state (Stratfor Worldview, 2016). The trends of events and patterningx of militant 
activities that have changed over time in the Niger Delta is not only critical to the understanding 
of the Nigerian political economy but to the different state-centric approaches in addressing the 
conflicts in the region as well as the nature and character of the state. This will be analyzed in 
the proceeding section. 
2.2 Nigerian Political Economy, State Policy Response and the Nature of the 
Nigerian State 
2.2.1 A Survey of the Nigerian Political Economy 
Nigeria is recognized as the most populous country in Africa (Martini, 2014) with a population 
of about 200 million (World Population Review, 2019). The country has the most known 
reserves of petroleum and gas in Sub-Saharan Africa (Gboyega et al., 2011). Since the 1970s, 
petroleum has been significant to Nigeria’s political economy, accounting for more than half of 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), about 85% of government revenues and over 90% of 
exports and foreign exchange earnings (Lewis, 2018). The country’s overdependence on oil 
with negative development indicators, very low Human Development Index (HDI), and high 
levels of inequalities, unemployment and governance challenges notably corruption and social 
conflict has resulted in a natural resource curse (Amundsen, 2010, p. 2; Chukwuma, 2015, p. 
38; Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007, p. 94). Nigeria has been a source of strategic oil 
supplies to oil dependent global powers like the USA, UK, and China etc. (Punch, 2016; 
Statista, 2017). Attacks on oil wells implies a reduction in imports of the crude to these 
countries. The oil industry is dominated by a large number of multinational oil corporations 
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including Chevron, Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Total, ENI/ Agip, Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC), TotalFinalElf and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
(Pak & Ebienfa, 2011, p. 140). 
Prior to the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region, the Nigeran economy was largely agrarian 
(producing cash and food crops) in nature, stable and steadily growing (Alley, Asekomeh, 
Mobolaji, & Adeniran, 2014, p. 377; Akanmidu, 2015, p. 18). Past statistics revealed that 
between 1964 and 1965, agricultural products accounted for about 55% of Nigeria’s GDP and 
employed about 70% of the country’s work force (Sekumade, 2009, p. 1385). Moreover, by 
1970, agricultural produce like rubber, cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, groundnuts and cotton 
accounted for almost 75% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings (Sekumade, 2009, pp. 1385-
1386). However, with the oil boom in the 1970s, the tides turned against agriculture (Omeje, 
2013). Oil has displaced agricultural resources as the principal commodity that sustained the 
economy. The emergence of an oil economy as a formidable commodity has virtually 
transformed the country’s economy to operate as a monoculture extractive economy depending 
primarily on oil rents (Pak & Ebienfa, 2011, p. 140).  
Oil and gas have particularly been blamed for a number of Nigeria’s problems such as poverty, 
corruption, political instability and conflict (Basedau & Mehler, 2005, p. 9). Nigeria’s political 
economy is more complex and involves a wide range of aspects including fragility and violence. 
The economy is fragile because oil resources have damaged other tradable sectors and sources 
of economic growth and development (Alley et al., 2014, p. 382). This accounts for the weak 
linkage and differential levels of growth that exist between the oil sector and other sectors in 
the country. Between 2000 and 2009, 34,2 trillion Naira was recorded by the Federation 
Account as opposed to 7,3 trillion Naira that represented non-oil sector contributions to the 
national revenue (Ekperiware & Olomu, 2015, p. 76). The general economic performance is 
very poor as the economy is a fledgling economy struggling for survival standing side-by-side 
a thriving oil sector and low human capital (Baghebo & Atima, 2013, p. 103). Furthermore, the 
overarching influence of political elites and bureaucrats on economic activities have intensified 
the vulnerability of the economy. The abundance of oil has equally stimulated unwise economic 
policies and rendered the economy vulnerable to external shocks. In June 2014, the country 
witnessed a 40% fall in crude oil prices and the Naira triggered by the effects of the fluctuating 
oil prices and other global crises where oil prices dropped from $115 a barrel to $49 a barrel 
(Plumer, 2015). Amidst this deteriorating world market situation, the Nigerian economy was 
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plunged into economic recession as it did not have the necessary mechanisms to resist such 
shocks (IMF, 2018).  
In Nigeria, the crowded political economy of oil has become the most important mechanism in 
determining domestic economic and political affairs (Gilpin, 2001, p. 8). The country’s 
economy is characterised by unrestricted trade, illicit financial flows and the exploration 
activities of MNOCs (Gilpin, 2001, p. 9). The economy is precarious and motivates the looting 
of resources. This has created room for an informal economy to thrive where illicit incentives 
exist in many illegal and hidden activities within the oil sector. Illegal oil business and refineries 
have become a very big industry in the country (Garuba, 2010, p. 4). The prevalence of the 
informal economy is framed by the invisible hand of the government for its corrupt and rent 
seeking practices. For example, the size of the informal economy in Nigeria accounts for more 
than half of the country’s entire GDP (Khandan, 2017, p. 38). The high microeconomic 
vulnerability of Nigeria’s economy stems from the fact that the economy is solely reliant on 
rent from oil resources and the country depends on external expertise to extract oil. In other 
parts of the world, the growth of the manufacturing sector is usually accompanied by broad-
based demand for medium skilled workers. Unfortunately, Nigeria has neglected the 
development of its human resources, which impacts the country’s economic performance 
(Basedau & Mehler, 2005, p. 13).  
Also, oil has posed a security challenge in the region. The country has weak economic 
institutions and the economy is strongly affected by security and the political interests and 
relations among dominant national, regional and local powers (Gilpin, 2001, p. 12). Thus, 
economic considerations are at the centre of national concerns in Nigeria. It is important to note 
that oil has a significant impact on the economic behaviour of the Nigerian state as economic 
forces and security are intimately linked (pp. 20-22). For instance, the economy acts as an 
avenue where diverse interest groups (including political leaders, elites, bureaucrats, MNOCs, 
and militia groups) interact in pursuit of wealth and power creating a very fragile economic 
environment. 
In addition, the economy is characterized by a wide array of violence. Petro-violence is central 
to the country’s political economy (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 1). The discovery of oil has been 
met with stiff resistance from the people of the Niger Delta. The distribution of economic 
proceeds from oil has been highly biased as oil has benefited some groups (such as political 
elites, MNOCs and Militia groups) while disadvantaging the local communities in the region 
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(Usman, Madu , & Fatimah, 2015, p. 3). This bias has triggered grievances which have been 
the sources of prolonged violence and civil unrest in the region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Oil 
politics has resulted in competing clashes and factional interests (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 2). 
The economy is threatened by the militant uprisings in the Niger Delta. Violent actions by 
militants have snowballed into economic implications for the rentier economy and Nigeria’s 
international position as an oil producer (Pak & Ebienfa, 2011, p. 142). At the heart of militancy 
between 2006-2009, the country lost about 61.6 billion dollars (Pak & Ebienfa, 2011, p. 144).  
The government has tried to diversify the economy by initiating some economic reforms. These 
reforms aimed at reviving the ailing economy of the country. Previously, the government of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the National Economic Empowerment Development 
Strategy (NEEDS) to run from 2003-2007. NEEDS was a modernization economic policy 
targeted to revamp the structural and institutional weaknesses of the economy. The restructuring 
of the economy was to be done through a variety of macroeconomic policies such as 
privatization, liberalization, commercialization and deregulation (Eze, 2014, p. 152). 
Unfortunately, NEEDS failed due to lack of leadership commitment to concretely stimulate 
planned objectives as well as corruption and the neopatrimonial nature of the economy 
(Ikeanyibe, 2009, p. 19). 
Despite the country’s natural resource endowments, the majority of the people of the Nigeria 
and the Niger Delta still live in abject poverty. Coupled with this, Nigeria is still grappling with 
a high rate of youth unemployment (Kayode, Arome, & Anyio, 2014). Ekperiware and Olomu 
(2015, p. 76) noted that the majority of workers employed in the oil industry are expatriates 
who transport the surplus to their home countries for investment. Such a situation coupled with 
the frustration of being unable to find or secure jobs within the oil sector have motivated many 
youths to be involved in criminal and violent activities. The violence is further aggravated by 
federal, state and local elites that dominate the control of rents derived from oil production 
(Auty, 2004, p. 2). For instance, since 1990 there have been regular raids, burning down of 
villages and brutal killing of innocent people. Armed militancy in the region has increased the 
flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) with constant attacks on oil and gas 
installations, bombing of pipelines, kidnapping and illicit financial movement (Edeko, 2011, p. 
57). It is this catastrophe that has paved the way for sustained civil unrest and conflict in this 
region that seem to be affecting the Nigerian economy adversely, that forced the government 
to sort various solutions to address the grievance of the people of the Niger Delta. 
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2.2.2 State-centric Responses to the Niger Delta Oil Conflict (1960 – 2009) 
Since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, successive civilian and military governments have 
made various efforts to study and resolve the Niger Delta problems. A 2006 report contended 
that in the forty-six years after independence, the Federal Government of Nigeria had appointed 
more than twelve panels to review the needs of the Niger Delta region and find solutions to the 
endemic poverty and problems connected to the area’s oil riches. Each of these panels were 
derided by residents of the Niger Delta. Niger Delta politicians and activists were not only as 
disillusioned, they were prompted by frustration to increase their demands for control over oil 
and other natural resources in the area (ICG, 2006, p. 17).  
According to Obi (2002), the conventional tactics in which the Nigerian government uses to 
address conflict in the Niger Delta region is based on “avoidance and confrontation” (p. 99). 
This implies that the government does not genuinely acknowledge the concerns and agitations 
of the people in the region and thus dismisses the peoples’ claims and agitations. The basic 
causes of agitation, frustration, poverty, lack of development and prevalence of violence in the 
Niger Delta are obvious (Ottuh, 2103, pp. 257-259). Avoidance and confrontation by the state 
further exacerbated the tensed environment and relationship between the state and the people 
of the Delta. Inuwa (2017) argues that policy responses to manage the conflict in the region 
were premised by both minimalist and maximalist approaches. From a minimalist perspective, 
minority agitations in the Niger Delta are a threat to national security and stability (Ikelegbe, 
2010, p. 39). This implies that if the situation is not well handled, it could jeopardize state 
security and stability. Hence, there is the need for the military to apply coercion or lethal force 
to address the situation. Conversely, a maximalist approach argues that the grievances and 
frustration that sparked resistant agitations in the region are grounded by the deep-rooted 
underdevelopment and harsh environmental conditions that make development difficult 
(Inuwa, 2017, p. 160). 
Generally, solutions to conflict usually involve actors with their own set of priorities and 
incentives (Becsi & Lahiri, 2007, p. 1169). Thus, understanding the incentive (positive carrots 
and coercive sticks) of the Nigerian government provides us insight into the seemingly 
haphazard way the oil conflict in the Niger Delta was dealt with (Arena & Hardt, 2014, pp. 127-
129). This analysis shows that the government used both carrot and stick strategies to manage 
the problems. The carrot and stick method is built on the argument that the demise of violence 
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can be attained by addressing some underlying grievances that triggered the agitation (Inuwa, 
2017, p. 161). 
2.2.2.1  Positive “Carrot” Approach 
A “carrot”, which is a reward, is particularly used as a non-violent approach to respond to 
conflict (Cortright, 1998). This approach is what Nye (1990) refers to as soft power approach 
to resolving conflicts. While a “stick” refers to a punishment, is a coercive and violent approach 
to respond to agitation (Emeseh, 2011, p. 58). This is usually equated to hard power (Nye, 1990, 
p. 157), i.e. the use of military and force to manage conflicts. Suffice to say, the government 
has employed development interventionist methods such as the carrot approach to respond to 
the concerns of the people in the Niger Delta. In 1960, the government of Balewa followed up 
on the Willink Commission report 9  recommendations by establishing the Niger Delta 
Development Board (NDDB) 1960-1966 (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 223). The NDDB was 
essentially mandated to address agricultural development challenges (Francis et al., 2011, p. 
73). Unfortunately, NDDB’s work was derided by the outbreak of the 1967-1976 Nigerian 
Biafra civil war, which followed quickly on the heels of its formation (Ifedi & Anyu, 2011, p. 
85).  
Following the demise of the civil war in 1976, the military Government of General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, instituted the River Basin and Development Authorities Decree, creating eleven 
basin authorities to assist “irrigation, water supply facilities, fishing regulations and pollution 
control” (Ezenweani, 2017, p. 1590). Four years later, in 1980, the civilian government headed 
by Shehu Shagari set up the Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA). The 
NDRBDA was meant to address environmental and ecological problems in the Niger Delta 
region. Regrettably, the agency failed due to lack of adequate funding for the project’s activities 
and because it was simply too broad a project to be properly carried out (Adegeye, 1982, p. 
301). Subsequently following the failure of the NDRBDA, the government in 1982, established 
the Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development (PTFNDD) to formulate solutions to 
the region’s problems (Ahonsi, 2011, p. 25). This led to the Nigerian National Assembly in the 
                                                 
9  The Willink Commission was established by the British colonial government in 1958 to study and make 
recommendations on regional conflicts, on the eve of formal independence, with particular attention to the worries 
of the ethnic minorities, especially those of the Niger Delta region. The panel was headed by Sir Henry Willink, a 
former British health minister. The panel rejected the creation of a new state and that separation is not a remedy 
for the peoples’ troubles (Adaka Boro Centre, 1958). 
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same year to enact a revenue provisions requiring the allocation of 1.5 percent of oil profits of 
the Federation Account to tackle development problems of the Niger Delta (Akinyoade, 2018, 
p. 223). This mandate also failed, this time because the National Assembly failed to create an 
effective administrative agency to manage the fund. 
Against this backdrop, in 1992, the Ibrahim Babangida administration based on the Belgore 
Commission report, set up the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) to replace the PIC (Omotola, 2007, pp. 73-74). OMPADEC was mandated to 
rehabilitate and develop the Oil Mineral producing Areas of Nigeria, endangered by ecological 
destruction and environmental pollution (Gabriel, 1999, p. 94). OMPADEC did not last for long 
due to corrupt practices by its administrators who embezzled the commission’s huge fiscal 
allocations to satisfy private unauthorized purposes. As a result of internal corruption, the 
commission found itself saddled with large debts and riddled with monumental proportions of 
fraud. This pushed the Nigerian government to set up an Interim Management Board to reduce 
OMPADEC’s task (Frynas, 2001, p. 34). Unfortunately, just like some many other initiatives, 
OMPADEC met its end in 1999, with a lot of unfinished projects (Omotala & Patrick, 2010, 
pp. 123-125). As a result of this mishap, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
was established by an Act of Parliament in 2000 by the civilian government of Obasanjo to fill 
the gap left behind by the collapse of OMPADEC.  
As an intervention agency, NDDC was tasked to boost sustainable development programs and 
promote peaceful communities in the region (Christmas, 2018, p. 72). The NDDC has fallen 
prey to corrupt autocracy and failed to produce the political behaviour necessary for a 
democratic society foundation (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 152-153). Despite these undertakings, only 
a few of the commission’s projects have been realized as most of them have failed to obtain 
funding for their desired budgets (Christmas, 2018, p. 79; Jike, 2005, p. 159). Through these 
institutions, the Niger Delta people have experienced rising expectations, relative deprivation, 
and frustration. The result has engendered more aggression and violent conflicts among the 
people as well as the people against the state and its multinational alliance (Akinyoade, 2018, 
p. 223). 
Against this background, acknowledging the restiveness and salient security conditions 
prevalent in the Niger Delta and the threat this persistent violence posed to national security, in 
September 2008, the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua established the Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs (MNDA) as a new hope for the region’s developmental challenges (MNDA, 2013). 
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The MNDA was part of the federal government’s wider framework initiative to manage the 
conflict over feelings of alienation, dispossession, neglect, (Obi, 2010); environmental 
degradation (Babatunde, 2017; Uchennia, 2014); poverty (Ekpenyong, Aniefiok, Ukommi, & 
Obiahu, 2010); and unemployment (Kpae & Adishi, 2017) in the Niger Delta region. The 
MNDA is mandated to design and implement plans, programs and other initiatives intended at 
promoting the urgent development of the Niger Delta region (MNDA, 2013). During this period, 
the entire region was in full blown militancy. Amidst these agitations and militancy, a peace 
summit was convened in September 2008 to propose recommendations for quelling conflict in 
the region (Isidiho & Sabran, 2015; Onapajo & Moshood, 2016, p. 42). Sadly, the peace summit 
failed and still in September 2008, the government set up the Technical Committee on the Niger 
Delta (TCND / “The Committee”), to search for a holistic non-violent approach to address the 
deep-rooted unrest in the region (TCND, 2008, p. iv). TCND was mandated to review past 
reports including the 1958 Willinks Commission Report and present a summarization of these 
recommendations and their appropriate calls for government action (TCND, 2008, p. 10). The 
outcome of the Committee was the establishment of an Amnesty and DDR program in 2009 as 
the last carrot approach in the region (Onapajo & Moshood, 2016, pp. 42-43). 
    Table 2. 2: Periodization of State Policy response in the Niger Delta (1960-2009) 
Year Initiative Mandate Why it failed 
1960-1966 
Niger Delta 
Development Board 
(NDDB) 
Facilitate 
agricultural 
development 
Outbreak of Biafra 
Civil War 
1976 
River Basin and 
Development 
Authority Decree 
Assist irrigation, 
fishing regulations 
and control pollution 
Inconsistent mandate 
with objectives of 
1958 Willink 
Commission 
1980 
Delta River Basin 
Development 
Authority 
(NDRBDA) 
Address ecological 
and environmental 
concerns 
Inadequate Funds 
1982 
Presidential Task 
Force on Niger Delta 
Development 
(PTFNDD) 
Design development 
strategies 
Corruption 
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1982 
1.5% Revenue 
Derivation 
Tackle Development 
Problems 
Bureaucratic 
Bottlenecks 
1992-1999 
Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas 
Development 
Commission 
(OMPADEC) 
Address ecological 
and environmental 
pollution 
Corruption, 
Embezzlement and 
Fraud 
2000 
Niger Delta 
Development 
Commission 
(NDDC) 
Promote sustainable 
development and 
peacebuilding 
Corruption and non-
strategic planning 
2008 
Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs 
(MNDA) 
Address 
development and 
infrastructural 
challenges 
 
2009 
Niger Delta 
Amnesty and DDR 
Program (NDDA 
and DDR) 
Promote peace and 
address security and 
development 
challenges 
 
 Source: Author’s compilation adapted from varied literature 
2.2.2.2 Coercive “Stick” Approach 
On the other hand, the government has employed coercive and lethal force to respond to the 
peaceful protest and agitations of the people. Since the 1970s, the state has continued to repress, 
intimidate, maim, and forcefully occupy the entire region through the use of state security 
apparatus like the military and Joint Task Force (JTF) also known as the “Operation restore 
Hope”, to continue the extraction and production of oil (Chiluwa, 2011, p. 199) The use of 
repression by the government, has heightened tensions and set the stage for the violent battles 
between militia groups and military troops in the region (Punch, 2017). The interventions of 
the government in the early stages of the conflict in the Niger Delta region were oppressive. 
For instance, Adaka Boro’s NDVF twelve-day revolution in the Niger Delta was met with brutal 
repression from the government. Boro together with members of his group were arrested by 
security forces and sentenced to death although with the outbreak of the Biafra war, they were 
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granted amnesty (Bourne, 2015, p. 7). Just like Boro, the military dealt with MOSOP’s protest 
through the use of torture and inhuman treatment. Ken Saro-Wiwa together with other activists 
who protested against the environmental injustice, were arrested and sentenced to death. In 
1995, he was hanged (Independent, 1995). Following these incidents, between 1998 and 1999, 
security forces and youth militia groups were involved in a number of armed clashes in the 
region. In 1999, the government deployed warships and more troops in the region to quell the 
violent protest by the youths. Military troops used force against militants and armed groups as 
people were severely beaten, tortured and arbitrarily detained (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
This clash came as a result of a peaceful and unarmed demonstration by youth which took place 
in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State and Kaima and this later transformed to the Kaima Declaration of 
the IYC (Owonikoko, 2018, p. 124). In response to the demonstration, the military between late 
1998 and early1999 retaliated with a crackdown in Bayelsa and Delta states. This resulted in 
loss of lives and destruction of properties, tortures and massive violations of human rights 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999).  
One horrible incident that resulted from this military deployment was the Odi massacre. On 20 
November 1999, following the murder of seven Nigerian policemen, the military retaliation 
raided and wiped out the entire Ijaw community of Odi based on the pretence of hunting down 
militants and armed criminals “hiding” in Odi (Punch, 2017; Ukeje, 2011, pp. 89-90). 
Following this threat, a JTF was also established and deployed to the region to maintain law 
and order especially oil infrastructure platforms, pipelines and power installations in the 
communities (Owonikoko, 2018, p. 124). Owonikoko (2018) further argues that, the 
deployment of JFK in the region was not to provide security for the people in the Niger Delta. 
Rather, it was meant to provide security to multinational personnel and ensure a safe 
environment for production to continue. Between 2003 and 2005, the JTF was in a full-blown 
war with militant groups like NDV and NDPVF (Adeola, 2014). Extrajudicial killings by 
security forces amounted to about 3,100 in action in 2003 (ICG, 2006, p. 5). A later example of 
the government’s stick approach came on 19 February 2005, when military troops attacked the 
town of Odioma, Bayelsa, shooting randomly, burning houses with petrol and raping women. 
This incident led to 17 people being killed including a two-year-old child and an elderly woman 
both burnt to death. According to the narrative of the forces, they were searching for militants 
(ICG, 2006, p. 6). In May 2009, a clash between the JTF and a group from MEND culminated 
in several deaths and damage of property (Smock, 2009).  
  
64 
Emeseh (2011) argue that, the Nigerian government has utilized legislation as a stick method 
to respond to the demands of the people. Laws like the 1967 Petroleum Decree signaled to the 
agitating groups the dangers of being punished by law through their illegal action (Fayemi et 
al., 2005, p. 55). Laws like the 1975 Anti-Sabotage Decree were enacted with the death penalty 
attached to them to prevent agitations (p. 55). The state’s response to the 1990 Ogoni Bill of 
Rights launched by MOSOP was to pass the Treason and Treasonable Offenses Decree in May 
1993. This law viewed the advocacy of minority rights from MOSOP as a treasonable act which 
is punishable by death. As a result, the military (policemen, soldiers and naval personnel) were 
deployed in the region to protect oil facilities against vandalization by protesters (Emeseh, 2011, 
p. 67). This political strategy has favoured resorting to extra-judicial and violent approaches to 
suppress legitimate demands and peaceful protest by minority groups and communities in the 
Niger Delta. The use of force to crush peaceful protest instead to seek to address the concerns 
being protested, certainly has worsened the fragile security landscape and relationships in the 
Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The government has over relied on stick/hard power 
than carrot/soft power. This is likely one of the reasons why several efforts to address the 
conflict have been futile. Inuwa (2017) argues that the human security and development aspects 
of the conflict were undermined, and securitization became a pivotal aspect. This portrays the 
nature and character of the Nigerian state, which will be discussed, in the following section. 
2.2.3 An Explanation of the Nature and character of the Nigerian State 
Oil has played a decisive role in Nigeria’s political economy and its distribution has shaped the 
style and quality of governance, as well as the country’s character (Watts, 2004). This section 
discusses some core distinctive features of the contemporary Nigerian state and how these have 
impacted on the general political space in the country. 
Nigeria has a colonial heritage and the historical context is the foundation for the nature and 
character of the contemporary state. The Nigerian state is a colonial imposition and emerged 
not as a product of consensus among the constituent units. Rather, it was a forceful merger 
between nations and peoples of distinct culture and practices (Ayatse & Akuva, 2013, p. 181). 
The political governance structure was inherited from the colonial state (Akinwale, 2010). The 
state was created to foster the economic interests of the colonial masters, helping to ensure law 
and order and guarantee an environment that enabled the imperialists to increase their interests. 
This disposition of the state has laid the foundation of the deep-rooted ethno-cultural conflicts 
in the country (Aghedo & Osumah, 2015, p. 209). 
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A further important component of the Nigerian state is its various ethno-religious composition, 
which came as a result of colonialism. The current country is multi-ethnic and multilingual in 
nature and is composed of over 250 ethnic groups and about 400 languages (Mustapha, 2007). 
The country is made up of three key ethnic regions involving the Northern Region (Hausa-
Fulani), the Western Region (Yoruba), and the Eastern Region (Igbo) with different needs, 
priorities and aspirations (Ejobowah, 2000, pp. 32-33; Mustapha, 2006, p. 5). One of the 
legacies of colonialism is the unequal geographical distribution and representation of these 
groups. This geographical composition has strategically advantaged the North over other ethnic 
groups due to its population size (Osha, 2007, p. 24). The north is comprised of Muslims while 
the south is made up of Christians (Akobo, 2016, p. 25). Thus, this has been the basis for the 
politics of the north-south divide. 
The North-South divide can be linked to one of the machine-like characters of the Nigerian 
state which is its neopatrimonial nature. The neopatrimonial logic has penetrated the political 
system in the country and its functionality. The state uses the political game of patrimonial 
distribution and redistribution along regional, ethnic and, family lines (Bøås, 2011, pp. 116-
117). Such institutions were created by colonial rule which changed the distribution of power 
and authority within communities. The colonial system of indirect rule destroyed the traditional 
institutions of Nigeria (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1948). Under this system, traditional chiefs 
were selected by colonial authorities (Ikime, 1968). This political culture has continued until 
date with the state-multinationals alliance choosing and rewarding certain communities over 
others. The approach has equally been adopted as the modus operandi by public officials and 
elites who frame the quest for the control of rents from oil and gas (Francis et al., 2011, p. 31). 
In such a disposition, there exists complex powerful and deep-rooted networks of patronage 
and political alliance among public officials and institutions. This has resulted in poor public 
service delivery. The neo-patrimonial nature of the state helps to secure political alliances. 
Employment opportunities and contract awards have become resources for personal or group 
advancement and does not benefit the public. 
The Nigerian state is a very corrupt state. Corruption can be seen through the manipulation of 
tension and rigging of elections (Onapajo, Francis, & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015, p. 4). This is a 
political culture whereby tensions are triggered by office holders over public resources, creating 
a personalized uni-centric field for power relations (Francis et al., 2011, p. 59). Political actors 
are motivated by the incentive to manipulate elections to gain political office because such 
positions give them the power to control the resources in the Niger Delta. As such, alliances 
  
66 
and loyalties are established as means to access resources (Nwokolo & Aghedo, 2018, p. 326). 
The high stakes serve as incentives for rigging and election fraud, not only in Nigeria but in the 
Niger Delta (Carter Center, 1999). The power dynamics are very complex at federal, state and 
local state levels. At state level, elected governors possess huge economic and political power. 
Contracts and projects are awarded based on patrimonial lines. At times, governors favor some 
constituencies over others (Human Rights Watch, 2003). 
The nature of the 2003 state and federal elections in Delta state was very fraudulent. Such 
conditions have resulted in electoral violence prevalent in different federal, state, and local 
government elections especially during 1999, 2003, and 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
For instance, the 2003 elections were marred by several electoral malpractices as votes were 
rigged in Rivers, Delta, and Cross River states. The 2007 election was also characterized by 
fraud and many communities in the region did not participate in the presidential and state 
elections (National Democratic Institute, 2007, p. 3). Elections have become a focus for 
violence in the country (The Guardian, 2019; Aljazeera, 2019). Electoral violence has 
intensified conflict at all levels culminating in a vicious cycle of violent political competition 
and confrontation (Bello, 2015). It is reported that during the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections, 
armed youth groups were recruited by politicians to rig elections in their favour (The Economist, 
2007). These youths were paid to attack political opponents (Human Rights Watch, 2003; 
Reliefweb, 2008). These politicians forged alliances with these armed groups. The country has 
been scored as one of the most corrupt countries in the world on the Corruption Perception 
Index according to Transparency International (Sahara Reporters, 2019; This Day, 2019; 
Transparency International, 2019). Key politicians and elite have taken advantage of the 
anarchic situation to profit economically by looting the region’s wealth (Sahara Reporters, 
2012). In 2011, the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, revealed that 
72% of former governors in Niger Delta were under investigation for corruption. Among them 
include: the Governors of Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Rivers and Abia states ( BBC, 2011). Likewise, 
the former Minister for petroleum Ms. Diezani Alison-Madueke was accused and charged for 
corrupt practices (Africa News, 2018). The oil sector is very obscured and institutions in the 
country are not transparent and democratic. For example, actual figures on oil spending are not 
clear and are rarely published or communicated (Transparency International, 2019; USIP, 2018). 
Equally, the Nigerian state is a rentier state. The oil sector has been plagued by various problems 
due to the rentier nature of the state. The economy is complexly entwined with the oil sector 
(Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012, p. 298). As such, any shock in the international commodities market 
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negatively impacts the reliant economy. A good example is the 2008 economic and financial 
crisis when the prices of crude oil dropped. This almost plunged the economy to it kneels 
(Agbaeze, Udeh, & Onwuka, 2015, p. 3). A key characteristic of the Nigerian rentier state is 
the rentier elite dynamic (Omeje, 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that because Nigeria 
relies on external rents from oil and gas, the country is liable to poor governmental 
accountability, corruption, leadership power conflicts, and civil unrest etc. (Nwokolo & Aghedo, 
2018, p. 325). The political landscape is composed of a dynamic of spoils politics where rentier 
elites struggle to acquire political power to access fiscal resources (Allen, 1999, p. 376). The 
state and its rentier elites are corrupt and promote political patronage, frame and manipulate 
decision making processes, institutions or structures that benefit their self-interest and priorities 
and that of their groups at the expense of non-elites and community interest (Nwokolo & 
Aghedo, 2018, p. 326). Besides, oil rents foster the foundation of increasing patronage networks 
and alliances, clientelism, assistencial distribution policies and hinders democratic institutions 
in Nigeria (Mähler, 2010, p. 7). In such situations, alliances are built on rewards. For instance, 
cases have been reported where the state in alliance with MNOCs usually employ traditional 
leaders who are financially persuaded to negotiate sustainable human development and human 
security. Also, militant leaders are given huge financial incentives by the governors in the Niger 
Delta states (Nwobueze, 2017, p. 26). Some multinationals reward local elites and youth groups 
through patronage to protect company interests and assets and put communities against each 
other (Obi, 2010, p. 490). Due to the over reliance on oil rents, the country is unable to diversify 
to other sectors of the economy and therefore is liable to extreme vulnerability (Mähler, 2010, 
p. 8). The claim is that resource wealth is linked to poor economic growth and affects other 
sectors like agriculture. 
Another distinctive attribute of the state is its authoritarian nature. Just like its colonial 
predecessor, the state is an interventionist, repressive and exploitative state that relies on the 
deployment of force/coercion in the management of tension and conflicts in the country (Imoh-
Itah, Amadi , & Akpan, 2016, p. 9). The state is a militarized state as its response to community 
agitation is seen through the heavy presence of soldiers, naval officers and ratings, mobile 
police patrol and several security agents deployed to quell social unrest (Ukeje, 2011, p. 83). 
The military is highly involved in civilian politics particularly oil, and this has made the 
Nigerian state more authoritarian than democratic (Amuwo, 2001). Ukeje (2011) argues that in 
the context of delegitimization of state power, the state response to threats of its authority and 
governance is through the use of hard instead of soft power. Political confrontations among the 
ruling elite is highly premised along ethno-regional and religious identities. The political system 
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of federalism which was adopted after independence as a symbol for national unity, failed due 
to an unequal distribution of power between different constituent units and groups. This has 
resulted in general frustration and unhappiness by the country’s minority groups leading to 
different factions of insurgent groups (Aghedo & Osumah, 2015, pp. 209-210). 
2.3 Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the historical timeline (periodization) of oil conflict from precolonial, 
colonial and post-colonial states and how this has been an accelerator to the drivers of oil 
conflict and militia agitations in the Niger Delta. The chapter argues that the contemporary oil 
conflict is similar to the precolonial and colonial conflicts in slave trade and palm oil 
respectively. To critically analyze the political economy of the Amnesty and DDR program, an 
understanding of the origins, dynamics, state management policy and character of the state is 
critical. In this vein, I have shown that the post-colonial state inherited patterns of 
administration from the colonial state that left behind a legacy of disunity in the Nigerian 
political landscape. These patterns of power are what the contemporary state has replicated 
especially in the management of the conflict on the Niger Delta. The state policy response to 
the conflict has been based on the concept of divide and conquer as well as both carrot and stick 
strategies.  
This confusing approach has been an impeding factor to peace, security and development of the 
Niger Delta. The chapter has unraveled and analyzed the evolving politics of oil and 
demonstrated an incisive analysis of the perennial problems of the contemporary state. 
Evidence revealed that oil is a misery and source of conflict for the local communities. Further 
discussion on the contemporary rentier state and the rent-seeking nature and interest of the state 
and the economy was presented. This rent-seeking interest is what has complicated the oil 
conflict in the Niger Delta. The chapter illustrates that the contradictions of a dysfunctional 
rentier-neopatrimonial nature of the state are the drivers of the conflict. Understanding the 
nature and character of the Nigerian state requires nuanced understanding of contemporary 
relationships which can only be understood within a historical context. As such, the nature and 
character of the Nigerian state will determine the kind of outcomes from institutions that were 
entrusted to implement the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR program.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE AND NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS IN 
NIGERIA 
3 Introduction 
Chapter Two focused on the historical underpinnings and previous state management 
approaches towards conflict in the Niger Delta as well as a presentation of the Nigerian political 
economy. Chapter Three builds on this argument by focusing on the role of institutions in the 
Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Programs, specifically on how institutions frame the 
implementation of these programs. In order to achieve this, the chapter adopts Cleaver’s (2012) 
concept of institutional bricolage which states that “people consciously and unconsciously draw 
on existing social formulae (styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social norms and 
sanctioned social roles and relationships) to patch or piece together institutions in response to 
changing situations” (p. 45). What emerges from these findings is that institutions have 
competing ideas, interests, values and preferences that either aid or stifle the implementation of 
the Amnesty and DDR programs. Competitions and alliances between institutions reflect the 
broader challenges faced by Nigeria such as the struggle for control over the production, use, 
and distribution of oil resources in the Niger Delta. In this chapter, we will look specifically at 
how the Amnesty and DDR programs were crafted and designed and how these institutions 
negotiate conflict, strike bargains, address formal and informal political settlements, and form 
and break alliances and coalitions in the Niger Delta. Ultimately, this chapter will begin to 
address the collapse of political settlements that have resulted in continued violent conflict in 
the Niger Delta.  
This chapter contributes to the institutional debate without which we cannot understand the 
dynamics and complexities surrounding the Amnesty and DDR. Several scholars have 
conceptualized the Amnesty and DDR processes from the perspective of their successes and 
failures but in doing so, have generally failed to underscore how institutional assemblages 
interact and entangle in the structural programming of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR 
initiatives. To date, most scholars on the subject have either ignored or not understood the 
centrality of institutions in interpreting the successes and failures of the Niger Delta Amnesty 
and DDR programs.  
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3.1 Furthering Institutional Scholarship and Debates 
In order to strengthen the debate on political economy, this thesis has adopted two significant 
scholarly concepts about institutions that provide better explanation and understanding of how 
amnesty and DDR institutions function. Before delving into the analysis of state and non-state 
institutions, it is important to develop a conceptual framework of what institutions are and the 
role they play in the Amnesty and DDR programs. Institutions are a nebulous but inarguably 
distinct entity comprised of many parts. Different economists view them as existing in several 
manifestations. Broadly speaking, economists view institutions as “governing structures” 
(Williamson, 1975) associated with the customs, standards and expected outcomes in a given 
societal framework (Nelson, 2008, p. 2). Rixen and Viola (2016) argue that political economy 
actors and agents create institutions in response to collective problems and claim that the use 
of institutions lowers transaction costs while simultaneously facilitating common interests (p. 
7). Institutions are established as payoff structures for cooperation,10 and political and economic 
relationships are in this case, inherently institutionalized (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 227).  
3.1.1 The Mainstream Debate 
The first debate addressed in this chapter attempts to understand the internal functioning of 
public institutions. This debate is premised upon the mainstream perspective, which observes 
that institutions are formed through crafting principles that characterize robust institutions and 
that decision-making and other negotiations take place in mostly public platforms. Mainstream 
institutionalists hold the view that agency is seen through the lens of bounded rationality and 
believe that human behaviour is driven by incentives, rules and punishments. According to this 
view, the constant relations between these elements within institutions produce efficient 
resource management outcomes (Cleaver, 2012, p. 16). 
Institutional analysis provides an examination of the relationship between political actors as 
objects and as agents of history (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p.10). In his discourse on historical 
institutionalism (HI), Steinmo (2008) identifies three types of institutional analysis in social 
science: rational choice, sociological institutionalism (SI) and historical institutionalism (HI). 
Those who are proponents of rational choice attempt to apply explanatory approaches as a 
                                                 
10Cooperation is not equivalent to harmony. Harmony necessitates an obvious recognition of interest whereas, 
cooperation only occurs in conflicting and complementary interest circumstances. In such circumstance, 
cooperation takes place when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others 
(Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 226). 
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strategy for analyzing human behavior in settings where interest and rules of the games are 
created (Gjevori, 2018, p. 33). Suffice to say that the adoption of institutional bricolage is 
significant in understanding the dynamics and complexities of institutions in peacebuilding. 
Institutional bricolage is not only key to explaining the significant institutional arrangements 
that are brokered but also serve as a lens through which we can explain and understand the 
complexity of institutional assemblage, ecological stress, historical factors, power relations, 
gender, access to other institutions and cultural repertoires embedded within communities 
(Gutu, Wong, & Kinati, 2014).  
The analysis of the social context within which institutional arrangements are embedded is as 
important as the institutional crafting itself (Guru, 2018). This research will expose the diverse 
layers of institutions by examining the successes and failures of the Niger Delta Amnesty and 
DDR programs. Rational choice scholars believe that humans are rational beings who calculate 
the costs and benefits of the choices they face, structuring their choices by following rules that 
result in the maximization of their own self-interests (Steinmo, 2008, p. 162). Rational choice 
institutionalists consider institutions to be a key element of their strategic context and view 
constraints as an imposition on self-interested behavior (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p.7). 
Sociological institutionalists perceive human beings as principally social beings who are neither 
self-interested nor rational but exist primarily as “satisficers” who continually take actions. The 
assumption is that institutions structure the way people perceive their world, not just within the 
confines of self-interest and rule-following, but in so far as humans follow a “logic of 
appropriateness” (Steinmo, 2008, p. 162). This “logic of appropriateness” suggests that people 
focus first on their actions without considering the potential incentives they may get for 
engaging in such behaviour. As such, sociological institutionalism is built on the existence of 
institutions vested with agency (Gjevori, 2018, p. 33). 
Building on the political economy approach, this research integrates historical perspectives in 
analysing and interpreting institutions. Historical institutionalism adopts both rational choice 
and sociological approaches and combines the ideas that human beings are both norm-abiding 
rule followers as well as self-interested rational actors. Sitting outside the narrow confines of 
rational and sociological motives, the historical institutionalist approach helps provide structure 
for political behaviour and outcomes irrespective of formal institutions, informal rules and other 
norms. The overarching scope of the “historical school” shapes who participates in certain 
decisions and simultaneously identifies what underlying factors dictate the strategic behaviour 
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of participants (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 150-159). This approach assumes that institutions provide 
the context in which political actors define their strategies and pursue their interest. 
3.1.2 The Critical School 
This research incorporates critical theoretical foundations that explain institutions in order to 
support the PE approach. The critical institutional approach examines how institutions 
dynamically negotiate relationships between people, natural resources, and society. The critical 
approach emphasizes the multi-scalar complexity of institutions entangled in daily social life, 
the creative human actions that shaped their historical formation, the linkages between formal, 
informal, traditional and modern arrangements, and the power relations that stir these 
connections (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015, p. 1). Building on the PE perspective, critical 
institutionalism (CI) argues that institutions are formed through the uneven patching together 
of old practices and accepted norms with new arrangements (Cleaver, 2012, p. x). This 
“patchwork” implies that institutions are adapted and often derived from other pre-existing 
arrangements and are not created for a specific reason. The critical school stresses the relevance 
of performance and adaptation through diverse scales for assessing challenges in public service 
delivery (i.e. national to local levels) (Jones, 2015, p. 65).  
Critical institutionalism explores how Amnesty and DDR institutions are animated not only by 
people acting individually or collectively in relation to others, but also how these institutions 
are transformed by their physical and material environment. CI unmasks how different powers 
function to maintain Amnesty and DDR institutions in Nigeria and frames their participation, 
access and outcomes. In this vein, the complexity, uncertainty, institutional environment, 
centrality of power dynamics, nature of human action, and the issue of social justice are 
portrayed (Cleaver, 2012, p. 4).  
These arrangements include the interaction between ecological and social systems; the diversity 
of livelihoods, resources and uses; the variability of actors and their practices within 
heterogeneous communities; multiple and overlapping scales, domains and timescales of 
interaction; the repeatedly obscure manner in which institutions work and power operates; and 
the variability of outcomes produced. Faced with such multiple complexities, there is need to 
combine the generation of rich, context specific accounts of institutional functioning with the 
identification of recurring patterns of governance and societal resource allocation (Cleaver, 
2012, pp. 2-3).  
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To buttress the argument on institutions, the CI approach puts forward that bricolage is a very 
significant element in institutional functioning. CI views institutions as necessarily unequal in 
their functioning and influence, going as far as to say that they are at times “fuzzy” blends of 
significant practices, spreading and acting on numerous reasons (p. 45). Bricolage occurs when 
people deliberately or unintentionally build and reframe institutional arrangements based on the 
availability of materials and resources, despite the people’s initial purpose. As a result of this 
process, old arrangements are adjusted, and new ones are created (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015, 
p. 4).  
Institutional bricolage is central to the Nigerian case as it elaborates on how norms are 
operationalized. It discusses institutional survival and change, and illustrates human agency and 
relations of power as well as the debate on institutional effectiveness (Cleaver & de Koning, 
2015, p. 4). This paper argues that bricolage is needed to craft and design Amnesty and DDR 
institutions in the Niger Delta. This helps us to understand the interactions amongst people, 
assumes diversity, dynamism and complexity. The debate further reveals the importance of the 
several process and practices that go beyond social life and layers. This is where institutional 
arrangements are designed (Caine, 2014, pp. 228-229). However, with time, these layers of 
arrangements transform policy settings and patch together diverse sources of political and social 
framings of institutions (Marin & Bjørklund, 2015, p. 30).  
3.2  State-to-State Institutional Interaction 
This section analyses how state institutions interacted to produce the Niger Delta Amnesty and 
DDR program. It is significant to look at state institutions because they have legal mandates. 
State institutions are promulgated by their status as defined by parliament and it is the 
responsibility of the state to ensure that outcomes are delivered. Over the years, the Nigerian 
government set up a variety of state institutions to provide services and implement the Niger 
Delta Amnesty and DDR program. These institutions included the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) that was meant to facilitate development initiatives in the region. Also, 
the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) was created to implement development programs; 
while the Ministry of Environment was to handle environmental challenges. Furthermore, the 
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) was tasked to review previous reports on 
Niger Delta and make recommendations to the government. Just like the other institutions, the 
Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (OSAPND) was mandated to 
conceptualize, plan and implement the DDR; while the Office of the Special Adviser to the 
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President on Petroleum Matters (OSAPPM) was entrusted to address issues related to the 
redistribution of oil assets. Equally, the military was mandated to oversee security matters of 
the DDR process; and the Ministry of Health was to provide medical facilities for militants in 
demobilisation and reintegration camps. Likewise, the Ministry of Employment was tasked to 
set up the needed infrastructure for cluster employment initiatives; and the Ministry of 
Education was entrusted with designing and implementing educational and vocational training 
programs for ex-militants. This cluster of state institutions operates at federal, state and local 
levels and is directly connected to the corresponding definitive nature of these institutions 
involving economic, political, developmental, security, and social characteristics. 
3.2.1 Institutions as “Rules of the Game” 
Building on the PE approach, institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions. In consequence, 
institutions structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic” 
(North, 1990, p. 3; Ostrom et al., 2002). Institutions are rules that govern the behaviour of agents 
(DFID, 2004, p. 1). Agents are individuals and organizations pursuing particular interests, 
including the political elite; civil servants; political parties; local government; the judiciary; the 
military; faith groups; trade unions; civil society groups; the media; the private sector; 
academics; and donors (DFID, 2004, p. 1). The “rules of the game” provided by institutions are 
very often guided by self-interest. In other words, the constraints created by institutions are 
generally designed to maximize self-interest and these rules in themselves can become 
institutional frameworks. Such institutional constraints become the arenas in which human 
interaction takes place (North, 1990, p. 4) and define formal and informal rules (Hudson & 
Leftwich, 2014, p. 40). Formal rules are framed by the state, whereas informal norms “are a 
part of the heritage that we call culture” (North, 1990, p. 37). 
In the case of Nigeria, old institutional rules have been adapted and new ones have been crafted 
to implement the Amnesty. The state institutions that were designed to implement the Amnesty 
and DDR programs interact with the larger economic and political system within which they 
are embedded and act as players of the game as they attempt to alter the varied institutional 
rules to benefit their members and coalitions (Hodgson, 2006, p. 9). In implementing the DDR, 
formal institutions formed networks where incentives were shared amongst political elites to 
maintain their affiliations. For instance, some of the networks were considered outcomes of 
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previous games for political elites and bureaucrats in order to deliberately form alliances and 
friendship links with other state officials and elites (Greif & Kingston, 2011, pp. 30-31). 
In as much as coalitions and networks of patronage were solidified among these NDA and DDR 
institutions, the institutions equally encountered some defections related to the distribution of 
gains to compensate themselves (Greif & Kingston, 2011, p. 16). In this vein, individuals have 
shifted their position and try to change the rules because according to them, existing rules 
governing their interaction with other state officials are unsatisfactory. As such, these 
individuals calculate their expected costs and benefits from the institutional arrangements.  
Considering the current structure of formal and informal rules, individuals from state 
institutions have taken advantage of the perceived opportunities related to the amnesty and 
DDR. This is the reason why some officials/elites have attempted to change the structure of 
formal rules and adjust previous informal rules which in effect restructure the constraints (North, 
1990, p. 91). Informal rules and norms such as the culture of corruption to extract rents from 
the state have been able to strive within state institutions (Martini, 2014, pp. 2-4). This is backed 
by the debate on the neopatrimonial nature of the Nigerian state where patrons secure the loyalty 
and support of clients by granting benefits from state resources. For instance, most institutions 
in Nigeria are controlled by sit-tight elites who don’t want to give up power. These elites 
formalize laws to accumulate personal wealth and not to address concrete problems. In normal 
circumstances, the government’s role is to set the rule of the game and provide oversight for 
those rules since governance is part of the problem in the region. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case as the government did not only set rules but also served as one of the implementers of the 
program. The argument is that the corrupt nature of state officials, could not allow state 
institutions to provide oversight to itself. Suffice to say, the rules together with the perception 
of the actors have influenced key elements in inhibiting and shaping the implementation of the 
NDA and DDR. This has led to the inefficiency of the program based on the informal rules that 
have obscured its success. 
A growing body of literature considers the interaction of formal and informal institutions in 
implementing the NDA and DDR program. Within the institution as a rules framework, a clear 
distinction is made between formal rules created by the Nigerian State to implement the 
program and the informal rules that are produced by the individuals that run the institutions. 
Decisions about policies linked to the implementation of the program are made by powerful 
politicians and their allies who are linked by informal, personal and clientelist networks that 
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co-exist with the formal state institutions (Martini, 2014, p. 2). The Nigerian government in 
coordinating the amnesty, adopted rules (institutions) which corresponded to the rules they were 
familiar with. Based on the rules paradigm, behavior is constrained not just by formal rules, but 
also by the informal rules existing in the Nigerian society. The explanation offered is that 
amnesty and DDR institutions were exogenous constraints (rules) that shaped the endogenous 
behaviors of the state implementers of the program. The institutional dynamics are pursued by 
the changing formal rules which have hindered a sustainable outcome of the program (Greif & 
Kingston, 2011, pp. 30-31). 
Conflict in the Niger Delta has encouraged political elites to establish legal institutions that help 
to strengthen their interests (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002). It is worth noting that by rent-
seeking, the military, politicians, members of government and public officials in Nigeria have 
taken advantage of their positions to exploit state and private institutions as well as the entire 
economy for personal enrichment and power purposes (Amundsen, 2010, p. 13). The amnesty 
and DDR institutions were rules that were responses to the deteriorating environment in the 
Niger Delta and were determined by the interests of the political actors who made the rules 
(Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011, p. 3). In this regard, political powers (elites) selected rules 
(institutions) to generate distributional benefits of oil for themselves rather than for the people 
of the Niger Delta. Therefore, the institutions that emerged to manage the DDR program were 
framed based on the interests of the political elites, bureaucrats and government officials to act 
collectively to achieve their interest in oil in the Niger Delta.  
3.2.2 Differential Power Distribution 
Power dynamics is a significant factor in shaping not only the trajectories of the NDA and DDR 
program but also the form and functioning of state institutions that promoted or hindered the 
outcome of the program (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 12). From a PE stance, power is 
premised in institutionalized settings (Gjevori, 2018, p. 33). Power/authority is dominated by 
individuals who claim their rights through participation, shaping and negotiating over the 
control, distribution and use of resources. Hence, power is used by actors to mobilize and impact 
decision-making to their advantage. Power is further seen as an instrument and source of wealth 
that is crafted and utilized to pursue and safeguard outcomes to reward actors (Cleaver, 2012, 
p. 21).  
In Nigeria, the political impact of oil wealth has been the centralization of power and the growth 
of a neo-patrimonial system of governance characterized by patronage and a rent-seeking 
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culture (Amundsen, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, due to the rentier nature of the economy, power is 
very centralized and personalized, and priorities are on the building of networks rather than of 
efficiency in implementing the program. Power calculations center around access and 
distribution of rents by the ruling elite and political class. For instance, in implementing the 
NDA and DDR program, more bureaucratic power was leveraged on OSAPND than other state 
institutions. This resulted in contestation and bargaining between the political class and ruling 
elite with competing claims over rights and resources in the region. The oil wealth has given 
the ruling elites both the incentives for controlling the state institutions of NDA and DDR (and 
accordingly the revenue), and the means to maintain control of the state (Amundsen, 2010, p. 
15). The distribution of power is determined by the incentives that stem from institutional 
arrangements (J. Robinson, 2002, p. 510). In this way, the competing interest and conflict over 
the control and distribution of resources by state institutions shaped and influenced the DDR 
agenda (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 18). 
An unequal balance of power exists among state institutions involved in the implementation of 
the program. This is seen in Nigeria, oil determines who benefits from what and who does not, 
or who participates in the program or not (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 13). Some institutions 
were given more status than others. For instance, an institution like the OSAPND exercises a 
very high and central level of power in the dynamic that exists between the Presidency and 
interaction with other state and non-state institutions. Also, some institutions like the NDDC 
and the military have utilized both legitimate and non-legitimate means to manipulate the 
institutions for their own interest. Various powerful actors inside and outside of the NDDC 
including NDDC Board members and staff, political elites, bureaucrats, contractors, consultants, 
and influential government officials have together formed a strong network that incentivizes 
them to behave at the detriment of the beneficiary communities (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 231). The 
military on its part has a vested interest in the status quo. Some military officials have used their 
institution to violate and thwart the rule of law and state institutions to accumulate rents for 
private benefits (Amundsen, 2010, p. 13). Because of the imbalance of power distribution, 
checks and balances within state institutions are obscured. Political elites and officials use 
informal rules as alternatives to operate in an environment of unaccountability, corruption, and 
clientelism. They bypass formal rules and maximize their own personal interests (North, 1990). 
Consequently, poor institutional practices have directly or indirectly incentivized poor 
performance and pervasive and socially undesirable outcomes for DDR projects for militants. 
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Research has produced a basic consensus on the key determinants and characteristics of state 
institutions in terms of the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and 
individuals. This includes the processes that establish, sustain and transform these relationships 
over time in framing the NDA and DDR program. From a PE perspective, the distribution of 
power is connected to the interaction of political and economic processes in state institutions. 
In the case of the NDA and DDR, economic and political power within state institutions, 
political elites and the ruling class strengthen informal norms of political patronage to access 
and preserve power as well as gain political support (Martini, 2014, p. 8). Considering that the 
state is the central actor for oil revenues, it is to the state’s institutional network that political 
elites, bureaucrats and state officials coalesce to distribute power among themselves to have 
easy access to oil rents. As such, given the rentier economy and the centrality of the state, 
ambitious state officials contested to control the rents by seeking strategic positions within the 
NDA and DDR state institutions. The interaction between state institutions shaped the choices 
for the operationalization of the programs. To gain some room for manoeuvre, patrons select 
those loyal to be part of the inner circle of state institutions entrusted to implement the program. 
This allows both patrons and their proteges to profit disproportionally from the opportunities 
created by oil wealth (Martini, 2014, pp. 2-4). Significantly, collective action is driven by 
rational individuals forming alliances with similar interests (Cleaver, 2012, p. 23). Government 
officials and elites use forms of both de facto and de jure power in the framing of the NDA and 
DDR (Bertocchi & Dimico, 2017, p. 322). 
3.2.3 Formal Institutional Bargaining 
The discourse on the role of state institutions in producing the outcome of the NDA and DDR 
program also centers around the dilemma that lies at the heart of institutional agreements 
(Ikenberry, 2003, p. 2). According to Young (1994) institutional bargaining is when natural 
resource institutions depend on interactive processes involving the interaction of different 
forces. The process is defined as the development of commonly accepted agreement. After the 
1958 discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, the dominant question that Nigerian policy-makers 
have confronted over the decades is how to address the security challenges in the region that 
hinders oil exploration activities.  
From a neo-liberal perspective, institutions are created to help solve collective action problems 
by minimizing the engagement problems and transaction costs that hinder cost-effective and 
mutually beneficial political exchange (Keohane, 1984). This research has shown that 
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institutions create a conducive and obvious political environment in which ruling elites achieve 
their interests. This implies that institutions can operate as instruments of political control and 
as such act as the weapons of coercion and redistribution among the state institutions (Ikenberry, 
2003, p. 6). The result is a potential institutional bargain that lies at the heart of the relationship 
among state institutions.  
Over the years, the government of Nigeria has pursued ambitious strategies that necessitated 
the use of an assemblage of state institutions to address the oil conflict in the Niger Delta. The 
efforts of previous governments to manage the conflict and address the development challenges 
in the Niger Delta produced weak and apparently bleak results (Reliefweb, 2017). These 
institutions were employed to manage the relations between the state and the people of the 
Niger Delta. Yet, despite the creation of these institutions, Nigeria has been reluctant to tie itself 
too firmly to these institutions and rules. (Ikenberry, 2003, p. 6). In 2009, the government put 
the NDA and DDR at the center of its peace designs in the region. State institutions were to 
play a distinct role in organizing security and providing mechanisms for dispute resolution and 
formal negotiations. It was against this backdrop that the Technical Committee on the Niger 
Delta (TCND/ “The Committee”) was set up in 2008 to bargain on appropriate calls for 
government action to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental 
security in the Niger Delta region (TCND, 2008, p. 10). After the declaration of the NDA, the 
federal government started pushing for an array of new institutions--security, economic, 
political, developmental and social, and so on. New institutions were established due to the 
bargaining made with already existing institutions. The impact of the bargaining is the 
production of new institutions or major patching of old ones (Marin & Bjørklund, 2015, p. 26). 
In the process of this bargain, the leading new state institutions cooperate with already existing 
institutions to frame the implementation of the NDA and DDR program (Young, 1994, p. 82). 
Despite the institutional bargaining process characterised by multiple institutions forming 
alliances to push for the implementation of the NDA and DDR, there has been some misgivings 
which have resulted in defections among these statutory institutions. The argument is that the 
process of bargaining between self-interested actors is driven by developing arrangements 
acceptable to many actors and with the goal to achieve mutual agreements rather than a majority 
through a form of integrative (or productive), rather than distributive (or positional) bargaining 
(Marin & Bjørklund, 2015, p. 30). 
  
80 
3.3 Non-state Driven Institutional Interlinkage 
While the preceding section analyzed the interaction of state institutions, this section follows 
the same direction to explain how non-state institutions interact to address the amnesty concerns. 
Non-state institutions in this instance refers specifically to traditional structures, militia groups 
and informal networks, NGOs and CSOs at local and national levels. 
3.3.1 Institutions as socially shared rules/traditional systems 
It is important to note that the connection between non-state institutions are constructed from 
the belief systems of the Nigerian society (Rothstein, 2005, pp. 127-128). This implies that the 
design of the NDA and DDR institutions should not be regarded solely as an effect of the 
Nigerian society‘s historical and cultural legacy. On the contrary, it is possible to say that 
Nigeria’s political history illustrates highly deliberate choices concerning the amnesty made by 
key politicians in the construction of amnesty institutions with the express purposes of shaping 
the belief systems of the people. Militia groups and networks have been key rhetoric in the 
struggle in the region. This is because they are networks that are embedded in the social 
structures of their community’s daily life11. They form an integral part of the social life of the 
communities they live in. They are very significant as they govern and control activities in these 
communities. Their relevance is partly because the government has failed in its role to protect 
its citizens and provide them with security. As such, militia groups and criminal networks in 
the region serve as alternative governments in this regard. 
According to the belief systems in the region, manhood is defined by the social affiliations that 
one subscribes or belongs to12. Thus, militancy is perceived as a social group which youth in 
the region affiliate with as a source of protection as well as to fight for their plight. As such, 
being a militant to them signifies the attainment of manhood13. However, becoming a militant 
demands they fulfil certain requirements. For example, the belief is that to be qualified militants 
they must be initiated into cultism. In cultism, there is hierarchy and respect for leaders. The 
leader’s actions (good or bad) cannot be challenged and whoever challenges occultic hierarchy 
is eliminated. This is part of the reasons why ex-militants under Ateke Tom cannot challenge 
him as their “godfather” even though they are not satisfied with the N25.000 cut off from their 
initial N65, 000 monthly amnesty stipend given to them by the government for fear of going 
                                                 
11 Respondent 10, July 2018, Nigeria. 
12 Respondent 15, July 2018, Nigeria. 
13 Respondent 06, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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against the rule and being killed 14 . Thus, as ascribed by the social beliefs of militancy, 
subordinates/followers must pay allegiance to their patrons (militant leaders) irrespective of 
their shortcomings. 
Interestingly, Niger Delta communities do not interpret/perceive militia groups as gangs or 
criminals as the government and MNOCs present them. They are not seen as unofficial social 
networks, criminals or prohibited channels. Rather, for the communities, militants are looked 
upon as role models especially for young people who aspire to become militants15. Those who 
have joined militant groups have not only become prominent and influential in their 
communities but rich and as a result their immediate family members, relatives and friends look 
at them as a source of inspiration. They are eager to be successful or become rich just like the 
militants. For instance, several militants revealed that their motivation for becoming militants 
was because their brothers were militants and built houses from the proceeds of their militancy. 
The other reason is that they were unemployed, and militancy became a source of employment 
for them. Some of them disclosed that they wanted to be protected. Therefore, from a PE 
perspective, militancy becomes a lucrative business as it is a way of getting rich and prominent. 
3.4 State and Non-State Institutional Exchange 
This section presents the relationship between statutory and non-statutory institutions in 
shaping the implementation of the NDA and DDR program. 
3.4.1 Institutional Bricolage 
To analyze the interface between state and non-state institutions, this research makes use of 
institutional bricolage. Institutional bricolage is a post-institutionalist approach explaining the 
interaction between actors (defined as bricoleurs) and institutions focusing on the dynamics of 
institutional arrangements surrounding the implementation of the NDA and DDR (Gutu et al., 
2014, p. 5). This approach views NDA and DDR institutions as constraining and enabling 
human agency because NDA and DDR institutions provided boundaries that diverse actors 
(state and non-state) within the context of the Niger Delta in turn, reshape (Cleaver, 2002). In 
implementing the NDA and DDR program, institutions working from diverse backgrounds 
were always reused, reworked or refashioned to perform new functions (Carstensen, 2017, p. 
                                                 
14 Respondent 09, July 2018, Nigeria. 
15 Respondent 20, July 2018, Nigeria. 
  
82 
140). Also, modified arrangements of rules, practices, norms and relationships were given 
significance and power (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015, p. 4).  
The DDR program was launched by the Nigerian government and implemented in collaboration 
with other non-state actors. This necessitated the bricolage process which was relevant in 
designing the programs. In this view, new arrangements were brokered to support collective 
peacebuilding in the region. Cleaver (2012, p. 4) argues that the interest of people to form 
collective alliances and arrangements involve the economic, emotional, moral and social 
reasoning driven by varied rationalities and world perspectives. This is the rationale why state 
and non-state policy makers were more interested to respond to circumstances of uncertainty 
surrounding the production of oil and the security concerns in the region (Carstensen, 2017, p. 
140). Therefore bricolage was seen by the different actors as a combination of resources at hand 
to solve problems and look for opportunities in the region (Phillips & Tracey, 2007). 
In addition, institutional design and local bricolage capacities were applied to operate the DDR. 
For example, there was the need for the participation of women. This was because of the role 
that women have traditionally played in their communities as champions for peace. During the 
rehabilitation phase of the program, a community-based women NGO like Kebetkache Women 
Development and Resource Centre (KKWDRC) used community women who are usually 
serving as wives, mothers and relatives to gang groups to rally young boys and men in gangs 
to drop their weapons and denounce violent activities (Okon, 2012). Niger Delta women were 
very significant actors in the NDA and DDR process as they were central in changing the 
trajectories of the Niger Delta. 
Also, participation in the program was directly based on the authoritative resources of the actors 
involved in the peacebuilding process. Authoritative resources here relate to the influence, 
political position, wealth, and social network (Gutu et al., 2014, p. 12). For instance, KKWDRC 
was involved in the program because the institution had been engaging grassroots women and 
had equally been active in peace and stability initiatives in the region. Other non-state 
institutions like Academic Associates Peaceworks (AAPW) was invited to cooperate with the 
government based on their broad knowledge and social relations in the region. In addition, the 
Africa Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR) was requested to carry out a conflict 
reconciliation and reconstruction program due to the standing relationship they had established 
with the affected communities and their accessibility to militia groups. Hence, through 
bricolage, state and non-state institutions became socially embedded and historically molded.  
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Against this backdrop, the use of bricolage portrayed the social context and dynamics of the 
hectic interaction between state and non-state NDA and DDR institutions with some 
implications for institutional influence. The key issues seen through the lens of bricolage 
between state and non-state institutions in shaping the amnesty process involve power relations, 
the individual agencies of institutions, gender and access to other institutions etc. (Haapala, 
Rautanen, White, Keskinen, & Olli, 2016, p. 1174). The framing of the amnesty by these actors 
depict power, politics, struggles and process of negotiation (Gutu et al., 2014, p. 12). Therefore, 
bricolage becomes an authoritative process and some actors (bricoleurs) during the 
implementation process, possessed more authoritative resources than others (Cleaver & de 
Koning, 2015, p. 4). For instance, institutions like the military; NDDC; Foundation for Ethnic 
Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN); Search for Common Grounds, and Stakeholder Democracy 
Network (SDN) among others were involved in the program based on either their official 
positions, kinship, economic wealth, or special knowledge. 
Building on the above argument, militants that were interviewed for this study revealed that 
they reluctantly accepted the amnesty program. One of the primary reasons is the lack of trust 
in the government in view of previously failed governmental promises. Another reason is 
suspicion. They confirmed that they were not certain if the government had good intentions. 
One of them mentioned that they were afraid it was a way to get hold of them and put them in 
jail16.  
A former top commander further explained that he did not accept amnesty at first because he 
thought it was a way for the government to take their fingerprints and put tracking devices on 
their bodies. However, when he saw how the first phase was conducted, he left the creeks and 
surrendered his weapons to security forces. In discussing about their nature of relationship with 
the military, the interviewed ex-militant commander asserted that the Nigerian military is a 
“business institution”17 because it has been heavily involved in the oil business, frequently 
pitting multinational companies against the local population of Niger Delta. Another ex-militant 
pointed out that “the Nigerian military is the most corrupt and criminal institution in the world.” 
This, respondent stated, is because military officers collaborate with criminal gangs in engaging 
in illegal activities. The interviewee reported that on some occasions military officers provide 
militants with top security information which is used to set up kidnappings, and oil theft. After 
the crime is completed, the spoils /booties are shared with the officers who provided the 
                                                 
16 Respondents 06 and 09, July 2018, Nigeria. 
17 Respondent 07, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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classified information18. Thus, they see the military as a business institution that benefits from 
conflict in the region and would therefore see no reason to push for any genuine resolution. A 
genuine resolution will entail a loss of power, relevance and enrichment.  
It is argued that human actions run and animate institutions (Cleaver, 2012, p. 4). In the Niger 
Delta, such exchanges have reproduced existing patterns of inequality. This may serve to shape 
and reinforce other differences. In particular, the disgruntlement of militia groups emanates 
from what they rationalized as deprivation. Also, with the prevalent inequality, many 
interviewees perceived the elites as responsible for poverty in the region. The state and MNOCs 
are equally perceived as influential bodies in the deprivation process by the militants and 
communities. Although the Nigerian government has produced guidelines for institutional 
development applicable within the DDR, the encounter between state and non-state actors has 
produced a gap between institutional design and reality (Haapala et al., 2016, p. 1174). Gaps 
exist in the implementation of the program and have led to institutional rearrangement. Some 
respondents stated that NGOs are very active. Part of the reason is the lack of trust regarding 
the capacity of the state to manage the DDR program. This has given NGOs more grounding in 
the region. The absence of the state has led many NGOs to prevail in the communities to adopt 
local bylaws for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region (Hassenforder, Ferrand,, 
Pittock, Daniell, & Barreteau, 2015, p. 1000).  
Since 2009, local, regional CSOs have formed alliances geared towards addressing the crisis in 
the region. This network now involves a plethora of state and non-state institutions including 
NGOs, CSO and private sector players. Arrangements like conflicts reconciliation and 
reconstruction among communities draw on a network of stakeholders, interconnected through 
kinship and tensions. Such links were furthered by well-connected members of the community 
and extend up to the parliamentary and ministerial levels. These significant actors were 
institutional brokers of connection19. 
3.4.2 Institutional Credibility 
The ongoing research about institutional credibility is essential in our analysis of the 
interlinkages between state and non-state institutions that shaped the NDA and DDR program. 
Scholars like Snider (1996, p. 79) consider institutional credibility as the merging of the 
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functional20  with the constitutional. More specifically, institutional credibility arises when 
formal and informal rules enhance an institutional environment where public administrators 
impartially protect people’s property rights (Bittick, 2008, p. 372). Concerning the relationship 
between state and non-state institutions, Davis and North (1970) argue that in the institutional 
environment where key political, social and legal standard rules create the basis for production 
exchange and distribution and institutional arrangements as governance structure which operate 
at the level of individual transactions (pp. 5-6). Consequently, the interaction of state and non-
state institutions, together with enforcement strategies i.e. government, makes up the 
institutional environment of Nigeria. 
This thesis argues that institutional credibility applies to people’s approval of the NDA and 
DDR institutions based on their perceptions of the institutions’ accountability, representation, 
legitimacy, transparency, fairness and justice (Pero & Smith, 2008, p. 16). It is reported that 
many of the NDA and DDR institutions and public officials did not have credibility which 
created an incredible institutional environment. For instance, OSAPND has been criticized for 
operating along political partisan lines (This Day, 2017). Also, there have been alleged cases 
of corrupt practices by amnesty officials and some collaborators working with OSAPND, 
including accusations levelled against the Office’s first two Special Advisers, Hon Kingsley 
Kuku and General Paul Boroh (Vanguard, 2018; PremiumTimes, 2018). The country exhibits 
strong executive control on petroleum regulations in a political environment where there are 
weak/minimal checks and balances (Gboyeya et al., 2011, p. 16). 
The interaction of state and non-state institutions within the realm of the Niger Delta has given 
rise to a complex adaptive system in producing the DDR as an outcome (Bittick, 2008, p. 367). 
Nigerian politics suffers from many conflicts of interest between state and non-state institutions 
(Gboyeya et al., 2011). As such, compliance has been an enormous challenge in the 
implementation of the Amnesty and DDR programs.  
Many of the service providers for the program, especially the military, did not have adequate 
capacity and experience in DDR matters. It should be noted that being a military employee does 
not necessarily mean they are trained to work on amnesty and DDR processes. The government 
did not recruit DDR experts to pre-train the military to get a broad knowledge on how to 
implement the program. Even though the military is linked to issues of DDR, what is required 
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for amnesty is a specialty or some form of expertise which the military did not have. This has 
propelled the NDA and DDR and is one of the reasons why the rightful outcome has still not 
been met. 
Besides, these institutions were not only weak but lack credibility and competence. One NGO 
staff member working in the Niger Delta noted that several non-state institutions that were 
contracted by OSAPND were incompetent and lacked skills in DDR implementation21. Sadly, 
the institutions selected by OSAPND to provide pilot training courses have been condemned 
by many in the Niger Delta community for not living up to their promised standards. One major 
example of this flaw is, as some critics have pointed out, that none of the institutions offered 
for the entrepreneurship trainings had any level of certification. They are unable to provide 
documents for their program graduates to enter the workforce with accreditation (ICHR, 2011, 
p. 20). Apart from the fact that some of the NGOs and Training centers lacked accreditation, it 
was revealed that they were also very fraudulent. For instance, it was reported that the NGO 
Search for Common Ground which was involved in the Agent for Change Program engaged in 
very corrupt practices during the process22. This is partly responsible for the slow rate of the 
implementation of the program, a trend that has instated corruption, lack of accountability and 
exploitation in the Niger Delta.  
Most militants that participated in this study complained that they are unable to find or secure 
jobs even after completing their training. More than 75% of Niger Delta youths are unemployed 
and almost half of these youths are unemployable because they lack skills applicable to modern 
industry (Okonofua, 2016, p. 5). When interviewed in July 2017 in Abuja, an expert working 
in the Niger Delta attributed this unemployment issue to skills mismatch23. He also pointed out 
that most institutions may not want to associate their corporate brands with the image of the ex-
militants as they are profiled as having criminal backgrounds. This is in the wake of limited 
available jobs in the desired fields of study. The aviation companies are afraid to permit 
individuals with criminal backgrounds to fly their planes, fearing that in situations of discontent, 
these individuals run the risk of hijacking planes and putting the lives of passengers in danger24. 
Furthermore, appointing appropriate leaders to pursue collective goals and applying appropriate 
institutional and governance structures is very challenging (Pero & Smith, 2008, p. 16). There 
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is little or no monitoring and evaluation on decision making processes and in decision making 
outcomes related to NDA and DDR. There are no checks of processes put in place to mitigate 
the risk of fraud in the established institutions. Concerns have been raised about ghost 
beneficiaries for the program as well as participants not related to the program who have 
benefited from it (Vanguard, 2018). Likewise, money allocated for starting businesses for ex-
militants (such as the purchase of agricultural equipment) have been syphoned off and 
embezzled by government officials and non-state officials running the program. Therefore, 
when state and non-state institutions interact, in the realm of the NDA and DDR, the rules of 
their various institutional environment shape their transactions and creates a complex order 
(Bittick, 2008, p. 381). 
3.5 State, Non-State and International Collaboration 
3.5.1 Complexities of NDA and DDR Institutions 
The interactions between state, non-state and international institutions are very complex. This 
resonates with the revelation made by PE critical institutionalists to the effect that institutions 
are complex hubs (Cleaver, 2000, p. 362; Gramsci, 1980). Institutions both state and non-state, 
as well international institutions in Nigeria have formal and informal complexities. First, human 
beings are self-interested as they calculate their cost and benefits (Steinmo, 2008, p. 162). The 
institutions came with their own interests, agendas, traditions, orientations and experiences. 
This made it difficult to collapse to homogenous groups of decision-makers. Second, the 
complexity was due to incompatibility from multiple institutional logics25 that existed between 
them (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011, p. 318). As such, there 
was no repertoire of strategies and structures that institutions could deploy to cope with multiple 
competing demands. For example, during the rehabilitation process different services were 
provided by different institutions (state, non-state and international). They all were pursuing 
their own agendas, without effective coordination. This is one of the reasons why the program 
was not well implemented. 
In addition, coexisting institutional logics have created opportunities to enterprising actors in 
the Niger Delta (Martin, Currie, Weaver, Finn, & McDonald, 2017, p. 103). These actors 
constrain and facilitate agency (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 7). Intrinsically, such logics that 
frame the NDA and DDR have opened opportunities for actors to resist, reinterpret or make 
                                                 
25 Institutional logics are overarching sets of principles that prescribe “how to interpret organizational reality, what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed” (Greif & Kingston, 2011, p. 318) 
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judicious use of institutional rules. Consequently, the diverse institutional forces not only 
compete for dominance, but also often interact and coexist. This negatively affects the nature 
and behavior of several DDR institutions and individuals (Martin et al., 2017, p. 104). The logic 
in the Niger Delta is nested within diverse layers of resource use and power distribution. A 
possible argument is that, the dynamics of a crowded political economy of oil in the region has 
not only driven the looting of resources but has created avenues for competing claims over 
entitlement, distribution and use. These complex layers partly drive the fragility of institutions 
and heterogeneity.  
Young (1982, p. 278) a renowned scholar on global institutions argues that institutions are 
“human artefacts,” social systems serving to address problems with coordination and 
cooperation among groups of human beings. Both the institutions and the problems themselves 
are the result of regular human behaviour and activities. The key feature of these “human 
artefacts” type institutions is the conjunction of convergent expectations and recognized 
patterns of behaviour or practice. Data from field research revealed that many institutions came 
with their own orientation and wanted to control the agenda setting26. It is reported that MNOCs 
did not want the government of Nigeria to embark on an amnesty program. Rather, MNOCs 
wanted negotiation with militia groups rather than implementing an amnesty program which to 
them is costlier27. Implementing an amnesty program requires a lot of technical and financial 
resources which at the time was a very expensive approach. Also, amnesty implies the need for 
development in terms of infrastructure and transport. Looking at the nature and terrain of the 
region, this according to MNOCs at the time was a very expensive approach. Irrespective of 
claims from the MNOCs to the contrary, the Nigerian government went ahead and granted 
amnesty. This created a conflictual relationship among the parties. If there is such a conflict it 
condoles one to raise a question whether the Amnesty and DDR approach was a rightful one or 
was it just considered to be the best methodology for practical reasons to ameliorate the 
challenge? 
The complexity is broadened by the centrality of authority and the unity of national, regional 
and local elites. This intricacy of the function of institutions is reinforced by the different local 
arrangements and interventions of the amnesty and DDR and their connection to the lives of 
the people in the Niger Delta. It is important to note that the predominant position of leaders 
and local elites in shaping actions reveal that the use of authoritative resources help institutions 
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to function. There is therefore the need to understand the relationship between Niger Delta 
communities, the government, MNOCs and other stakeholders. (Cleaver, 2012, pp. 1-3). While 
creating a complex environment from program implementation, these complex institutions 
equally complemented each other. 
3.5.2 Complementarity of NDA and DDR Institutions 
One characteristic of the amnesty program was the complementarity of various institutions. 
This involved the hybridization of both formal and informal institutions. Institutional 
complementarity refers to a situation of interdependence among institutions (Büthe & Mattli, 
2011). Three different types were evident in the DDR institutions. First, institutions with similar 
resources blended together and adopt similar strategies or institutional solutions to varied 
actions. For instance, political elites in Nigeria applied the same ideologies (rules) they used to 
address religious conflicts to the oil conflict (political-economic) in the Niger Delta. The second 
aspect is that, one institution complements for the deficiencies of others. This is a form of 
opposed institutional logic. For example, a well-functioning free market requires a strong state. 
The third form is linked to the logic of synergy from an economic perspective (Crouch, et al., 
2005, pp. 359-360). 
 Considering that the DDR is a very broad development and security program, its 
implementation requires different specialized resources, knowledge and technical experts (both 
human and financial). Against this background, political-economic and social institutions of 
capital-labour, vocational training and education, governance, security and social protection 
form a coherent whole (Terhorst, 2009, p. 50). These institutions were heavily involved in the 
DDR phase. At the rehabilitation centres, several service providers gave assistance ranging 
from security, mental health, conflict reconciliation, skills training, career fairs, 
entrepreneurship orientation, and sports among others28. Also, other institutions were involved 
in working with the communities to build resilient communities, empower women and youth 
as well as implement peacebuilding and development projects29. 
The core assumption for a mixture/blend of institutions is to enhance economic performance 
(Crouch, et al., 2005, p. 363). Unfortunately, this was not the most important concern for the 
actors. Actors were rather more concerned with the incentives they will generate from the 
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process. Part of their incentive was to loot resources and ensure the effective flow of oil. To 
this extent, NDA and DDR actors rationally neglected the economic aspect of the program and 
pursued other targets such as social stability and security30. Their actions were incentivized by 
institutional rules of the game, where they manipulated rules for implementation to reward their 
private and public interests (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, pp. 45-46). 
Complementarity also opened spaces for cooperation and competition amongst each other. 
With regard to cooperation, the international community contributed immensely to the 
implementation of the amnesty program. They assisted in the design of development and 
stability programs. International bodies like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
were actively involved in providing technical support. This was done through various 
consultations which accelerated the declaration of the amnesty. The UNDP assisted in the 
formulation and provision of the “Strategic and Operational Plan for the DDR”, which clearly 
outlined the vision and operations of the amnesty program. In addition, foreign governments 
and institutions including the United States and the United Kingdom, the European Union and 
The World Bank together with other international partners were very instrumental to improve 
governance and capacity of institutions. An estimated fund of $3 billion was given by key 
development partners as their commitment to the program (Francis et al. 2011, p. 10). 
Additionally, competition entailed that various institutions were to be controlled by different 
elites with different interests, and with their own orientations (ideas) as to which institutions 
must be patched up to enhance bricolage (Sehring, 2009, p. 61-63). This created contingencies 
and constraints since the NDA and DDR institutional complementarity was impartial. 
Furthermore, these institutions displayed power dynamics (Foucault, 1983). Not all the 
institutions were given equal status in the process. Thus, deflections arose in relation to power 
among statutory, non-statutory and international institutions. While some were very 
authoritative and influential, others were very limited as corruption obstructed their functioning. 
This resulted in endemic tensions and inconsistencies in social arrangements that necessitated 
constant readjustments (Cleaver, 2001). This ultimately defined the poor outcome of the 
program. 
A development expert working in the Niger Delta argued that in the case of NDA, 
complementarity of institutions was not partial. This is because the designers of the program 
did not conceive the program as taking place on “the ground” and “bottom-up”31. Also, a 
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militant reported that the state in collaboration with MNOCs were the key players in the 
process32. This gave them more leverage and capacity to impose certain rules to other actors 
like CSOs, NGOs, militia groups, and other national and international development partners. It 
is therefore relevant to recognize the inherent influence of the most powerful actors and their 
implications on the behaviours of others (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012). The conflict that 
centres on such power dynamics illustrates that actors had a similar goal (i.e. DDR 
implementation) but, their traditions, orientations, agendas and experiences vary. This likely 
contributed to the poor implementation of the program. 
Even though NDA and DDR institutions are similar, and sometimes compensate each other’s 
deficiencies as well as act as a synergy, there was limited access order within institutions. This 
inherently limits the implementation of the program. 
3.5.3 Limited Access Order in NDA and DDR Institutions 
This research will employ the framework of limited access order (LAO). The significance of 
looking at this concept is to understand the implementation of the amnesty and the frenzied 
relation between state, non-state and international institutions. The framework is premised on 
the view that today most developing countries use limited access order to address the issue of 
violence. They do so by conceding political elite’s privileged control over parts of the economy, 
each getting some share of the rents (North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2011, p. 1). Proponents 
of the concept believe that the use of political system will create and allocate rents, arising from 
arrangements such as government contracts, land rights, monopolies on business activities, and 
entry to restricted job markets (North et al., 2011, p. 1).  
Limited access order practices in countries dominated by either a single party or dominant party, 
requires limiting access and competition. Such is evident in Nigeria. Although Nigeria practices 
a multiparty system, the political turf is owned by two core political parties: Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC) (AllAfrica, 2018). For almost a decade, the 
PDP had been the dominant party that ran the “show” and controlled the state. However, at the 
2015 elections, the tides turned against PDP and APC emerged as the ruling party (BBC, 2015; 
Independent, 2015). In such a dispensation, the party is conjoined or conflated to the state. Of 
the country’s rentier-neopatrimonial nature, there is little or no separation between the 
presidency and other branches of government such as the legislature, the executive and the 
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judiciary (Gberevbie, 2014, p. 143). Because of this exertion of power, there is a limited access 
of resources to other groups in the Nigerian society (Foucault, 1983). 
The APC as the dominant party, distributes resources to party members. Members and political 
elites in the dominant party are incentivized or allowed to make and loot rents (Maniavibes, 
2019). This implies they are expected to control the subordinates down the chain of command 
and restrict access to their members. In Nigeria, the system allows the elites to get more 
resources (Amundsen, 2012). The coalition of elites use their power to collectively extract rents 
from the rest of the population. These rents are then used to hold the coalition together (Van 
Besouw, Ansink, & Van Bavel, 2015, p. 2). However, once they acquire resources, they are 
expected to limit access to other non-party members. In avertedly, they are limiting violence. 
For instance, currently as the dominant party, the APC controls the state, the institutions of the 
state and its members etc. Leaders of these institutions are allowed more access to resources 
than others. In this vein, once the leaders of the state institutions get access, they are tasked by 
the party that violence doesn’t erupt. They are also tasked not to give access to others. This 
justifies why the elites are very rich and have subordinates. Bayard (1993) describe this scenario 
as patron-client relation. Therefore, the role of institutions is to both limit access and to be 
controlled by dominant elites, who criminalize, undermine the state and accumulate resources 
through corruption. Personal ties and networks of patronage are built through shadows resulting 
to shadow state and shadow economies (Schneider, 2014). These networks serve as the source 
of inclusion and exclusion. Bayart (1993) calls this the politics of the belly.  
In a limited access society, powerful individuals are provided with an incentive to be peaceful- 
ranging from extortion and corrupt payoffs to land rent, natural resource royalties, and 
monopoly profit (North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2007, p. 3). They have incentives to 
restrain the violence, because outbreaks of violence reduce their rents (North et al., pp. 1-2). In 
the case of the Niger Delta, militant commanders are paid off by the state and MNOCs to 
constraint violence from their subordinates. The commanders have formed cluster 
networks/coalition with the government and MNOCs (Agbiboa & Maiangwa , 2012). For this 
coalition to work, militant commanders are rewarded (given so-called carrots) to prevent 
disorder (North, 2012, p. 7). A military officer noted that the government had to maintain close 
collaboration and alliance with militant commanders because if it does not, the government 
stands to lose due to the sophisticated nature of militancy in the region33. The exchange between 
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the state, MNOCs and militant commanders requires the creation of incentives for the latter to 
peacefully compete rather than fight (North et al., 2009, p.18; Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 616). 
Apart from the commanders, local elites such as chiefs and community leaders are given rents 
by regional and local elites. Their mandate is also to keep violence low. As such, the complaints 
of the foot soldiers (militants) in what they rationalized as deprivation and exclusion becomes 
inconsequential3435363738. The reason being that they no longer have the capacity for violence. 
The local elites benefit out of such hybrid collaboration. The government and MNOCs likewise 
benefit because when there is violence, the government and MNOCs are under threat as disorder 
reduces their rents (North et al., 2007, p. 8). This part of the game is played by the agency of 
actors that animate the various institutions (Cleaver, 2012, p. 4). Similarly, both state officials 
and MNOCs rely on personnel connections or on institutions of government to support their 
contracts. Viable alliances such as joint ventures have been established between MNOCs and 
the government (Amadi, Henriksen, & Germiso, 2006, p. 58). 
In addition, the acceptance of amnesty by youth militia implies limiting access to resources. 
Nevertheless, the amnesty process was done as a way of constraining violence by granting 
unconditional pardons to people who had been labelled for decades as insurgents, and criminals 
and so on, and limiting them from accessing resources. Suffice to say that as institutions 
compete to secure resources, some open spaces while others dwindle, limiting space. 
Democratic institutions open space for everyone to participate in resource use, distribution and 
power. A traditional leader in one of the villages in the Niger Delta revealed that during the 
implementation of the amnesty and DDR, traditional leaders were left out.39 
Besides, data from field research revealed that, the first two processes (disarmament and 
demobilization) were carried out solely by state-run institutions particularly the military. In 
other parts of the world, DDR programs have been carried out in cooperation and collaboration 
with both state, and non-state institutions. However, in the case of the Niger Delta, CSOs, local 
institutions, NGOs and international institutions were left out40. Yet, during the reintegration 
phase, these other institutions were integrated into the process. The state is offering some 
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arguments regarding this. One dominant assumption why the first two stages were implemented 
solely by the government is the fact that it is the responsibility of the government to provide 
security to its citizens. So, owning the process is part of the government’s mandate of providing 
security to the citizens41. A second argument raised by a military official is that security matters 
are highly technical and mechanic. This implies that very few people or institutions are skilled 
in DDR processes. As a result, it remained the preserve of state institutions, in particular the 
military42. This justifies why other institutions are found at the margins of reintegration. It is 
easier to do humanitarian assistance or to provide humanitarian aid. NGOs are known for 
providing humanitarian assistance. This implies they deal with capacity building and 
empowerment programs and resourcing the former rebels43. One security officer mentioned that 
by limiting access to other institutions during the disarmament and demobilization phases, the 
Nigerian government wanted to sustain or consolidate its power because amnesty has the 
propensity to weaken the power, capacity or expose the state. He further highlighted that 
government has always done things that help to consolidate, maintain and sustain its power. 
This has constantly created perpetual conflict with the international community whose interest 
was to ensure the interest of the combatants were addressed. Also, based on the suspicion that 
involving too many credible international institutions will turn off the depth of corruption, they 
decided to leave out these institutions. The officer noted that corruption is very exclusionary. 
Hence, the government could not allow other institutions who have got more powers to come 
and control the whole show44. 
Lamenting over the issue of exclusion and corruption in enforcing the program, a CSO worker 
indicated that some NGOs became neopatrimonial. He noted that NGOs formed alliances with 
government elites because they wanted to be granted contracts45. This implies that for NGOs 
and CSOs to get contracts, they must please the patrons or elites of government institutions 
especially the OSAPND, NDDC and MNDA. The fact that their relationship and partnership is 
on patrimonial basis widens the infectious disease of corruption. Consequently, this tended to 
affect the entire regime of institutions, their delivery, services and the overall outcome of the 
NDA and DDR program. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Respondent 27, July 2018, Nigeria. 
42 Respondent 24, July 2018, Nigeria. 
43 Ibid 24, July 2018, Nigeria. 
44 Respondent 13, July 2018, Nigeria. 
45 Ibid 13, July 2018, Nigeria. 
  
95 
Figure 3. 1: State, Non-State and International Institutions 
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3.6 Implications of Statutory, Non-Statutory and International Institutions to NDA and 
DDR 
This section addresses the effects of institutional exchanges on the outcome of the NDA and 
DDR. 
3.6.1 Lack of Coordination 
In any institutional setting, coordination is very crucial. Coordination was a challenging aspect 
in the interrelation among NDA and DDR institutions. There was no emphasis on clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities by the different institutions involved in the execution of NDA 
and DDR programs. Roles shape actors and institutions and help to overcome the broad and 
complex challenges of institutions (Boella & Van der Torre , 2006). Collective action could 
only be achieved with some sort of arrangement and coordination, as obligations are better 
attained with exchange (Provis, 2004). During the implementing of the DDR process, genuine 
coordination among institutions was absent. In fact, institutions ended up competing and 
fighting among each other in order to have a fair share of control of the program instead of 
coordinating program activities46. One of the primordial reasons for lack of coordination is 
related to lack of trust among the different NDA and DDR institutions.  
Trust acts as a positive option to outcome attainment among imperfect competition and the 
usurped end goals of institutions (Osifo, 2013, p. 153). Yet, there was mistrust and misgivings 
among the service providers during the rehabilitation phase of the program. This worsened the 
situation as it was difficult to keep the differentiated functions and structures in line with the 
overall purpose of the program 47 . Similarly, inadequate information flow, 
cooperation/collaboration and integration among the various institutions contributed to the 
whole saga. Lack of coordination between institutions infringes on controlling interdependence 
that leads to conflation and poor development outcomes in the region. Thus, it affected the 
capacity and performance of institutions to effectively enforce the program. 
 Respondents were unanimous that, there was little or no monitoring and evaluation by the 
designers of the project48. For this reason, there was a multiplicity of institutions doing different 
things without proper guidance. At the Obubra Rehabilitation Camp for example, various 
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service providers were pursuing their own agendas without coordination of their activities. Part 
of the argument is connected to the issue of corruption which characterized the entire 
implementation process. Data from field research indicated that widespread corruption 
characterized the implementation process. With such practices, it was obvious that the delivery 
and performance of the project could not be attained. As a result, the program was poorly and 
properly executed. 
3.6.2 Exacerbation of Conflict  
It is certain that in any environment where activities/projects are carried out haphazardly, with 
little or no coordination and supervision, tensions increase among actors. In the case of the 
Niger Delta, the complexities of institutions in particular: their orientations, interests, agendas, 
experiences, and traditions, heightened the already tensed environment. The power dynamics, 
coupled with the fluid alliances and networks that were established, had an impact on the 
negative outcome of the program. In post conflict settings, institutions are expected to boost 
peace and security processes and ensure that support and interventions do not contribute to the 
exacerbation of the risk of armed conflict (Sida, 2016). Unfortunately, the actions of the NDA 
and DDR, instead escalated the already fragile setting. Also, the governments, multilateral and 
bilateral agencies, civil society organizations (at both the national and the international level), 
are expected to actively lead and manage peacebuilding processes to ensure long-term 
sustainability (Peacebuilding Initiative, 2007). In as much as the NDA and DDR institutions 
were created, they were even more fragile than the people they were trying to help. Most of the 
institutions were weak. They lacked legitimacy and credibility and did not have the capacity to 
govern transparently and accountably (Sharma, 2009). Besides, the rentier-neopatrimonial 
character of institutions made them more fragile. State institutions for instance, had no concrete 
commitments and incentives for accountability, as well as check and balances. They instead 
limited entry into the process and created rents for the political elites (North, 2012). In settings 
where institutional interventions are not well coordinated, conflict does not only exacerbate but 
continues. Thus, the poor implementation of the program is likely one of the reasons for the 
reemergence of militancy in 2015.  
3.6.3 Weak Hybridized Institutions 
Apart from the fact that institutions were fluid and fragile, their interactions to produce the 
NDA and DDR played down on the weaknesses of hybrid institutions. This research adopts the 
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definition of hybridity as the ‘blending49 and layering50’of institutions (Polzer, Meyer, Höllerer, 
& Seiwald, 2017, p. 71). This involves the integration of multiple institutions to solve the 
problem in the Niger Delta region. It can be argued that the agency of different actors affected 
the way DDR projects were executed in the region and negatively impacted the bricolage of 
institutions (Skelcher & Smith, 2015, p. 437).  
Accordingly, the interactional regularities of institutions, their iterative rationalities and 
competitive or coercive institutional interactions made the whole process of the implementation 
of the DDR complex (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012, p. 8). This complexity of the NDA 
and DDR institutions instead of properly blending, opened doors for potential conflicts as actors 
competed, and superseded each other (Greenwood et al., 2011). This stemmed from the fact 
that the strategic alliance of different institutions to produce DDR in the Niger Delta lacked 
coping strategies to deal with complexities and potential conflicts as a result of their various 
practices and logics (Polzer et al., 2017, p. 71). According to Battilana and Lee (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014, p. 397), the activities, structures and processes of hybrid institutions that combine 
multiple institutional forms deviate from socially legitimate templates for animating, and thus 
face implementation challenges. Resultantly, this hindered amnesty designers and 
implementers to deal with different institutionalized demands even through 
compartmentalization (Fossestøl, Breit, Andreassen, & Klemsdal, 2015, p. 292). 
It is important to emphasis that institutions cannot stand alone as they must cooperate and/or 
form alliances to meet up the diverse constraints they face. As such, it was relevant to have an 
assemblage or multidimensional character of institutions to operationalize the NDA and DDR. 
For such to happen, implementation could only work through bricolage with a synergy of 
different institutions working together. It is for this reason that different layers of institutions 
come together to ensure a successful DDR is a success in the region. However, for this to be 
done, there is need for the right assortment of institutions and a proper co-existence (Thornton 
et al., 2012).  
Equally, for goals to be achieved, there is the need for a strong hybrid of institutions. This 
necessitates a thickly institutionalized environment with binding rules and contracts among 
                                                 
49 blending refers to hybridity as an “amalgamate” with original components that are no longer discernible (Polzer 
et al., 2017, p. 71) 
50 layering conceptualizes hybridity in a way that the various elements, or clusters thereof, are added on top of, or 
alongside, each other (Ibid, 2017, p. 71) 
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institution. Sadly, the cooperation between state, non-state and international institutions had 
some sort of limited entry together with flawed rules and arrangements (Polzer et al., 2017, p. 
71). It produced weak hybrid institutions. The institutions, and their interaction has reproduced 
existing patterns of inequality and served to shape and reinforce other differences. This points 
to the fact that the conjoining of institutions was not the right bricolage (Gutu et al., 2014, p. 9). 
As much as Cleaver (2012) sees the importance of having a bricolage of institutions, it is not 
enough to have an assemblage of different layers. What is more significant in such settings are 
issues of coordination, cooperation, partnership credibility. This was not the case in the Niger 
Delta. The blurred nature of politics, and limited access into the process, resulted in poor service 
delivery and made the blending and layering of DDR institutions weak and ineffective (Jones, 
2015, p. 67). 
3.7 Conclusion 
The study looked at how institutions interact in post conflict amnesty settings and how the DDR 
process was carried out. I discussed the different layers of institutional dynamics and 
complexities by using Cleaver’s institutional bricolage framework which states that for 
effective conflict management mechanisms to be obtained institutions must be coordinated. 
This could be state, non-state institutions and/or international institutions. In analyzing the 
patterns of interactions between the institutions involved in the amnesty process, the chapter 
presents a context where conflict is negotiated; where bargains are struck; where formal and 
informal political settlements, alliances and coalitions are made and broken; and where politics 
collapses, and violent conflict can break out. In everyday politics, institutions are contested, 
shaped, implemented, avoided, undermined or amended, and contingency, critical junctures and 
windows of opportunity disturb old patterns or open up new possibilities. Crucially, this is 
where different players use different forms and degrees of both de jure and de facto power 
(Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 10). The analysis further revealed the economic incentives of 
institutions. It examined both material and non-material incentives that are generated in 
institutions which has been part of the rules of the alliances and analyses how based on 
perceived incentives, actors act and interact. 
After examining the five levels of institutional interrelations; the paper analyzed the 
implications for the amnesty and DDR process in the Niger Delta. With data generated from 
field work, the study makes three main observations: First, that the NDA and DDR institutions, 
institutionalized conflict, driven by serious disgruntlement, lack of trust in the government and 
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lack of trust in the institutions themselves. This implies that when institutions are in conflict, 
conflict might worsen. Second, powerful rent-seeking activities and patrimonial political 
practices were consistent with most of the institutions. Many of the institutions were motivated 
by power, their own interest and incentives and they were pursuing their own personal agendas. 
These factors are attributed to the possible shortcomings of the amnesty program. Lastly, the 
institutions that were involved in the process were not the rightful institutions to deal with 
amnesty issues. Also, hybridized institutions (formal and informal institutions) in this case do 
not work together due to constant defections and competition among them. Data also revealed 
that state institutions do not work better together than informal institutions because they are 
haphazardly coordinated. However, informal institutions (non-state, international etc.) to an 
extent work better than state institutions because they deliver more and are a little more 
transparent/credible than state institutions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCEPTUALISING INTERESTS AND INCENTIVES IN THE FRAMING OF THE 
NIGER DELTA AMNESTY AND DDR PROGRAM 
4  Introduction 
While the previous chapter examined the institutions adopted by the state and non-state actors 
to meet the development challenges in the Niger Delta, this chapter advances various arguments 
that embody the roles of vested interests in the conflict in the Niger Delta. The study adopts the 
Political Economy Analysis (PEA) approach and analyses the role of different actors/agents 
involved in conflict, their contested interests, and their capacities for defending or challenging 
the status quo. PEA attempts to understand the reasons why self-interested and utility 
maximizing actors in the Niger Delta will constantly and certainly respond to incentive 
frameworks. This implies that individuals will react to the incentives represented in institutions 
in consistent and predictable ways. Thus, actors may intentionally or unintentionally frame and 
push for their interests within the groups they find themselves in.  
The major questions in this chapter are: who are these key actors, what drives their various 
behaviors and how these translate to broad-based outcomes (amnesty and DDR) and/or engage 
in narrow clientelist actions in the Niger Delta? The fundamental idea is that to understand the 
amnesty and DDR program, there is the need to first understand the actors, their agency and the 
politics that shapes the conflict. PEA explains how in addressing conflict and diverse interests, 
political constraints and behaviors influence economic policies and outcomes. The term 
“interest” in this case refers to an underlying driver of behavior and outcomes. Interest can be 
instrumental, rational, and/or self-interest. Vested interests have been a binding constraint on 
policy reform in Nigeria where oil revenues are at the center of patronage systems. In this case, 
the study will illustrate how individual and group interests, and institutional incentives interact 
to push for conflict as well as produce pro or anti peace outcomes in the Niger Delta. The 
research further discusses different incentive frameworks in which actors in the Niger Delta 
channel their interests. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part provides a vivid description of the different 
actors involved in the Niger Delta Conflict and the factors that motivate their behavior. The 
second part analyses the heterogeneous interests of these actors, their agency and behavior and 
how this impacts on the shifting networks of relationships and interactions in the Niger Delta 
resulting to an economy of conflict. The last part is the chapter conclusion. 
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4.1 Mapping Actor Network Analysis in the Niger Delta Conflict 
This section identifies key actors and their interaction in the Niger Delta conflict. The study 
uses the stakeholder analysis, which indicates various dimensions of conflict and violence in 
the Niger Delta. The analysis portrays the connection/interaction of the dimensions of conflict 
and the diverse actors. This connection provides the basis for the complexity of the conflicts in 
the region (Ebiede, 2017, p. 5). However, this paper pays attention mainly to the conflicts 
related to oil revenue control and allocation, the distribution of power between various interest 
groups in the region, and their ability to affect the process through power and/or leadership. 
The key actors in the oil conflict in the Niger Delta are: i) the Nigerian Government, ii) the Oil 
Communities, and iii) Multinational Oil Companies. These actors are all interested in the 
exploration of oil and the incentives/rents that accrue from it. Yet, there exists a shift in their 
actions depending on their position of influence during the production and allocation of profit 
that are generated from oil exploration.  
Understanding the actors in the Niger Delta requires us to pay close attention to the diverse 
nature of conflict in the region. This involves a broad variety of actors within one structure. 
These players are rationally calculating, utility maximizing individuals or groups who will 
consistently seek to maximize the benefits that accrue from policy or bargaining opportunities 
they face (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 41). Their interests are often channeled through 
political considerations which could be in the interest to policymakers to stay longer in power; 
to get rich by accumulating oil rents; to prevent political opponents from gaining power, and to 
reward favors/patronage to their allies by preventing improvement in the property rights of 
workers or competitors and broad-based public goods and positive outcomes (Beuran, 
Raballand, & Kapoor , 2011, p. 1). 
4.1.1 The Nigerian Government 
The Nigerian government as a state actor is comprised of a vertical three tier administrative 
structure including the Federal Government (FG), State Governments (SG) and Local 
Governments (LG). Power and resources are distributed among the three tiers. The three tiers 
are made of political leaders, bureaucrats, government officials and workers, elites and 
government agencies.  
According to the Nigerian constitution, (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
[Promulgation] Decree 1999) the federal government (FG) owns all minerals, oil, and gas in 
  
103 
Nigeria, and thus has supremacy over the oil in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian government, 
through the NNPC, holds 55% to 60% of the production interest in this primary field. The 
question on the ownership of oil can be dated back to the colonial era when the colonial 
government in 1946 promulgated the Mineral Ordnance, which states as follows: 
The entire property and control of all minerals and mineral oil, in, under, or upon any 
land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and 
shall be vested in the Crown (The Guardian, 2001, p. 12).  
At independence in 1960, the right of ownership and control of oil resources was granted to the 
FG. This implies that the legitimacy of the oil sector as well as land resources are owned by the 
FG. Such is reflected in the laws and decrees that the state has put in place to control the 
governing of the oil sector. The most prominent include: The Oil Pipeline Decree of 1956; the 
Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969 (as enshrined in Sections 40(3), 42(3), 44(3) of the 1979, 
1989, 1999 Constitutions respectively), the Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 of 1971, the 
Land Use Decree of 1978, the Title Land (Vesting) Decree No. 52 of 1993 and the National 
Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997. (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 69; World 
Bank, 2008, p. 12). The Federal Government also controls the management and collection of 
taxes charged from oil exploitation activities. It collects most of the taxes irrespective of the 
fact that states and local governments have the right to exercise control of the revenues. 
Distribution of resources is done through the principle of equality between sub-national units. 
Such principles have boosted the demand for the establishment of states, as this is a way for 
different underrepresented interest groups to access revenues that accrue from the production 
of oil and gas. Since the military era in Nigeria, there has been no concrete change in the revenue 
allocation formula where the FG was allocated 48.5%, States 24%, local governments 20% and 
special funds 7.5 % (NDDC, 2006, p. 52). Yet, the government distributes Federal allocations 
between states including 40% equally shared among states, 30% equivalent to the state’s 
population, 10% in terms of Land mass and terrain, 10% on social development factors, and 
10 % for internal revenue efforts. The Niger Delta states are allocated 13% of oil revenues 
derived from their land. Local governments take 35% of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Pool in 
addition to 20.6% of the Federation Account (Gboyega et al., 2011, pp. 12-13). 
The oil distribution question in Nigeria is essential in understanding the disastrous politics of 
imperial oil. Over the years, the derivation revenues have dropped affecting revenues 
designated for the region. In fact, Watts asserts that there has been a process of radical fiscal 
  
104 
centralism where oil- states which comprised of ethnic minorities have lost while non-oil 
producing ethnic majorities have gained through corruption (Watts, 2008, p. 12). 
In fact, Ikelegbe (2005) argues that by decrees, oil and gas became owned by the federal 
government and progressively, the regions entitlements by way of derivation-based allocation 
declined from 50% to a mere 1.5% in 1984 and later 3% in 1999 (p. 214). 
The major changes in oil revenue derivation for the Niger Delta region is shown in the table 
below: 
Table 4. 1: Oil Revenue Allocation to Niger Delta States from 1982 to 2019 
Year(s) Percentage Allocated 
1982 1.5% 
1992 3% 
1995 13% 
1999-2002 15% 
2007 to present 13% 
 Source: Author’s compilation 
Also, the Federal Government has created public institutions to manage the oil sector and 
address the regions development challenges. The most significant of these agencies include the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources with NNPC as the channel through which oil rents gets to the 
FG, NDDC and MNDA. The Government uses these established agencies to accumulate oil 
revenues that accrue from the Niger Delta. The Nigerian Government is very reliant on the oil 
rents from the region as this is the main source of government revenue for the survival of the 
economy. Unfortunately, the character of the government has not been able to influence 
economic growth and development in the region.  
This is linked to the argument that political powerful elites in Nigeria often do not allow 
implementation of sustainable programs and strong institutions/structures because they might 
not maximize incentives for them (Beuran et al., 2011, p. 2). Thus, political leaders, bureaucrats 
and elites would push for short-term programs or weak structures to thrive leading to 
constrained support for sustained economic growth, unsatisfactory decrease in poverty, and 
continued high levels of corruption and poor governance in the Niger Delta.  
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Also, the state governments are second level of governmental actors in the Niger Delta. Most 
of these states were established to manage ethnic agitations (Ebiede, 2017, p. 11). Ethnicity 
places a very decisive role in the oil conflict in the Niger Delta. This has created space for 
different ethnic groups within the Niger Delta and other dominant ethic groups within Nigeria 
(Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo) to shape their interests within the oil economy. In this case, a 
constant conflict and contestation of power is pushed by a synergy of ethnic groups. Political 
elites often exploit such scenarios particularly during elections to achieve their individual/group 
and economic benefits (Agbiboa, 2015). Ethnic group leaders use the space of state 
governments to push for an increase in oil derivation, and political representation at the Federal 
level. Unfortunately, the Federal system is a broken system. The checks and balances between 
different branches of government systems do not work very well. This is partly because the 
state and local governments are 100% dependent on the Federal government. The bureaucracy 
is an intricate patronage system that is corrupt and opens doors for an upward mobility for the 
middle class in the country.  
4.1.2 Oil Communities 
Oil communities in the Niger Delta are very significant actors in the conflict over resource 
control in the region. They are hosts and extractive spaces for the MNOCs who extract and 
export crude oil (Oluwaniyi, 2011). It is important to emphasis that oil communities are made 
of diverse actors and heterogeneous interests. They involve youth, militant and criminal groups, 
almost 40 ethnic groups (see page 41) elders, chiefs, women, children, civil society 
Organizations, churches and NGOs etc. (NDDC, 2006, p. 53).  
Authors like Obi, (Obi, 2003) have attributed the conflict from the perspective of poverty, 
disempowerment, ethnicity, marginalization and injustice and so on, which lie at the heart of 
production and reproduction of violent dynamics of conflict. Other discourses mention the 
widespread unemployment rate among the youth, environmental pollution and damage caused 
by extraction. This has damaged the farmlands of the communities and directly affects their 
livelihoods, economic and social development of the entire region (Eweje, 2007, p. 220). The 
argument raised by these debates is that communities have felt deprived and marginalized by 
the extractive activities of the government and MNOCs. According to literature this has 
motivated local communities to turn against the multinationals and the FG. In affirmation to the 
above argument, Obi and Rustad (2011) argue that the feeling of neglect is what has created a 
sense of frustration and alienation among these communities who think they do not benefit from 
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the resources generated from their land. They further argue that the aggrieved communities 
claim that oil production in their communities has not generated any development outcomes. 
Hence, concerns have been raised relating to the centralization of oil wealth and the regional 
inequalities it causes, the low political inclusion and representation of the communities in 
resource decision making processes as well as environmental degradation and pollution caused 
by the exploration activities of MNOCs (pp. 1-2). According to Ikelegbe (2001), advocacy and 
campaigns by CSOs and protest by communities demanding justice has constantly been ignored 
and/or met with very repressive measures from the state and the military represented by the 
Joint Task Force (JTK) in the region. Communities in most cases react negatively towards 
expressing their grievances and discontent (Obi, 2003). Therefore, community grievances have 
later transformed into armed violence and militancy in the region.  
Despite the benefits that is derived from oil wealth, Oil communities are marred by abject 
poverty and widespread underdevelopment (Osah & Amakihe, 2014). In the past, traditional 
rulers and members of Community Development Committees (CDCs) in the region were the 
people that defended and conveyed the interest of their communities. Also, they were tasked to 
negotiate with MNOCs and government agencies that represented the oil industry (Ebiede, 
2017, p. 13). However, with the emergence of militancy, youth groups in communities have 
questioned the intensions and capacity of chiefs, traditional rulers and elders of communities. 
They have become the powerful and significant actors contesting against the state and MNOCs 
over oil benefits. Ikelegbe argues (2001) that, the economic gains from the oil economy does 
not trickle down to the communities. To him, anger and frustration started to develop in the 
region, which encouraged the creation and mobilization by civil groups and violent activities 
by dissatisfied youths. This scenario transformed the oil communities in their relationship with 
the state and MNOCs. The opinion of exclusion and demands for justice went beyond the 
community to ethnic groups, states and the region as a whole. Hence, this transformation 
resulted in the formation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (pp. 
440-441). 
Oil communities also witnessed inter and intra community contestations among groups and 
interests. This layer of competing interest is motivated by the control and distribution of 
political power and policymaking bodies in communities for example the election of Governors, 
local government heads, chiefs and traditional rulers. This contestation is also influenced by the 
rents they seek to accumulate from such strategic positions (Ebiede, 2017, p. 13). Unfortunately, 
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the conflicting interests have produced negative development outcomes and have hindered 
genuine peacebuilding initiatives in these communities that remain challenging till date.  
4.1.3 Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 
Just like the government and oil communities, MNOCs play a significant role in Nigeria’s 
political economy. They are the key actors in the exploration and production of oil in the Niger 
Delta. MNOCs are involved in both Onshore and offshore fields in the Niger Delta region. 
Seventeen giant oil and gas production fields are located offshore (Uzoma et al., 2015, p. 
71).They contribute greatly to the federal government’s revenue as they mainly govern crude 
oil business in the Niger Delta. They provide 65% of the budget funds for the country (Ibenegbu, 
2018). There are 18 international oil companies operating in Nigeria. The most critical players 
in the Niger Delta are represented by Shell Petroleum Development Corporation from USA; 
Chevron from USA; Exxon Mobil from USA; Texaco from USA; Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) 
from Netherlands; Agip from Italy, Elf from France; Addax Petroleum and Nexen Inc from 
China, with varied levels of involvement and interaction with the host communities 
(Environmental Justice Atlas, 2018; Ibenegbu, 2018). These oil corporations account for an 
estimated 95% of Nigeria’s crude oil production (NIPC, 2018; World Bank, 2008). They 
produce a minimum of two million barrels of oil a day (Eweje, 2007, p. 222). Shell for instance 
began operation in 1958 in Ogoniland with the Nigerian government. Shell is Nigeria’s largest 
oil producer and generates more than 10% of Shell’s total exploration and production profits 
(Eweje, 2007, p. 222).  
Oil production in Nigeria is primarily through Joint Ventures (JV) or Production Sharing 
Contracts (PSC) between the government represented by NNPC and a number of MNOCs. The 
government through NNPC, controls seven joint venture partnerships with these MNOCs. 
NNPC accounts for more than 50% of oil production and over 40% of gas supply (NIPC, 2018). 
The six joint ventures connecting foreign owned oil companies are represented on the table 
below:  
Table 4. 2: State-Multinational Joint Ventures in Nigeria 
Name of Oil Corporation Description of Operation 
SPDC A joint venture controlled by Shell accounts 
for more than 40% of Nigeria’s total oil 
production (899,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 
1997) from more than eighty oil fields. The 
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joint venture involves NNPC (55%), Shell 
(30%), Elf (10%) and Agip (5%) and 
operates largely onshore on dry land or in the 
mangrove swamp (NNPC, 2018). 
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) A joint venture between NNPC (60%) and 
Chevron (40%) previously has been the 
second largest producer (about 400,000 bpd), 
with fields located in the Warri region west 
of the Niger river and offshore in shallow 
water. It is reported to aim to increase 
production to 600,000 bpd.17 (NNPC, 2018). 
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited 
(MPNU) 
A joint venture between NNPC (60%) and 
Mobil (40%) runs in shallow water off Akwa 
Ibom state in the southeastern delta and 
averaged production of 632,000 bpd in 1997, 
making it the second largest producer, as 
against 543,000 bpd in 1996. Mobil also 
holds a 50% interest in a Production Sharing 
Contract for a deep-water block further 
offshore and is reported to plan to increase 
output to 900,000 bpd by 2000. Oil industry 
sources reveal that Mobil is likely to overtake 
Shell as the largest producer in Nigeria 
within the next five years, if current trends 
continue (NNPC, 2018). 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited 
(NAOC) 
A joint venture operated by Agip and owned 
by NNPC (60%), Agip (20%) and Phillips 
Petroleum (20%) produces 150,000 bpd 
mostly from small onshore fields. (Uzoma et 
al., 2015, p. 72) 
Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL) A joint venture between NNPC (60%) and 
Elf (40%) produced about 125,000 bpd 
during 1997, both on and offshore. Elf and 
Mobil are in dispute over operational control 
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of an offshore field with a production 
capacity of 90,000 bpd (NNPC, 2018). 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of 
Nigeria Unlimited (TOPCON) 
A joint venture operated by Texaco and 
owned by NNPC (60%), Texaco (20%) and 
Chevron (20%) currently produces about 
60,000 bpd from five offshore fields (NNPC, 
2018). 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Also, there are “more than 300 oil fields, 284 wells, 7,000 kilometers of pipelines, 10 export 
terminals, 275 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 4 refineries (three of which are situated in Warri, 
Port Harcourt I and II, and Kaduna), and a massive liquefied natural gas project (in Bonny and 
Brass)” (Watts, 2006, p. 109; 2008, p. 11). Research has revealed that MNOCs are the agents 
behind the degradation and pollution of the environment in the region (Human Rights Watch, 
1999). This is caused by their unsustainable extractive activities.  
Besides, MNOCs continuously construct artificial channels in oil communities as part of their 
activities to explore, extract and transport crude oil and gas. The impact has been disastrous to 
the communities especially with the increase in industrial waste released during Oil related 
activities. Often, the waste is channeled into farmlands and water bodies, resulting in loss of 
vegetation, agricultural productivity, marine and wild lives, that has historically sustained lives, 
and movement of the population in the region (Adeola, 2014; Akaruese, 2018, p. 361). 
Furthermore, the extractive activities of MNOCs have destroyed the fishing and farming 
economy of the Delta people. Decades of oil spills and gas flaring have caused soil degradation, 
water contamination, pollution, deforestation, destruction of ecosystem/habitat and loss of 
biodiversity (Clark, et al., 2000, pp. 5-8). Statistics from the Department of Petroleum 
Resources indicate that multinationals including Shell, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil and Total, 
and the Nigerian state oil company, NNPC between 1976 and 1996, recorded approximately 
4,835 incidents resulted in the spillage of at least 2,446,322 barrels of oil (102.7 million U.S. 
gallons), which polluted the environment (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 55). The Spillage is 
caused on the one hand by the fact that many oilfields pipelines and flowlines are old and subject 
to corrosion. This has increased the chances of pollutions and leakage (Oviasuyi & Uwadiae, 
2010, p. 113).  
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Apart from oil spills, gas flares are another hazardous activity of MNOCs that destroy the 
environment (Scholz, 2017). It is reported that an average of 75% of total gas production in 
Nigeria is flared, and about 95% of the “associated gas” which is produced as a by-product of 
crude oil extraction from reservoirs in which oil and gas are mixed (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 
pp. 65-66). Gas flaring has contributed to the emission of greenhouse gases and almost half of 
this is done by Shell. The effect of these activities on the region’s environment, which is a 
source of living for the people, is very alarming and has been part of the drivers of the discontent 
by the people and their communities (Akinyemi, Nwaokocha, & Adesanya, 2012, pp. 518-519). 
All these have contributed to the kind of interaction that exists between MNOCS and oil 
producing communities since the discovery of crude oil in the region.  
A prominent argument that runs through literature is that oil companies in the Niger Delta are 
mostly interested in making profits (Moruku, 2012). Their actions are capitalistic, as the surplus 
that is gained from the production of oil does not stay in the communities where extraction takes 
place rather; it is transported to their home countries for investment. Consequently, this has 
created profound mistrust as MNOCs are perceived by oil communities as capitalistic and 
opportunistic. They are not accepted in their communities as their actions do not mean well for 
them (Moruku, 2012, p. 898). The result of such relationship is that oil communities have 
engaged in hostile actions against MNOCs, shutting down oil operations facilities, kidnapping 
foreign oil workers, oil theft and armed militancy by youth in the community as a form of 
protest. Ebiede (2017, p. 13) argues that militancy has strengthened the relationship between 
the MNOCs and the Nigerian government as the latter provided the former with state security 
forces to suppress the agitations in their various communities of operation.  
In addition, debates over the years have focused on the nature of MNOCs Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in the Niger Delta. It has been reported that for more than two decades, 
Oil companies have not respected international best practices and rules such as laws and norms 
of the communities in conducting business in the region. International environmental laws and 
CSR among others have not been applicable. Such non-compliance policy has caused 
deprivation and massive youth unemployment in the region (Nwosu, 2017, p. 47). However, 
following international outcry, MNOCs recently have established CSR projects to initiate social 
capital and establish cordial relationship with the communities. Unfortunately, critics have 
slammed the projects for their limited outcomes in the communities as well as being part of the 
drivers of conflict among communities in the region (Ebiede, 2017, p. 13).  
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Over the years, MNOCs have borne the burden of brutal communal agitation. In recent times, 
the people have realized how much is taken from their communities by the oil companies and 
very little is given back. Some scholars have highlighted the resentment of inequality and 
negligence among the people of Niger Delta towards the government and MNOCs that has 
resulted into recurrent and volatile confrontations. As such, the communities have adopted 
different approaches to push their demands for what they rationalize as justice. The approach 
over the years has transformed from mere resistance to out blown violence. This has resulted 
not only to loss of lives and property on both sides but has had a negative brunt upon the 
country’s economy (Eweje, 2007, p. 224). Subsequently, many companies were forced to 
abandon operations and drilling activities. 
Evidence has shown that the MNOCs have played a crucial role in the power dynamics 
surrounding oil in the Niger Delta. Elaborating on this assumption, Akinyoade (2018) asserts 
that their connection with oil communities is characterized by divisiveness. MNOCs use the 
divide and rule strategy as part of their interest /goal in conducting business in the communities 
where they explore and produce oil. They have been accused of funding and perpetrating 
systematic abuse of power, resources and corrupt practices. Suffice to say their actions 
encouraged greed and the desire to satisfy needs among the different actors, hence mobilizing 
their conflicting resources and capacities. The divide and rule strategy created a platform where 
different communities compete to create winners and losers. For instance, as a means to quench 
the tensions in the region, MNOCs have been reported of paying off influential local actors 
such as local community chiefs, leaders and traditional rulers (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 237). These 
local actors are awarded oil contracts and are tasked by MNOCs to protect and secure oil-
drilling facilities from theft, destruction and piracy by community gangs, criminal groups and 
militants etc. (World Bank, 2008, p. 26). At times, the distribution of such incentives is done 
through corrupt means as well as exclusionary measures. Such actions further exacerbate 
conflict among communities, gang/criminal members and result to intra and inter-community 
struggles. The action of rewarding a few while excluding others has put different community 
groups at logger heads particularly the youth against their traditional rulers who work in 
collaboration with MNOCs to exploit them. 
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Figure 4. 1: Niger Delta Conflict: Actor Network Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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4.2 Contested Interests: Actors, Encounters and Entanglements in the Niger Delta 
Conflicts arise from conflicting interests, which become incompatible. In Nigeria, interest plays 
a key role in the resource conflicts in the Niger Delta region. The wealth of the country has 
become a curse because of the many conflicting interests (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). 
Contending behaviors have facilitated the survival of conflicts due to the deep-rooted and 
complex attitudes, behaviors of actors and situations that seem to be opaque to the management 
strategies in the region (Freitas, 2015). As a result, actors with competing interests engage in 
aggressive and violent disputes over rent seeking and the extraction and trade of primary 
commodities like oil and gas. Such economic incentives of actors in the Niger Delta who depend 
heavily on black and gray markets that operate outside and at the expense of legal and formal 
economic activity of the state are predatory (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005). This implies that 
the various actors focus on the deliberate and systematic use of violence to acquire access, 
control trade and exploit labor (pp. 2-3). The dependence on primary commodity exports in the 
Niger Delta have increased competition as well as the link between natural resources and 
conflict (Bannon & Collier, 2003, p. 2). Thus, natural resources in the region have allowed 
opportunistic and capitalistic actors to crowd out ideological leaders. Heavy dependence on oil 
serves the country’s national income as well as non-tax revenue for state and MNOCs who 
dominate the Niger Delta where rents are generated (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005, pp. 626-627). 
The scenario in the Niger Delta is surrounded by contending behaviors where different actors 
satisfy their egoistic tendencies. The major conflict centers around the haves/powerful 
(represented by the Nigerian Government, its bureaucrats, officials, politicians, elites, military 
and MNOCs etc.) who accumulate rents, live in affluence and make all the decisions concerning 
the control, management and distribution and management of oil wealth and the have-
nots/powerless (represented by the Niger Delta population, communities, peasantry, women, 
youth, CSOs, and NGOs etc.) who on their part protest, take up arms and demand for resource 
control and entitlement of land ownership. The various layers of competing interests among 
actors in the Niger Delta entangled over access, ownership, and entitlement of resources in the 
region will be analyzed below. 
4.2.1 Powerful Versus Powerless Encounters 
The resource contention between the powerful and the powerless in the Niger Delta allows us 
an understanding of how environment impacts on human behavior, attitude, agendas, agency 
and fuels actor’s violent expression, and agitation (Freitas, 2015). In the Niger Delta, both the 
powerful and the powerless have not changed their cognitive thoughts and attitudes towards 
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another as such; this has led to the reoccurrence of conflict over several decades. For instance, 
there is a disparity in the income gap between the rich and the poor as the rents generated by 
the oil industry is controlled by the powerful represented by elites, and politicians. Besides, 80% 
of the oil and gas wealth benefits just about 4% of the entire population (Mähler, 2010, p. 14). 
A growing literature reveals that, the behavioral patterns of the elites is to accumulate wealth 
and get rich at the detriment of the poor communities where crude oil and gas deposits are found 
(Omeje, 2006-2007, p. 46). Ifedi and Anyu (2011) argue that the interest of the powerful rich 
ruling elites, government officials and politicians is to grip control and ownership over the 
petrol dollar. This to them has impoverished communities and triggered negative development 
outcomes (p.76). The actions of the powerful elites and ruling officials driven by their interest 
and the incentive structures in which they manipulate is not pro-poor and does not generate 
broad-based public goods for the affected communities (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 12). 
The interests of the rich elites and politicians are conveyed through political considerations such 
as the interest to policymakers to stay longer in power in order to get more access to power that 
will enable control and manage oil rents; to get rich by accumulating oil wealth; to prevent 
political opponents from gaining power, and to reward favors/patronage to their allies by 
preventing improvement in the property rights of workers or competitors (Beuran et al., 2011, 
p. 1). 
The powerless represented by the affected communities, groups and their leaders are more 
interested in the contestations over power and authority over of land ownership, resource 
control and distribution. The powerless desire to be involved in contests over access to oil, 
inclusion in oil decision-making matters, as well as to be represented at high-level political 
positions at the Federal level. These contentions have been causes of violent resistance and 
conflict in the Niger Delta. However, in recent times, the interest of local groups has further 
pushed towards infrastructural development, employment opportunities, accountability and 
environmental justice (Ahonsi, 2011, pp. 28-23). These interest groups demand greater 
corporate social responsibility from MNOCs who have made their environment stagnant and 
unbearable to live, as well as pushing the federal government to force multinationals to 
compensate the communities for the huge environmental neglect and damage. This is one of 
the pivotal reasons why there exist local resistances against the Nigerian government-MNOCs 
alliance in the Niger Delta. In this regard, there exist several interest groups within and among 
communities and their local leaders against the tactical alliances of the state and multinationals. 
There are those who serve as loyal opposition to oil companies and the Nigerian Government 
  
115 
in return for favor and patronage. There exist others who are requesting to be paid for the 
damages and rewards for oil wealth from multinationals, and others who undermine the 
legitimacy of the Nigerian Government and the multinationals, thereby seeking full control over 
oil and their lands (Engel, 2005, p. 205). 
Engel further identifies three major interest groups among the local communities: the 
conservatives, elites or moderates; the radicalized youth, peasantry and women and; finally, the 
vigilantes (p. 206). There also exists multi-dimensional competing interests within these groups 
relating to the tactics, leadership, and objectives in their resistance against the government and 
multinationals over the control and entitlement of oil rents. For instance, disputes often exist 
between traditional authorities and militant groups like MOSOP, where traditional leaders were 
perceived as loyal and aids to the rich politicians and elites and multinationals that control the 
rents. MOSOP believed these leaders formed tactical alliances with both the rich and powerful 
elites and the oil companies to seek and benefit from oil resources (Ebiede, 2017, p. 13). Thus, 
different militant groups (MOSOP, Ijaw Youth Council, CSOs, NGOs etc.) all formed strong 
alliances and connections to challenge the legitimacy of the state and multinationals in the 
region (Engel, 2005, pp. 206-207).  
The youth have mobilized especially those who joined militant groups and have provided 
counter narratives to the legitimacy of the government. Communities have strongly mobilized 
especially the youth and militants who play the role of victims of crude oil production which 
has not only deprived them but has also been looted by the rich and non-Niger Delta 
communities. This has given them the legitimacy to resist the control of the rich /powerful and 
economic magnets like the elites, government and MNOCs. Coupled with this is the interest of 
the poor to gain international recognition as ethnic minorities resisting overarching exploitation 
of natural resources. The militants have pushed their legitimacy by creating a booming 
underground economy for themselves as a means to satisfy their interests. The underground 
economy is established around a complex cycle of oil-theft, arms proliferation and hostage 
taking (Ahonsi, 2011, p. 29).  
A glaring dimension of interests is the use of militancy as an option by the poor communities 
to destroy not only the legitimacy of the powerful, but also to destabilize their economic desires 
and interests as well. As a counter tactic for challenging the status quo by armed militants, the 
rich and political elites in Nigeria have used laws and corrupt schemes in the oil industry that 
has hindered the flow of rental income so that they do not trickle down to the local people. The 
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several laws and decrees passed by the Federal government claiming total possession of all land 
and resources is seen by the people as an injunction by the rich and powerful against them, 
which can only be reversed through violence since the rich cannot dialogue with them. Some 
of these legal texts include the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Land Use Act of 1978 and more 
recently Decree No. 13 of 1996 vesting legitimate rights and authority over resource ownership 
in the Federal government (Tantua & Kamruzzaman, 2016, p. 2). 
4.2.2 Elitists Entanglements 
The contestation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta is not limited to competition between groups with 
varying interests but also to groups with similar or the same socio-political and economic 
interests as the powerful elite. The elite are commonly referred to as the “political or ruling 
elites that comprises of both elected and non-elected officials, economic elites and traditional 
rulers who exercise influence on policy making and execution” (Adeosun, Norafidah, & 
Zengeni, 2016, p. 303). They are groups with excellent access to resources or capacities, a 
feature that distinguishes them from other (non-elite) members of society (Kifordu, 2011, p. 
20). In Nigeria, elites are actors with vast disproportionate control over resources (Khan, 2012, 
p. 361), occupying key positions and relations through power networks (Azeez & Ibukunoluwa, 
2015, p. 303). Elites dominate the sectors of the economy that are not under the control of 
MONOCs and their governments, command key positions and make decisions at all levels of 
government (Attah, 2013, p. 73). They are a selected and small group of people in Nigeria with 
power and strong influence on the public, yet their role played in the Niger Delta conflict and 
management outweighs their number (Vergara, 2013, p. 32). Unfortunately, the leadership of 
these minority elites does not benefit the masses and communities in the Niger Delta (Adeosun 
et al., 2016, p. 305). The dominant elites in Nigeria include “senior government and civil service 
officials, political (party) leaders and ‘godfathers’, influential businessmen, retired military 
officers, Nigerian and international oil industry bosses, and community chiefs, various leaders 
of militia groups in the Niger Delta and civil society and social movement leaders. These groups 
challenge in totally different ways, the traditional and predatory but dynamic and fluid political 
processes (whether overt or covert) of negotiation, compromise, bargaining, accommodation 
and coalition and networking-building among powerful groups of state and non-state actors 
(Schultze-Kraft, 2013, P. 7-9). At the core of power in Nigeria and the violent contestations in 
the Niger Delta are the entanglements among key national elites, their international petro-
capitalist allies and contending Niger Delta militia groups that shape diverse interests solely 
focused on the entitlement of oil rents organisations (Laws, 2012; Di John & Putzel, 2009). 
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In the case of the Niger Delta, there are two types of elites, those who are originally from the 
region and those who are from other parts of the country (non-elites). Whether Niger Delta 
elites or non-elites, they are all national, regional and local elites, composed of educated and 
non-educated rich people who either emerged from humble peasant or working-class 
backgrounds (Attah, 2013, p. 73). They have enriched themselves through greed, bribery, 
corruption, and frame practices in government and in the oil business instead of addressing the 
abject poverty, environmental degradation, and socio-economic injustices that plague the 
region. The competing claims are evident in the actual power that dwells with those who control 
the high point of the economy to evade the political class. Since the Nigerian economy is 
controlled by MONCs and backed by their home governments who conduct business in the 
Niger Delta, both elites compete for the position of “comprador” for MNOCs (Attah, 2013, p. 
73). The contention among the influential in Nigeria in their interaction in the oil rich Niger 
Delta is driven by elites whose interests are either to defeat their opponents or look for ways to 
impede the other and/or remain in power. The common feature between both groups is that, 
they control and manipulate the masses and people in the Niger Delta region to satisfy their 
economic incentives. To this end, sometimes by distorting information and public opinion 
region (Tonwe, Ojo, & Aghedo, 2011). The tussle between the Niger Delta elites and non-elites 
usually centers on acquiring wealth and its attendant’s power. In their clash over political spoils, 
these elites challenge each other for political positions in order to benefit from the politics that 
is linked to the control of resources and the distribution of oil revenue from the Niger Delta 
region (p. 59).  
The oil revenue distribution question is very central in the encounters between elites. There are 
four major procedures in which oil revenue is distributed in Nigeria. They include the federal 
account (rents assigned directly by the federal state), a state derivation principle (the right of 
each state to a percentage of the taxes that its inhabitants are expected to have contributed to 
the federal treasury), the Federation Account (or States Joint Account) which distributes 
revenue to the states on the basis of need, population and other criteria, and a Special Grants 
Account (notably monies allocated directly for the Niger Delta, for instance through NDDC ) 
(Watts, 2007, p. 642; Watts, 2008, p. 12). Just like non-elites, Niger Delta elites who ascend to 
power and control state governments are more interested in monopolizing the access to power 
and wealth. The Niger Delta elites use their strategic positions to manipulate and exploit their 
own people and promote private interests by aligning personal interests with the various state 
objectives of the groups (Omilusi, 2015, p. 133). For instance, Niger Delta elites have 
associated their interests into the oil revenue distribution question where communities demand 
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an increase of 25% derivation to all oil states. They have complained about losses and economic 
injustice their states as ethnic minority get while non-oil ethnic majorities have gained by foul 
means (Watts, 2007, p. 642). These competing claims are very evident during the allocation of 
state budgets at the National Assembly. However, the Federal Centre has only increased the 
derivation to 13% refusing to meet the regions’ demands and to balance the outcry of resource 
control. The oil revenue distribution question has enforced enormous power and wealth at the 
level of state governors becoming “Godfathers” (Watts, 2007, p. 642).  
Internally, political elites build legitimacy through elections, and to some extent, through the 
delivery of services and development struggles (Engel, 2005, p. 205). Political elites, state 
officials, the ruling class and hegemonic groups and interests of the political patrons are to 
sponsor candidates during elections that will represent and defend their interests in the oil 
revenue distribution question. As such, clientelist in exchange for economic favors give 
political offers. These clientelist and patrimonial behaviors have weakened political structures 
and made institutions dysfunctional, as the systems do not represent pro-poor interest, but that 
of political godfathers (Oyebode, 2014, p. 139). In such dispensations, certain people are meant 
for public offices and certain families and lineages are vested with power, which gives them 
unbridled authority, and access to oil rents in the Niger Delta. It is argued that the establishment 
of the Niger Delta Development Corporation is part of a clientelist electoral contract because 
the former president Olusegun Obasanjo needed the votes of the people of the Niger Delta 
during the presidential elections (Engel, 2005, p. 205).  
The rise of powerful gubernatorial elections in Nigeria has further complicated matters as 
Governors have been vested with much power and influence on resources (Watts, 2007, p. 650). 
They control state budgets as well as appoint members to civilian positions. Gubernatorial 
elections are usually complex and contested as most politicians and elites and their godfathers 
reinforced the services of thugs, militias and cult groups to militate for them. For instance, in 
oil states, politicians have been supported financially and with arms by ethnic militia groups 
such as NDV and NDPVF. These political thugs distribute votes and intimidate voters as in the 
2003 scandalously corrupt and violent elections. In relation to electoral political thuggery, some 
corrupt high-ranking politicians and disruptive military officials have provided arms to NDV 
and NDPVF and financed these groups with oil money from the region to harass other 
candidates (their opponents) and their supporters (Bøås, 2011, p. 119). A good example is Peter 
Odili the then Governor of River State who deployed NDV and NDPVF for his campaign and 
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re-election in the 2003 gubernatorial elections. Yet after winning with 98%, he, along with other 
patrons distanced themselves from their former thugs (Bøås, 2011, p. 120). 
The extreme proportion of clashes between armed and cult groups coordinated by diverse 
political opponents, has promoted the circulation of small arms and light weapons as well as 
the emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta. This political behavior that surrounds the Niger 
Delta, home to oil revenue for the country, has increased the intense fragility of Nigeria’s oil 
economy (Watts, 2007, p. 637). On the one hand, this has opened avenues for politicians to 
largely steal wealth earmarked for the region, and on the other hand created economic 
opportunities/incentives for the thugs/armed groups they deployed as well as empowered other 
groups like MEND. It is assumed that political grievances by armed groups against their former 
political sponsors/patrons who have failed to deliver promises of money, employment and 
education has encouraged youth in the region to form militia groups (Bøås, 2011, p. 121). To 
scholars like Oluwaniyi (2011), militancy is a creation of the competing interest by high-
ranking politicians and elites in Nigeria struggling to maintain power and control of oil 
resources in the Niger Delta. Unfortunately, this has transformed the political landscape of the 
region as viable youth militias groups have emerged vying and demanding for equal distribution 
of oil wealth (Amaraegbu, 2011, p. 209). The result is that militias and armed groups have 
subsequently formed alliances and networks of state patronage. These groups are often involved 
in illegal economic activities such as oil theft, kidnapping, hostage taking of oil workers and 
asking for ransom (Ogundiya, 2009, p. 31). MEND in 2006, was responsible for 19 attacks on 
foreign oil operations that accounted for a 30% reduction in oil revenue (Watts, 2007, p. 647). 
Critical to the elite struggle is the escalation of ethnic rivalry promoted by political leaders eager 
to shape profitable political and economic advantages and influence for themselves. This is 
rooted in the hegemony of powerful northern and southern political interests. While Niger Delta 
elites are mounting political pressure for the revenue distribution process and a greater share of 
the oil wealth, non-elites, especially Northerners want a permanent grip in the oil industry. It is 
argued that the ethnic divide was enhanced by the British colonial masters who had cautioned 
the Hausa-Fulani (Northerners) never to leave political power as it would guarantee them a 
strong grip over Niger Delta resources (Chidiebere, 2016, p. 29). With a firm control over the 
Federal government, Northerners have bypassed every Niger Delta state authority to control oil 
rents. Being the ethnic majority, Northern elites have appropriated power in Nigeria since 
independence with just brief passages of some Southern elites like Olusegun Obasanjo 
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described as “friendly to the North” and Goodluck Johnathan (Fenske & Zurimendi , 2017, p. 
9). 
The dispute between Niger Delta elites and non-elites was further exacerbated during 
Obasanjo’s regime. Many elites strongly opposed his conflict management strategies that were 
initiated in the region especially the fact that he instrumentalized coercion and violence. 
Coupled with the circumstance where he wanted to change the constitution to run for a third 
term, many Niger Delta elites vehemently opposed his bid. This led to open clashes between 
Niger Delta elites and Obasanjo who was backed by Northern elites who saw his presidency as 
a means of remaining in firm control of oil resources (Idemudia, 2009, p. 18). Consequently, 
prominent elites of Niger Delta were arrested, notably the former president of the Ijaw Youth 
Congress (IYC) Asari Dokubo, and Chief Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State and many others 
(Watts, 2007, p. 646). 
Elites play very relevant roles in the development of their society and initiate processes that 
transform them. Regrettably, the elites in the Niger Delta have not been able to encourage 
positive development outcomes in the region irrespective of the fact that the Niger Delta elites 
are the ones who understand the plight of their communities and should have encouraged long-
term sustainable solutions to the problems that confront the region. (Adeosun et al., 2016, p. 
308). Rather, they have complicated the problems of the region and pursued economic interests 
at the expense of secure and stable Niger Delta (Amaraegbu, 2011, p. 209).  
4.2.3 Intra and Inter Community Contestations 
The struggles among the poor communities in the Niger Delta are a common form of 
competition that is usually witnessed through intra-communal conflicts (often involves actors 
belonging to the same communities) and inter-communal conflicts (encompassing conflicts 
between different/opposing communities). Intra communal struggles often arise over claims to 
traditional authority within communities, or new power-brokers emerge to challenge traditional 
chief. At times, intra communal conflicts take the form of fights between community members 
and groups over entitlement to MNOCs payments and oil distribution. For instance, there has 
been several instances where the youths have challenged the powers of traditional leaders in 
dealing with compensation payments resulting in violence. For example, the case of Nembe 
(World Bank, 2008, p. 36). The inter communal level is characterized by disputes over 
boundaries where oil wells and installations are located. Communities fight over land 
ownership as it is usually customary rather than registered. Also, local vigilantes’ groups are 
  
121 
requested to defend community interest in terms of jobs, and benefits from oil which often cause 
clashes among communities (World Bank, 2008, p. 36-37). These contentions between 
members of the same communities and opposing communities arise due to disputes over land 
and the contest to hold leadership positions in their various communities. Land conflicts are 
very common among communities as they fight over ownership of ancestral land as well as 
land used for fishing and farming. These encounters also surround tensions over land that 
MNOC’s exploration and production of crude oil takes place (Ebiede, 2017, p. 15). The conflict 
had redefined interactions, solidarity, integration and relations among the poor in the Niger 
Delta (Folami, 2017, p. 4). 
The control of power has also been a major reason for the conflicting interests between members 
of the same community and/or different communities or ethnic groups. This is related to the 
control of oil wealth that is found in most of the local communities where the poor live. The 
encounters between poor communities center around the local rivalry to control oil resources 
and the benefits that these communities get from the corporate practices of the MNOCs. This 
is often the key factor over the contention for power as everyone one wants to be part of the 
rents that accrue from oil exploration activities in their communities. There have been reported 
cases where poor communities have witnessed very violent clashes related to the compensations 
given to them by foreign oil companies due to the unsustainable activities such as gas flaring 
and oil spillage from uncovered oil pipelines like those of Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC). In such scenarios, members of the community often find themselves 
competing over the compensations paid by MNOCs. For instance, communities have 
challenged their leaders for receiving compensations from oil companies at the expense of their 
interests (Ebiede, 2017, pp. 15-16). 
In addition, ethnicity has come into play in the claims over the oil resources and the distribution 
of political opportunities. Inter-ethnic conflicts develop over panic over political participation, 
rights and control of local budgets/funds (World Bank, 2008). For example, conflicts between 
the Ijaw and Itsekiri over issues of ethnicity related to distribution of candidates to benefit from 
the NDA and DDR program Also, inter-ethnic tensions usually take the form of claims of 
entitlement of rights and privileges by ethnic majority groups in the region. In an interview with 
community members of the Niger Delta, it was consistent that communities where oil 
operations, production, drilling, exploration takes place, claim they are more entitled to the 
resources and it is their rights in this regard to get more benefits from the resource distribution 
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than other communities51. These communities consider themselves, as dominant ethnic oil 
communities as such should receive more privileges than others. Other communities with less 
extractive activities equally feel they should be compensated just like the others. Such claims 
of entitlement have worsened community relations as well as relationship among ethnic 
minorities in the region52. Pertinent are the feuds between the Itsekeri and the Ijaws as well as 
the Itsekiri and the Urhobo communities in Warri, Delta state who are struggling for the limited 
political space available for them to occupy (Kalejaiye & Alliyu, 2013, p. 254). This has really 
affected the socio-economic and political landscape in the Niger Delta characterized by gross 
inequalities. Such claims have resulted in new groupings where ethnic groups demand to have 
equal access to the rents that accrue from crude oil production (Dibua, 2005, p. 6). This is 
manifested at the local, state government and Federal level. 
The manipulative character of elites/politicians and MNOCs further heightens the politics of 
intra and inter communal strife where communities in the heart of poverty revolt against each 
other. The elite dimension in the socio-economic and socio-political problems in the feud has 
impacted on the political economy of the country. In some cases, powerful political elites stay 
behind the scenes teleguiding and manipulating policy and actions. They exploit the poor to 
revolt against each other and defend their economic and egocentric political interests (Okeke, 
2014, p. 324). Also, MNOCs usually reward communities they consider obedient and 
cooperative while those they consider difficult usually get nothing. Moreover, elites/politicians 
distribute favors and oil wealth based on their relationship with the communities. This has been 
a nursing ground for the competition that takes place in these communities and their neighbors 
(Ifedi & Anyu, 2011). 
4.2.4 MNOCs and Niger Delta Communities’ Confrontations 
The conflict in the Niger Delta can be captured from the perspective of the clash of interests 
between MNOCs and local communities involved in some form of encounters (Imobighe, 2004, 
p. 101). These groups include: oil multinationals who are perceived as the most powerful and 
richest corporations in the world, local communities and social movements such as NGOs, 
CSOs, and faith-based organizations who have been active in advocating for the rights of the 
indigenous people (Imobighe, 2004, pp. 101-103). It is important to note that both 
multinationals and poor communities in the Niger Delta region have different, undeniably 
                                                 
51 Respondents 10 and 21, July 2018, Nigeria. 
52 Respondents 11, 15 and 20, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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conflicting interests, priorities and needs (Ebegbulem, Ekpe, & Adejumo, 2013, p. 281). 
Although the interests of these two actors differ hugely, they mainly converge on the 
importance of oil and its associated wealth. In this regard, there is a growing consensus in 
literature that the interest of multinationals is purely business (oil extraction) and to make profit 
(profit maximization) (Idemudia, 2014, p. 192). The tensions inherent in the region are partly 
connected to the nature of the core business activities of MNOCs. This limits the incentive and 
undermines development and peace in the region. This view substantiates the argument of 
Ebegbulem et al. (2013) as they claim that multinationals are more interested in maximizing 
profit. Their primary concern is to explore and produce crude oil profitably. They further argue 
that MNOCs are not interested in pushing for genuine development in the region. Unfortunately, 
this has continued to increase poverty in the region. On the other hand, the interest of the local 
communities is based on the discourse of entitlement on the question of land ownership and 
wealth distribution (p. 281). This argument was very coherent from interviews conducted with 
local community members in the region. Many community members that were interviewed 
gave reasons as justification for their claims of entitlement. One of such is the belief that land 
to them is ancestral53. Their rationalization of land is socially embedded in their cultural belief 
systems and this heightens their claim for entitlement and ownership54. Moreover, their personal 
perspective is that their communal land hosts oil activities of MNOCs and as such they should 
be entitled to control not only the land and its resources but the wealth that it generates55. A 
further argument raised is that the distribution of wealth in the region has been unjust56. Some 
elders and traditional leaders perceive the different laws adopted by the government (which 
grants the latter all legal rights of all land and resources in the country) as depriving them of 
what they are entitled to57. Their perceptions of such laws is that they have been created to take 
away their right to make decisions about the activities on their land; and strip the oil rights of 
all communities in the region (Ako, 2009, p. 296). Regarding this, communities in the Niger 
Delta in the past have complained about being marginalized as minority ethnic groups. They 
felt deprived of social and economic infrastructure from the MNOCs that operate in their 
communities (Eweje, 2007, p. 220). This has resulted in community resistance and tensions 
between poor communities and MNOCs. 
                                                 
53 Respondent 15, July 2018, Nigeria. 
54 Respondents 11 and 21, July 2018, Nigeria. 
55 Respondent 21, July 2018, Nigeria. 
56 Respondent 29, July 2018, Nigeria. 
57 Respondents 10 and 15, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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Local communities, supported by MEND, have continued their opposition to those exploitative 
policies. They demand a full clean-up of local waterways and territories, a more equitable 
distribution of oil revenues and broader compensation for ecological damage. (Environmental 
Justice Atlas, 2018). Also, pressure has been mounted by CSOs, NGOs and the international 
community concerning the abuse of the environment by oil multinationals in the region. 
Concerns have been raised and multinationals have been accused of depriving the poor people 
in the Niger Delta the right to a sustainable environment (Okonkwo & Etemire , 2017, p. 45). 
Responding to allegations made by CSOs and the international community regarding the 
unsustainable use of oil activities to both the environment and the people of the Niger Delta, 
MNOCs claim that since the government receives all the taxes and royalties, it is the 
responsibility of the government to develop the oil communities (Clark, et al., 2000, p. 12). 
Furthermore, the responses of oil corporations have been met with contradictions. Their 
strategies have been to take advantage of the fragile political environment including weak laws 
and tax enforcement systems in Nigeria to avoid damages and inadequate CSR practices in the 
region (Clark, et al., 2000, p. 12). They have failed to compensate and clean up polluted 
environments. Apart from the lack of compensation and clean ups, MNOCs have adopted over 
the years the divide and rule strategies to flame intra and inter communal squabbles via 
differential treatments of communities (including: Eleme-Okrika conflict, the Itsekiri-Ijaw 
conflict, the Itsekiri-Urhobo conflict and the Ijaw-Ilaje conflict) as well as the use of outright 
repression and violent acts to quench down protest in communities (Clark, et al., 2000, pp. 12-
17). 
The relationship between MNOCs and local communities is very complex, and this has 
impacted on the various levels of their exchange. This complexity is further complicated by the 
use of the military by MNOCs to address local resistance and tension in the region. The military 
has played a very decisive role in the politics of oil conflict in the Niger Delta region. The 
Nigerian military is a strategic actor in the capital accumulation process of the country’s ailing 
economy and is part of the government and MNOCs alliance (Agbese, 1990, p. 299). Their role 
in the conflict does not only portray the complexities but the contradictory alliances among 
actors. Just like government officials, politicians, elites and militia groups, the military has 
profited immensely from the oil wealth in the region. The military has been at the center of 
power and politics in Nigeria, involving itself in the socio-economic dynamics and politics of 
oil production, exploration and distribution in the Niger Delta (Onuoha, 2016, pp. 28-30). The 
military emerged as a key actor into the politics of oil during the period of the oil boom in 
Nigeria. During the era of the military rule, the military had full control over the Nigerian 
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economy. At this time the army was heavily involved in oil politics, some of its personnel 
hauling in enormous salaries and officers departing from the service with huge bank accounts 
(Akindele, 1993, p. 68). Various previous governments, both military and civilian, expropriated 
oil rents in the region to secure their control to power and to pursue their anti-populist agendas 
(Adeola, 2014, p. 9). 
Intrinsic to the conflicting perceptions of the military, it has created a culture of violence in 
which force and repression have been legitimized as instruments of governance (Agbese, 1990, 
p. 299). A good example is the Odi massacre where, on November 20th, 1999, following the 
murder of seven policemen, military retaliation raided and wiped out the entire community of 
Odi (Punch, 2017). This scenario culminated in lasting confrontations between the Military and 
resistant youth as well as militant groups like MEND in the region. Amidst this stalemate 
between the military and resistant youth and militant groups, a Joint Task Force (JTF) was 
established to maintain law and order in the entire region. However, the JFK has been deployed 
to quench peaceful protests and resistance in the Niger Delta further complicating the conflict 
resulting to a wanton destruction of lives and property (Smock, 2009). In view of the above 
argument, it can be observed that the modes of operation and frequent intervention of the 
Nigerian military in civilian politics has disrupted the democratic process and prevented 
democratic culture from taking root in Nigeria, thereby preventing the nation’s stabilization 
(Ikpe, 2000, p. 146). Accordingly, it is the nature of the military to violate formal rules, such as 
constitutional laws, as means to destabilize power and the voice of the people. This political 
strategy has favored resorting to extra-judicial and violent approaches to suppress legitimate 
demands and peaceful protest by minority groups and communities in the Niger Delta (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002). Military involvement in the political economy of oil has resulted in the 
instatement of many economic policies that accelerated civil discontentment and resistance 
among ethnic minorities and a number of civil society groups, notably the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) (Adeola, 2014, p. 11). The military incursion has instrumentalized 
the politics of ethnicity and tribalism to polarize the political landscape for their selfish political 
ends. This has created a favorable economic environment for them to loot resources in the Niger 
Delta region (Onuoha, 2016, p. 26).  
In addition, the interaction between oil multinationals and local communities in the Niger Delta 
has been based on patrimonial lines. Corrupt practices have characterized business dealings and 
relationships. Corruption at national and regional level has equally exerted a maximum 
influence at the local level. This feeds down into every community in the region, where oil 
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money flows into the hands of local elites in the same way as it does to national elites (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999, p. 96). For instance, there have been instances where oil company 
contractors have reported that MNOCs engage in bribe and corrupt practices. At times they 
award contracts to traditional leaders and in turn request for their own commission/percentage. 
They also bribe the leaders to support them and accommodate their unsustainable activities of 
oil production in the communities including environmental pollution. The interest of the local 
elites/local chiefs is to accept such offers and accumulate wealth for themselves (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999, p. 97). 
The role and impact of the multinational oil companies on local communities in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta region is very significant particularly through their agency and behavior. The relationship 
between local communities and MNOCs is built in a way that MNOCs create rents for local 
elites and restrict entry for others. As such, local leaders are expected to show their support for 
MNOCs and ensure that violence is reduced. They act as intermediaries between MNOCs and 
their entire communities in times of crisis. It has been argued that these local elites who benefit 
from the rents, are more interested in the operations of MNOCs and do not care if the 
interest/needs of other members are met. Some authors (Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2012, pp. 117-
119) have argued that, the exclusion of other members of the community has compelled them 
to resent not only the MNOCs but their local intermediaries. Those with limited access because 
of the tactical alliances of local elites and MNOCs, become discontented over their restricted 
entry to benefit from oil wealth. As a form of protest, they sabotage oil pipelines and commit 
other criminal activities. Data from the field revealed that, the excluded community members 
like militants, gangs and criminal groups, rationalize protest to get their voices heard, draw 
attention and equally benefit from the oil economy58. Therefore, protest becomes lucrative for 
them. This argument is premised from the fact that communities where oil production takes 
place, perceive themselves as victims. This is because they see the collusion between MNOCs 
and the Federal Government who benefit from oil as exclusionary59. Thus, there are a diverse 
level of conflictual encounters in the region. 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the social interactions, misunderstandings and battles over resource 
control, ownership, entitlement and distribution. It showed how relationships are challenged 
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through various forms of resistance by the people in the Niger Delta, and how dominated 
communities in the Niger Delta challenge representations that play upon and legitimize 
marginalization. The chapter analyzed how local communities challenged structures of power 
and actions that destroy their communities. It illustrated the multi-complex dimensions of 
power and contradictions inherent in the encounters between the Federal Government, MNOCs 
and Oil Communities. The encounters involve the coming together of conflicting claims, 
interests, agency, narratives and counter-narratives about the control and ownership of oil. The 
connection between actors, their interests, correlations, capacities, resources, strategies as well 
as their incentives to continue the exploitation and control of oil rents has been analyzed. The 
various discourses of conflicting interest and social entanglements has been detailed alongside 
explanations of how networks of patronage between the government, MNOCs and Oil 
communities are negotiated and defected. Thus (re)shaping the conflict within time and space. 
Finally, it analyzed the divergent perspectives and positionalities of the actors and demonstrated 
how these contested encounters in the Niger Delta re (frame) actors’ actions and behaviors. The 
chapter claims that self-interested and utility maximizing actors in the Niger Delta will 
constantly and certainly respond to incentive frameworks. The impact of all this upon broad-
based outcomes in the region such as the Amnesty and DDR program will be analyzed in 
chapter five.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY, DISARMAMENT, 
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 
5 Introduction 
This chapter examines the implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty and Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (NDA and DDR) and the extent to which it is an holistic and 
integrated peacebuilding initiative. The chapter argues that the politics of how the NDA and 
DDR program was conceived/formulated, negotiated/arranged on, planned and 
implemented/operationalized, has significant implications on the overall outcome of the 
program. Therefore, to understand the program, it is imperative to present an analysis of the 
politics behind the conceptualization, negotiation, planning and implementation. The chapter 
provides a detailed analysis of the Amnesty and DDR program from the perspective of the 
minimalist and maximalist approach to peacebuilding. The first section reviews the amnesty 
practice. The second section analyses the politics of conceptualization, while the next section 
discusses the art of the negotiation process. The fourth section offers a critical account on the 
implementation of the DDR program. The final section presents some consideration by way of 
a conclusion. 
5.1 Amnesty: A Peacebuilding Practice  
Globally, amnesty initiatives and laws have been approved and used by many state actors and 
non-state actors as a contribution towards the maintenance of global peace and security. 
Imperatively, amnesty has been used as a strategy to enhance global, regional, national and 
local/community-based peacebuilding. Amnesties are generally peace negotiations and 
activities of bilateral and/or multilateral working groups on burning issues of conflict including 
arms control, and regional security. They are usually passed by laws, which are voted by the 
parliament or result from decrees with the effect of law either following a political change or 
following serious disorder or war particularly civil wars and armed conflicts (United Nations, 
2014). 
Amnesty is a Greek word, “Amnestia” which means to forget (Bourdon, 2011). This implies 
that the legislature allows for the removal of legally punishable acts or eliminates any sentence 
upon individuals or groups which otherwise would have been punishable. Some of the global 
characteristics of amnesties are that, they are usually separate laws voted by parliament. In 
addition, such laws are retroactive because they only apply to acts committed before they are 
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passed. As a result, amnesties always have a restricted time frame validity to be implemented. 
In this regard, amnesties offer the elimination of any penalty when they come into existence 
after a sentence has been imposed or at the termination of public proceedings. Granting amnesty 
entails putting an end to all forms of private and public prosecution (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 400). 
This is polemic to see perpetrators of deadly crimes go unpunished and victims then feel an 
additional sense of victimization because the instigators and perpetrators cannot be brought to 
justice.  
Bourdon (2011) illustrates this and argues that: 
“When a law of amnesty follows a period of grave civil unrest or armed clashes, it may 
simply wipe out crimes which international law sees as “universal”. When that happens, 
the amnesty law is “justified” by the need to re-establish peace on the one hand or 
national reconciliation on the other. In other words, the law of amnesty does tend to 
ensure the silencing of those victims who have suffered crimes which a priori have done 
the worst damage to a national community or to the international community of nations. 
From that paradoxical nature, many contradictions arise. How can a deed be made 
unpunishable when it would seem on its face to be precisely the one that most demands 
punishment?” 
However, the elimination of a legally punishable act does not imply that the amnestied action 
may not still lead and or require in certain situations to pay damages to victims (Indianization 
of victims). 
Several amnesty programs have taken place in different parts of the world including in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Often, these programs have a common 
feature with the amnesty covering the DDR phases of the process. However, there exist some 
differences in the application and implementation of the amnesty in particular state contexts. In 
1970 for instance, amnesty was granted in Latin America particularly in Argentina and Chile 
to crimes that were considered worst against humanity. Additionally, in Uruguay in 1986, an 
amnesty program was passed, which declared an expiration of the state’s punitive authority, 
granting amnesty to acts of oppression committed by the Uruguay military and police officers 
from 1973-1975. This was the era of dictatorship and/or authoritarianism in the country. In 
1987, this amnesty was followed by a law of Due obedience that allowed junior officers to 
escape legal justice. Just like in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, Brazil, on 28 August 1979 
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granted an amnesty program. This allowed the military leadership to remove punishment on 
crimes committed during the era of authoritarian rule in the country (Bourdon, 2011). 
In other parts of the world such as the Balkan countries, internationally sponsored weapons 
amnesty programs were carried out. The Amnesty was a 45 days’ program sponsored by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to break the “gun culture” prevalent in the 
Balkans (New Europe Brussels Team, 2003). The amnesty was aimed at collecting illegal 
weapons and to remove penalties for crimes committed. In Albania, an amnesty was applied to 
disarm militants. 
In this vein, illegal weapons such as guns, rockets launchers and mortars in the possession of 
the local population during the years of ethnic struggles, which brought Albania to the brink of 
civil war in 2001, were collected. In addition, in Afghanistan, an amnesty that incorporated a 
DDR was very pivotal in dismantling the forces of Ismail Khan and his opponents in Western 
Afghanistan in August 2003. This was a voluntary DDR program and was led by the United 
Nations Development Program and Japan. The program demobilized soldiers of existing 
military units and disarmed them of heavy weapons (UN, 2003, p. 327). 
Furthermore, in Africa (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Nigeria), several 
amnesties and DDR programs were implemented and were used as neoliberal peacebuilding 
processes. These programs involved signing agreements for combatants in armed conflicts to 
surrender their arms and weapons, demilitarize and reintegrate them into society. In Angola for 
example, a DDR program for ex-combatants was initiated after three decades of civil war. This 
was a political process which was built on mutual trust, followed by a peace accord in 2002 
known as the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) (Andersen, 2011, p. 2). 
Additionally, in Liberia, after fourteen years of civil war and thirteen attempted peace 
agreements and intervention by the Economic Community of West African States Military 
Observer Group (ECOMOG), a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana 
in 2003. As a result, amnesty programs were granted to perpetrators of crimes and ex-
combatants. Finally, on October 31, 2004, the amnesty was completed. It included a DDR 
program of over 101,496 combatants and their associates who were disarmed and demobilized 
(Jaye, 2009, p. 5). A similar process took place in Sierra Leone where there was an extensive 
DDR process with the enactment of the 2011 Abuja Protocols. The process disarmed 76,000 
combatants including 6000 children (Sesay & Suma, 2009, p. 4). In South Africa, a “Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission” (TRC) was initiated to ensure negotiations between the apartheid 
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government and the Liberation movements. As a result, perpetrators of grave crimes during the 
apartheid period were granted amnesty and forgiven and were immune from legal actions. 
However, new challenges in countries such as in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, 
Libya, and the Great Lakes region have emerged, coupled with the volatility reluctance of the 
militias to disarm. Militants remain a threat to stability, with insecurity spreading to other 
neighboring countries. 
On 25 June 2009 in Nigeria, pursuant to section 175 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, late 
President Yar’Adua granted “amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have 
directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant 
activities in the Niger Delta” (The Conversation, 2017). Militants were expected to willingly 
and readily hand over all illegal equipment, weapons and arms in their possession and renounce 
militancy in all its forms (Austine & Sunday, 2013, p. 132). The Government promised that it 
would “institute programs to assist in disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and provision 
of reintegration assistance to the militants”. (Ebiede, 2017, p. 20). This according to the 
government would improve security stabilization in the region and guarantee medium and long-
term development (Sahara Reporters, 2009). The declaration was to take effect from 6 August 
2009 to 4 October 2009 and armed militants were given a period of sixty days to accept the 
amnesty and register for the DDR program. Under the terms of the proclamation, militants who 
give up all weapons and demobilized would not be prosecuted and would be given incentives. 
These benefits involve: formal education and vocational training at home and abroad, start-up 
of entrepreneurial projects as well as a monthly stipend of USD400 (The Conversation, 2017). 
5.2 The NDA and DDR Program and the Politics of conceptualization 
The formulation process of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program was informed by 
conflicting conceptual positionalities and understandings of the conflict, which resulted in 
security and stability versus development agendas for the program (Inuwa, 2017, pp. 168-169). 
This relates to the interests of different actors in relation to their perceptions and understanding 
of the conflict in terms of security and development. The conceptualization process and the 
development perspective and comprehension of the conflict can be dated to the 2008 report of 
the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (Ako & Omiunu, 2013, p. 96; Ibaba & Ikelegbe, 
2010, p. 219). The Committee recognized that the frustration and discontent that have fueled 
tensions and violent conflict in the region is deep-seated in development and infrastructural 
neglect (MEND, 2009, pp. 6-7). This implies that the Niger Delta’s development concerns were 
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primordial to the TCND. At the core of the worsening development and security challenges in 
the Niger Delta was the governance deficit which the Committee equally identified. Against 
this backdrop, the Amnesty and DDR program was interpreted and conceptualized from a 
development, security and stability response program as TCND took into account Nigeria’s 
stability and the Niger Delta’s place as a coastal frontier within the Gulf of Guinea security 
architecture (TCND, 2008, p. 48). The observations of the TCND were clear: the conflict in the 
Niger Delta was not only related to issues of governance but also as the result of rentierism and 
neopatrimonialism that lay at the fore of the community neglect, sparking deep discontentment, 
community agitation, resistance movements, and ultimately rampant criminality (Onapajo & 
Moshood, 2016, pp. 42-43). As a result, as part of the initiative to aid the government in solving 
the above-mentioned problems, the TCND made the following recommendations: to increase 
oil revenue allocation to the Niger Delta to 25% in order to fund infrastructural and human 
development projects; negotiate amnesty for all militants and create a DDR plan to encourage 
the negotiation, planning and implementation process; initiate an open trail and unconditional 
release of MEND’s leaders Henry Okah; and address environmental challenges among others 
(TCND, 2008, p. 3). It should be noted that the most central suggestion of the TCND was the 
comprehensive implementation of Amnesty and DDR program that respected the basic 
principles of neoliberal peacebuilding standards as prescribed by the United Nations in the 
Integrated DDR standards (Joab-Peterside, Porter, & Watts, 2012, p. 11; Molly, 2011, p. 111). 
Although the report of the TCND saw the need for a maximalist approach to peacebuilding 
which entailed addressing both the development and security questions in the conceptualization, 
design and implementation of the program, the Nigerian government was more interested in a 
minimalist approach which conceived, the program as a security and stability project and 
undermined the development aspects60. At the core of this lies the Nigerian government’s 
concerns about the deteriorating security and stability issues posed by militancy with an 
unfavorable impact on the production and exploration of crude oil from the region (Mohammed 
et al., 2014, p. 87). Connected with the fact that insecurity and instability in the region had a 
huge impact on the country’s economy which depends mostly on the rents from crude oil. The 
security agenda informed the conceptualization process of the program (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 
14). Members of the Nigerian security architecture saw militancy from a security sector 
perspective as a threat to national security and pressed for an Amnesty and DDR program that 
prioritized security over development with limited consideration to the fundamental human 
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security and development issues that led to the conflict (Inuwa, 2017, p. 72). During the heart 
of the strife, a policy report was submitted to the Late President Umaru Yar’Adua indicating 
that it was crucial to grant amnesty and implement a DDR program to the Niger Delta militants 
as a strategic approach to end militancy and youth violence which had made the region a hot 
spot61. Inuwa (2017) further reported that a preparatory meeting was held with Ateke Tom, the 
militant commander of the NDV with the main objective to suggest to the government to grant 
amnesty to the militants who were willing to lay down their arms and in return, the government 
would compensate him and his associates. Unfortunately, the strategy to grant amnesty to the 
militants was not well received by the National Security Adviser (NSA). Nevertheless, the 
suggestion was later coined as a disarmament agenda by the then Chief of Defense Staff and 
proposed to the government (p. 171).  
Obi (2014) argues that the primary concern of the state was to address the burning security 
stabilization crisis in the region. He further noted that in its widest frustration, the government 
instituted an Amnesty and DDR program which was not aimed at restoring sustainable peace 
but to get rid of the “disruptive militant elements” from the globalized production of oil in the 
Niger Delta (p. 250). In their day-to-day operations, the militants had created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and insecurity. The insecurity created by militant activities, costs the economy 4 to 
8 billion USD worth of oil (Ibaba, 2008, p. 20). The fragile stability of Niger Delta and the 
general insecurity that increased fear of the unknown gripped the hearts of the state-
multinational alliance and therefore pushed for a security response (Ikelegbe, 2010, p. 40). The 
capacity of the militants and the sophisticated arms and weapons in their possession was a main 
concern for the booming petro-business which had an immediate effect on the national economy 
and the political elites (Obi, 2014, p. 252).  
In fact, this analysis is echoed by Obi, who asserts that: 
‘the PAP has been less of a DDR programme and more of a political project by a 
dominant Nigerian elite coalition (comprising top-level state executives, members of 
their political networks, politically connected retired and serving military and security 
officials, government officials, traditional rulers and top-level private sector executives) 
intent on maintaining dominant power relations and preserving the conditions for 
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optimal extraction of oil—the fiscal basis of its power, wealth and hegemony’ (Obi, 
2014, p. 250-251). 
Besides, the rentier-neoptrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian state as well as its 
interests shaped the conceptualization process. The violence and chaos in the region that later 
transformed into out blown militancy, led to hostage taking, kidnapping, destruction of oil 
installations and pipelines and hindered socio-economic activities in the local communities 
(Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012, p. 163). This made the region ungovernable and a big threat to oil 
production, security, unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state. Thus, the government 
was pressured by these circumstances to first address issues that could be detrimental to its 
interests and nature, in this case oil rents and the general stability and security that surrounds 
oil operations (Alumuna, Ofoegbu, & Edet, 2017, p. 49429). Also, the stability and security of 
their allies, was instrumental in shaping the conceptualization of the Program. A respondent 
noted that both the government and the multinationals had immediate interest to maintain 
stability in the region. However, their interest was more of political stability for economic 
benefits62.  
The program was formulated as a one-shop for all activities associated to initiating peace in the 
restive region (Okonofua, 2016, p. 3). Inuwa (2017) asserts that the program brought in some 
sort of vagueness connected to the main purposes, procedures, methods and expected impact of 
the program. One challenge with the one-dimensional vested formulation of the program is that 
it failed to appropriately envision and/or construct likely menaces within the disarmament and 
demobilisation of ex-militants, because ex-militants can exploit the increasing political 
opportunities in place and rearm themselves (Alden 2002, p.34). Additionally, those who were 
not involved in the DDR program could sponsor and recruit former militants to commit violent 
acts (Mehlum, Moene, & Ragner, 2002, p. 448). For instance, this what exactly what happened 
with the emergence of the militant group the “Niger Delta Avengers” in 2016. The vagueness 
and uncertainty intensified by the state’s inability to contain strategies for monitoring and 
evaluating the implementation of the amnesty (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 20). The entire process was 
motivated as a security response to security conditions in the Niger Delta at the time (Agbiboa, 
2015, p. 400). It was the dire interest of President Yar’Adua and his government to reduce 
fundamentally the violence that was taking place and buy peace by getting the militants to lay 
down their weapons (Eke, 2014, p. 751). The process was specifically focused on armed groups 
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in the region renouncing violence and adhering to a government sponsored DDR program (Obi, 
2014, p. 250). 
In the view of Okonofua (2014), the government’s minimalist or narrow solution to buy off 
militants undermined the more devastating structural conditions that encouraged and continues 
to strengthen, poverty, unemployment and violence (Ushie, 2013, p.33). Furthermore, the 
conceptualization politics failed to tackle the wider socio-economic grievances (News24, 2017). 
These involve the lack of social development in local oil communities, environmental 
degradation, and the exclusion of local communities from the governance of oil production in 
the Niger Delta region (The Conversation, 2017). The agenda did not include the possibility to 
address political and economic conditions that promote cultural systems that connects militants 
to cults and the political state which have also been part of the drivers of conflict (Okonofua, 
2014). 
Adopting a minimalist strategy in conceiving the program, undermines a developmental 
approach to addressing the concerns of the people by providing them with socio-economic and 
infrastructural development (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012, pp. 167-168). This is an example of a 
resource curse where, the behavior and action of the government and its officials is driven by 
the vested interests to depend solely on oil rents and royalties from oil and lacking to conceive 
programs for the socio-economic development of the Niger Delta people (Birks & Sinclair, 
1984). Oil profit strengthens the coalition between the government and its corporate allies to 
focus on containment of the conflict (Okonofua, 2016, p. 2). It is assumed that members of the 
Nigerian State Security Architecture in their formulation, did not have a broad understanding 
of the complex relationship between development, conflict and security and thus failed to 
effectively blend both security and development or the securitization of development and the 
developmentalization of security (Inuwa, 2017, p. 172). 
From an international perspective, the philosophy behind the formulation of the program was 
to respond to international pressure to address attack on global oil market stability caused by 
militia activities in the Niger Delta (Molly, 2011). A respondent revealed that the country 
wanted to project its international image as a country that respects the liberal ideas of good 
governance through the resolution of the problem by responding to the governance and security 
challenges in the region63. 
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5.3 NDA and DDR Program and the Art of Negotiation 
Concerning the negotiation process, empirical evidence showed that the Nigerian Government 
did not initiate any genuine and formal discussion aimed at reaching an agreement with the 
affected communities or by using the military to conquer the militants as it is usually the case 
with the UN Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)64. 
In fact, the government virtually owned the entire process as it was in charge of the planning, 
execution and outcome of the program (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 21). The process was void of 
negotiated dialogue and agreement between the conflicting parties (the Nigerian State/MNOCs 
coalition versus the Militants/Communities)(Schultze-Kraft, 2018a). According to the accounts 
of some militants that were interviewed for this study, informal agreement and dialogue was 
held between the government, MNOCs and their leaders. They disclosed that at the end of each 
behind the door meetings, their leaders briefed them on what was discussed and agreed65. One 
of the militant leaders revealed that, they were the main arm of negotiation between the 
government/MNOCs and the boys they command. He asserted that they were invited in a 
closed-door meeting where an amnesty was proposed to them and their boys. However, due to 
the nature of the Nigerian government and its officials who never keep to their promises, these 
leaders did not trust the government. Nevertheless, having been convinced by the government 
who indicated its good fate and willingness to improve on the situation in the region and 
promised to compensate the top leaders and their boys if they drop down their weapons and 
accept amnesty, they decided to give a try to the proposal. He further indicated that their main 
interest and that of their communities has always been to get access to oil rents and 
environmental justice which was discussed during the informal peace deal between them and 
the government. Accordingly, their interest was aligned with the government’s interest and 
willingness to change the trajectories of their communities66. A report from Reuters (Reuters, 
2009) also indicated that the government was ready to grant amnesty to the militants if they 
agreed to lay down their weapons, but the key militant group dismissed the offer as mere words. 
MEND for instance rejected the offer because “it is ambiguous, dictatorial and has not been 
tested in a test tube” or a "well-defined" amnesty program negotiated by both sides (Reuters, 
2009). 
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It is important to note that one of the key recommendations of the TCND was the need for the 
government to negotiate amnesty for all militants, create a credible and authoritative agency 
and process comprising of international negotiators to plan, implement and monitor the Niger 
Delta DDR program at regional, state and local government levels as well as ensure ceasefire 
and withdrawal of forces from the region (MEND, 2009, pp. 6-7). These recommendations 
formed the basis on which the Nigerian Government negotiated with armed militant groups in 
the Niger Delta. To drive this dialogue, the Government formed the Niger Delta Peace and 
Reconciliation Committee (NDPRC), headed by Senator David Brigidi (Etekpe, 2013, p. 103). 
The NDPRC had a series of extensive dialogues with all armed groups in the Niger Delta, with 
committee members accessing the creeks to negotiate with armed groups. The Committee 
assured the militants that the Nigerian Government was deeply committed to the development 
of the region (Ebiede, 2017, p. 20). Unfortunately, due to the neopatrimonial nature of the 
government, it did not effectively follow all the aspects of the TCND report. However, Inuwa 
(2017) argues that the negotiation was based on a stakeholder matrix approach because 
discussions were only made with selected prominent militant leaders based on their influence 
and interest in the struggle over the control of resources (p. 170). This includes top militant 
leaders of MEND, NDPVF and NDV. These prominent militant leaders have been profiled as 
notorious with great potentials to commit violence and sabotage oil facilities with negative 
outcomes on oil production and revenue ( Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). They were 
classified under a cluster of Group A and B. Group A was represented by leaders profiled in 
terms of high power, high interest and high credibility while those in Group B comprised of a 
cluster of low power, low interest and low credibility. The government’s interest was mostly to 
dialogue with those with high risk to the security of the state as well as oil operations in the 
region. In this sense, Group A was given more priority given their influence in the communities 
as well as the militant and youth groups they control (Inuwa, 2017, pp. 177-178). 
Essentially, key figures like Asari Dokubo of NDPVF, Ateke Tom of NDV, Government 
Ekpemukpolo aka Tompolo, and others rejected the gesture of the government. For Asari 
Dokubo, the Amnesty and DDR program is a means to destroy the genuine struggle of freedom 
fighters. To him, only convicted criminals require a presidential pardon, thus Niger Delta 
fighters were not criminals to be granted amnesty (Eke, 2015, p. 755). Others like Ateke Tom 
who was the brain behind the deadly destruction of the Okuru-Ama community sponsored by 
the Rivers State Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), from the onset was skeptical about the 
program because he saw the amnesty as a plot to bring militants out of the creeks. Nevertheless, 
insistent assurances brought Ateke Tom to the negotiation table with President Yar’Adua on 
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October 1, 2009, where he later submitted his arms and accepted the peace deal (The Guardian, 
2009). 
In addition, a traditional elder in one of the communities in the Niger Delta identified his 
dissatisfaction on the type of negotiation that took place between the government and some 
selected top militant leaders. He noted that elders were never invited during the dialogue and 
no one even knew when this was brokered. To him, the government gave prominence to militant 
leaders instead of introducing an inclusive dialogue where all stakeholders including traditional 
rulers, youth, women, militants, MNOCs, CSOs and NGOs would have been invited for a 
genuine discussion finding sustainable solutions to the problems of the region. All of these 
actors have been affected in one way or the other or have been in the past key actors in the 
management of the conflict. Secretly negotiating with a faction of the community i.e. the 
militants illustrates the manipulative nature and bad intention of the Nigerian government and 
its allies67. 
A military official at the National Defense College in Abuja68 accounted that there was no 
negotiation between the conflicting parties. He said, the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR 
Program is a home-grown program and the Nigerian government did not want to involve 
external actors for strategic reasons which has been discussed in chapter three.  
According to a Niger Delta expert69, the multinationals suggested to the Nigerian government 
to negotiate with the militants instead of granting amnesty and implementing a DDR program 
for two main reasons. Firstly, for security and safety concerns. Security in terms of human 
security as well as the security of the pipelines and the general safety for expatriates working 
in their companies considering the violence and instability and security that characterized the 
region. The state of insecurity in the region, the coordinated and sustained violent attacks on oil 
facilities and MNOCs workers has turned the region into one of the most unsafe places in the 
world. Negotiating with the perpetrators of violence was crucial because militant activities had 
affected the production of oil which is a major profit for the multinationals and the economy. 
Secondly, granting amnesty to militants would be very expensive for both the government and 
the multinationals due to the nature and topography of the region made of mangrove forest, 
fresh water swamp, seasonal flooding, creeks and streams which would be expensive to develop. 
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Therefore, negotiating with armed militants would have meant compensating those considered 
as high threat rather than engaging in a very expensive development program like the DDR70. 
Discussions were characterized by informal rules of the game through corruption and patronage 
networks where, the government and its allies, provided financial incentives to top militant 
warlords perceived as obstacles to peace in the oil-rich but violent region, owing to their 
inclination for politics of disorder as a means to convince them to come out from the creeks as 
well as buy them off from the disruption of oil and gas production which threatened the national 
economy. The Federal government paid $40 million for 12 months to Asari Dokubo, Ateke 
Tom, Ebikabowei “Boyloaf” Victor Ben and Ekpumopolo to secure the country’s oil (Joab-
Peterside et al., 2012, pp. 11-12). For example, Ateke Tom received N560 million, Ebikabowei 
“Boyloaf” Victor Ben got N560 million, Ekpumopolo N3.6 billion and Asari Dokubo N1.44 
billion as cash payments for oil protection contracts (Eke, 2015, p. 757). The impact of this cash 
to buy peace deal is reflected in the life of affluence and wealth in the oil sector which these 
former militant commanders enjoy. Agbiboa (2015, p. 387) describes this as a strategy of gilded 
pacification where the government targeted at buying off militants and re-establishing oil and 
gas production in the Niger Delta without addressing the complexed causes of conflict in the 
region. However, this has ushered a new phase in the relationships between the government and 
“creek dwellers” (Eke, 2015, p. 754). 
Also, as part of the consultations, the government proposed a constructive engagement with 
leaders of militant groups. This gave a green light for such leaders to create their own private 
security agencies that would be hired to secure oil pipelines and other installations on a multi-
billion-naira contract agreement (Sayne, 2013, pp. 4-5). Such a strategy was meant to divert the 
interest of militant leaders whose wealth and income came from ransom taking, kidnapping, oil 
theft, oil pipeline vandalization, assassinations, piracy, and political patronage (Onapajo & 
Moshood, 2016, p. 44). As a result, this would serve as an alternative, legitimate and legal way 
to get wealth and income rather than the illegal activities they carried in order to acquire wealth. 
Presumably, the government is convinced since most leaders have been drivers of violence on 
oil pipelines and installations, they would serve as safeguards to protect these facilities and stop 
such criminal activities71. Part of the motivation for constructive engagement is to give militant 
leaders access to economic opportunities as part of the reintegration process, which is usually 
not evident in most DDR processes (Torjesen, 2013, p. 3). Many scholars have hugely criticized 
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the strategy, while some see it to create a peaceful and conducive environment for oil 
exploitation and to make profits (Omeje, 2004, p. 425). 
President Yar’Adua on 16th June 2009, convened a consultative meeting with the Governors of 
the Niger Delta to consider and put in place an amnesty and DDR for militants in the region. 
The Council of State on 25th June 2009 was equally consulted to request further support for the 
need of an amnesty. These actions were followed by a nationwide broadcast on 25th June 2009, 
which urged all militants to accept amnesty, reject militancy and surrender their arms and 
ammunitions in preparation to meet training needs of the registered ex-militants (Akinwale, 
2010, p. 204). The government did not involve militants in formal negotiation and agreement, 
rather, the consultations were at the top level of the Federal Government and included the Niger 
Delta elites, elders, high-level government officials and the militant leaders who were more 
self-interested and concerned with the incentives they will get from the program. Unfortunately, 
their foot soldiers are dissatisfied and feel cheated by the government (Nwobueze & Inokoba, 
2017, p. 32). 
The Nigerian Government rather than to employ bottom-up and top-down approaches in the 
process of negotiating the Amnesty and DDR program in the Niger Delta, chose to employ a 
“top-down” approach to the underlying causes of violence in the region72. In this vein, one 
could argue that the program was not inclusive because it excluded other crucial actors whose 
role was central to the management of the conflict in the region73. The communities where 
militant activities were carried out were completely left out in the process. This has affected the 
outcome of the program because a sustainable peacebuilding approach would entail an inclusive 
dialogue with all the stakeholders, not only leaders of groups (Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). It 
was a surrender without negotiated agreements or attempts to address the grievances of the 
militants and the entire communities of the Niger Delta. It implies that the government has not 
learnt lessons from previous interventionist strategies that failed to deliver because they were 
established as top-down approaches (Nwobueze & Inokoba, 2017, p. 32). 
A CSO worker asserts that the negotiation process portrayed the insincere nature of the 
government74. While the government was engaging in informal agreements with militants and 
convincing them to lay down their arms, at the same time, the government was planning a 
widespread military expansion in the region by increasing the number of checkpoints, mounting 
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electronic surveillance systems in many communities and purchased sophisticated weaponry in 
the region (Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 618). The process was presented as a victor’s benevolence. 
The government pronounced it and employed carrot-and-stick strategies to make the militants 
accept it (Albert, 2015). Some scholars have argued that the Nigerian government pushed for 
peacebuilding (i.e. the role of the amnesty policy) ahead of a peacemaking process (i.e. 
negotiation or mediation) (Nwobueze & Inokoba, 2017, pp. 29-30). Thus, the conditions and 
terms of the amnesty and DDR were determined by the government without negotiating with 
the various militant groups, and their communities. 
However, after concerted backdoor consultations and meetings with militant leaders, a ceasefire 
agreement was eventually achieved with handshakes between late President Musa Yar’Adua 
and some significant Niger Delta warlords in Abuja. The agreement ended the violent militancy 
in the region and subsequently laid the foundations for the implementation of the DDR program 
(Oluwaniyi, 2014). 
5.4 NDA and DDR: The Practice of Planning 
The Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament (PPAD) of militants in the Niger Delta 
was established on 5 May 2009 (Sahara Reporters, 2009). The PPAD set out the terms, 
procedures, and processes to grant amnesty to the militants. These guidelines were accepted by 
the government after consulting the National Council of State(NCS) (Sahara Reporters, 
2009).The panel was led by the then Minister of Defense Major General Goodwin Abbe, a 
native from the Niger Delta (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010, p. 13). The panel comprised of 18 
members. To facilitate its work, the committee designated seven additional members with four 
of them as serving senior military officers and a retired colonel. Members of the key committee 
were selected from strategic government institutions, members of the 7 Niger Delta affected 
states, and representatives of the Nigerian Security Sector (including the Chief of Defense Staff 
(CDS), Nigerian Inspector General of Police (NIGP), and an Assistant Inspector General of 
Police (AIGP) as well as representatives from the State Security Service (SSS) (Inuwa, 2017, 
p. 185). The PPAD tasked with the mandate to specify the terms, procedures, and processes of 
an amnesty to Niger Delta militants (I. Udoh, 2013, pp. 66-67). 
The planning process also entailed providing the necessary logistics to document and collect 
fingerprints of militants who have surrendered their weapons75. The Planning Committee was 
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to ensure the release of Henry Okah (MEND’s leader) who was under prosecution and 
guarantee that only crimes committed before the end of the program were to be pardoned 
unconditionally and crimes committed after October 4, 2009, which was the end date for 
militants to submit arms were supposed to be punished under the law (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010, 
p. 13).  
Deeper analysis portrays that the planning process of the Amnesty and DDR program was non-
inclusive, poorly planned and fraudulently implemented to the detriment of the people and 
communities of the Niger Delta (Ushie, 2013, p. 35-36). The process was too militarized and 
thus, deliberately excludes other key actors like the MNOCs, local governments, home-based 
NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs) who had been engaged in the Niger Delta 
conflict for a very long time76. It is instructive to note that the status plan was only limited to 
government officials, MNOCs and their governments whereas, the key actors that were 
concerned were not well informed. This explains why there was a strong hesitation on the part 
of the militant leaders because, to them, the deal was launched without their consultation (Eke, 
2015, p. 755).  
The structure and staffing of PAPC was made up of a majority of state security officials and 
this clearly shows that the program prioritized security stabilization over human capital 
development challenges in region (Akinwale, 2010, p. 206). A Niger Delta scholar posits that 
even though PAPC was composed of state security officials, they were not knowledgeable about 
DDR and its implementation as they were not experts in the field. This shows that the planning 
processes did not completely take into consideration the recommendations of TCND to set up 
a reliable and independent DDR institution that will oversee the planning and implementation 
of the program77. The planning committee embodies the Nigerian version of a DDR institution, 
whereas, creating an independent legal institution would have allowed for qualified and 
knowledgeable experts to lead the establishment who would have been able to strategically plan 
a well-coordinated, inclusive, and sustainable DDR program rather than the planning 
characterized by non-experts in the field78.  
In November 2009 PAPC was subdivided into five committees. This came because of the 
recognized challenges and delays in implementing all the clauses of the post-Amnesty plan. 
Just like other institutions in the country, PAPC and its members also engaged in some corrupt 
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practices (Inuwa, 2017, pp. 187-189). The different committees that were set up were criticized 
for alleged fraud and embezzlement. As a result of the allegation of fraud and mismanagement 
by the PAPC, the head of the Committee General Abba was sacked, and the committee was 
dissolved by President Jonathan who took office after the death of his Predecessor. Some 
authors have argued that terminating the committee was kind of a score that President Goodluck 
Jonathan wanted to settle with the Northern political elites who had challenged his ascension to 
power (Inuwa, 2017, pp. 187-189). Following this circumstance, a widespread violent protest 
was organized by ex-militants in and around Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Yenagoa and Bayelsa 
State. The protest came because of frustrations which centered around them not receiving their 
monthly amnesty stipends which was promised to them as well as not being included on the list 
of training opportunities79. Part of the factors that hindered the process was the illness and death 
of President Yar’Adua.  
A panel of eight people in January 2010, chaired by reputable Ijaw Civil Society actors, public 
personalities and ex-militants of subcommittees of the PAPC, presented a critical look at the 
preliminary plan of the program. It was realized that a huge amount of money was budgeted as 
charges for consultants involved in training and reorientation (Abazie-Humphrey, 2014, p. 4). 
The group also noted that psychological counselling was not relevant as vulnerable groups such 
as women who had lost husbands, children who had lost their parents and homes and internally 
displaced young people were not included in the program (Folami, 2016, p.2). This is even 
though they were the ones who were the most traumatized and affected by the armed conflict 
and militancy. The process was marred by inadequacies in terms of the content of the training 
which only reflected fields related to trade and agriculture. These training provisions did not 
consider the inclusion of ex-militants in prestigious sectors such as the oil and gas industry 
(Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010, p. 15). 
In addition, the planning committee did not ensure the regular payment of allowance to ex-
militants. Address issues related to inequalities in the payment among ex militant leaders and 
their soldiers. There was also limited access to rehabilitation training and employment and there 
was an unwillingness to resolve the political struggles between the people of the region. Yet, 
there was interest in setting up more institutions with politically motivated staffing in charge of 
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the design, coordination and implementation of the program irrespective of the fact that 
everyone was pursuing their own separate agenda80. 
While amnesty has encouraged alternative conflict resolution approaches and stabilization of 
the Niger Delta, its planning and implementation is unsatisfactory and not able to prevent 
sustained latent armed conflict in the region (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 390). 
5.5 The Implementation Process of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program 
The Amnesty program is a part of the Federal government’s determination and desire to address 
the agitations and violence in the Niger Delta region, with the aim of disarming, rehabilitating 
and reintegrating militants into their communities as a means to tackle the challenges facing the 
region (Touitou & Ojunta, 2016, p. 85). After due consultation with the Council of States and 
accepting the recommendations of the PPAD, on 25 June 2009, the Late President of Nigeria 
declared amnesty to the Niger Delta militants (Sahara Reporters, 2009). The proclamation laid 
the foundation for the establishment of the Post-Amnesty Program (PAP) in October 2009. 
Following this, the Government appointed a Special Adviser on the Niger Delta and PAP 
Chairman to lead the implementation of the amnesty and DDR (Ebiede, 2017, p. 20). The 
President granted unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly involved 
in militancy in the region. In his speech, he noted that 
The offer of amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants to 
give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely renounce militancy in all its 
ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect. It is my 
fervent hope that all militants in the Niger Delta will take advantage of this amnesty and 
come out to join in the quest for the transformation of our dear nation. The offer of 
amnesty is open to all militants for a period of sixty days (Vanguard, 2009). 
The implementation of the amnesty was carried out in three predominant phases including the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The objectives and deliverables of the program 
were as follows: (1) A disarmament phase to take place between 6 August 2009 and 4 October 
2009 and to include the collection of biometric data; (2) A demobilization and rehabilitation 
phase to last six to 12 months and to include the provision of, among other things, counselling 
and career guidance for the participants; (3) A reintegration phase to last up to five years and 
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to include the provision of, among other things, occupational training and microcredits for the 
participants (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 401). 
5.5.1  The Disarmament Phase 
Disarmament81 of armed militants was the first phase of the implementation. During this period, 
the militants accepted the offer and began coming out of hiding to surrender their arms and 
ammunition to the government through the peace committee set up to coordinate the program 
(Touitou & Ojunta, 2016, p. 85). It was a 60 days process that started from 6 August to 4 
October with the collection of arms and ammunitions. Militants were required to present 
themselves at the designated centers, drop their arms and ammunitions, take an oath of 
renunciation of armed violence and receive presidential and unconditional pardon and then 
proceed to register for rehabilitation and reintegration (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 401). During this 
period, about 26,000 male and 133 female militants surrendered their weapons and registered 
in the program (I. Udoh, 2013, p. 67). It was reported that a total of “287,445 rounds of 
ammunition, 3,155 magazines, 1,090 dynamite caps, 763 explosives, and 18 gun boats, 
communication gadgets, bullet-proof vests, and tear gas equipment” were handed over by the 
militants (Ebiede, 2017, p. 20; I. Udoh, 2013). The military oversaw the collection and 
destruction of the weapons that were surrendered by the militants82. It was revealed that during 
the first phase of the disarmament, approximately 26,358 ex-militants accepted the Amnesty 
offer (first phase – 20,192 militants representing those that accepted the offer on or before 4th 
October 2009, while during the second phase of the Amnesty Program that took place in 
November 2010, 6,616 militants accepted the offer post 4 October 2009 (Austine & Sunday, 
2013, p. 133). Six Niger Delta states including Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and 
Cross River had selected centers to submit the arms and ammunitions and register militants 
(Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010, p. 13).  
A Niger Delta scholar argued that even though several arms and ammunitions were submitted 
by armed militants, there was no audit to verify if there was complete disarmament in the region. 
He also noted that in normal UNIDDR practice, when arms and weapons are submitted, they 
are classified, registered and investigation is made on routes through which the arms were 
possessed in order to prevent further arms circulation in the region. The scholar claimed that 
                                                 
81 According to the UN (2014, p. 25), disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small 
arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian population. 
Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.  
82 Respondent 04, July 2018, Nigeria. 
  
146 
after disarming the militants, there were supposed to be a public destruction of the weapons 
collected. Unfortunately, none of these procedures were ensured or took place because to him, 
the interest of the government was security stabilization to allow the proper flow of oil. This to 
him, raises a huge problem as recent events and incidents portray that the region is still in 
possession of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) 83 . The submission of arms and 
ammunitions by armed militants marked the reduction of violence and militant activities 
including attacks on oil facilities, kidnapping, and hostage-taking, and the increase in oil 
production (Akinwale, 2010). 
The collection of arms from militants was done in different categories. The central category 
that the government recommended was the disposition of arms by group leaders and their 
members, based on one man, one weapon, to the JTF members in the creeks where they 
surrendered (Oluwaniyi , 2011, p. 20). Oluwaniyi (2011) further accounted that the number of 
militants that presumably handed in arms was more than the total number of weapons disposed. 
He equally noted that his empirical data revealed that the figures of total beneficiaries exceeded 
the number of genuine militants as those who joined the program were motivated by the 
incentives they were provided. Elaborating on the general conduct of the disarmament process 
and the number of weapons handed in, Austin and Sunday (Austine & Sunday, 2013) as well 
accounted that the 1,798 riffles, 1981 different types of guns, 70 RPGs, 159 Pistols, one spear 
and six cannons that were submitted to the military are definitely very low as compared to the 
26,358 militants that registered for the amnesty program (p.134).  
Indeed, the Bayelsa state government led by Timpre Sylvia, ran the second category of the 
disarmament. This was done publicly with a live broadcast by the media on how militants were 
disarmed. During this phase, prominent militant camp groups like Ebikabowei Victor Ben’s 
(aka Boyloaf) group, merged in Yenagoa in where the disarmament took place. These groups 
handed in about 95,970 live ammunition, 520 rifles, and 14 gunboats during this phase 
(Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 21). Camp groups were required to drop the weapons in their communities 
and spaces of operation. The disarmed ex-militants were later sent in batches for reorientation 
that lasted for at least four weeks. At the end of the reorientation, they selected a skill area in 
which they would receive three to eighteen months of training during the reintegration phase (I. 
Udoh, 2013, p. 67). 
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A central argument that runs through literature is that militants kept the most sophisticated 
weapons and only surrendered a small portion of the arms in their possession because of the 
mistrust in the government’s genuine commitment to the amnesty offer (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 401). 
5.5.2 The Demobilisation Phase 
The second phase of the DDR program was the demobilization84 of ex-militants which took 
place at Obubra, Cross River State (Ebiede, 2017, p. 20). This phase ended on 24 September 
2011. This was characterized by different activities such as verification and documentation, 
transformational training, peacebuilding and conflict resolution training, counselling and career 
guidance, wellness assessment, reintegration classification and education and vocational 
placement (Austine & Sunday, 2013, p. 133). This process involved biometric data capturing, 
certification of eligibility for benefits, allocations of cards, receipts of reinsertion allowances, 
and preparation for full demobilisation85. Also, ex-militants were also reoriented, and prepared 
for the next phase of the program that is reintegration. Official records from the PAP revealed 
that 23,358 ex-militants were successfully demobilized between June 2010 and December 2011 
(Joab-Peterside et all, 2012, p. 11). Further account from the Special Adviser of the Amnesty 
Program, recorded that between June 2010 and May 2011, 15,434 people had participated in 
the training program offered (Agbiboa, 2015, pp. 401-402). 
Akinwale (2010) argued that some rehabilitation centers were offered for the second stage of 
demobilization which was designed to meet training needs of the ex-militants. Due to logistical 
challenges to take in the total number of ex-militants at once in the camp, trainings were given 
in batches. Ex-militants were divided into groups due to the capacity of the centers. An NGO 
that participated in the process recounted that each batch would spend four weeks in the 
rehabilitation program and during this period, they had re-orientation, counseling and 
moral/Spiritual regeneration sessions86. The head of the NGO that was involved in conflict 
transformation process observed that, the demobilization process was done in a haphazard 
manner. He further noted that there was little or no coordination as there were several service 
providers with everyone running their own show. According to him, the needs and interests of 
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the demobilized ex-militants were not the priority, it was all about organizations competing 
among each other to get more contracts from OSAPND. In discussing how business was 
conducted at the centers, he revealed that there was no amount of professionalism as many 
service providers in the camp were contracted along partisan and neopatrimonial lines. He also 
indicated that participants were not classified according to groups and needs i.e. age, sex and 
education etc. No separate logistics were made for ex-militants that were less than 18 years as 
young boys and girls were all mixed together. He described the demobilization camp as a 
“devils’ workshop”87. Talking about the demobilization process, an NGO worker that took part 
in the demobilization phase, indicated that one of the major challenges of the program was 
miscommunication between the trainers at the camp and the ex-militants. According to her 
accounts, many militants were unable to understand the different trainers especially 
international experts that were brought in as they could neither understand their accent nor the 
advanced English that was spoken to them. She further noted that if proper classification of 
militants were done, it would have been discovered that a huge majority of ex-militants were 
uneducated. Therefore, it was important to bring local trainers who could speak the language 
of the militant88.  
 Ex-militants identified 10 sectors of career aspirations including Oil/Gas, maritime services, 
Fabrication and welding Technology, Exploration and Production and Processing Engineering. 
Others indicated interest to go back to school to further their education (Abazie-Humphrey, 
2014, p. 2). Just after the two weeks demobilization at Obubra, the names of ex-militants were 
submitted to the OSAPND and arrangements were made to start with the reintegration process 
(Oluwaniyi, 2014, p. 44). 
5.5.3 The Reintegration Phase 
Reintegration89 of militants happens to be the most significant phase of the DDR process as its 
implementation shapes the type of peace outcome. Reintegration is critical in helping ex-
militants, victims of violence, and communities affected by such violence return to normal and 
productive lives (Oluwaniyi, 2018, p. 8). It equally entails the empowerment of ex-militants 
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through socio- economic and political development. Ex-militants were selected by various 
training institutions based on their field of interest. (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 44). The reintegration 
phase involved re-insertion, reconciliation, rehabilitation and resettlement involving skill 
acquisition, job placement and micro-finance support for small scale businesses (Akpan & 
Ering, 2010, p. 147). To ensure that ex-militants receive an income while pursuing their 
educational and vocational training, the government decided to put them on a month stipend of 
N65, 000 equivalent to UDS400 (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 402; Osah, 2016). Six reintegration camps 
were planned in the Amnesty Roadmap. Unfortunately, out of the 6 selected camps, only the 
Obubra camp was functional (Akpan & Ering, 2010, pp. 147-148; I. Udoh, 2013). Due to 
logistical challenges for the camp to accommodate all the ex-militants at once, ex-militants 
were divided into batches as the camp could only host 1000-1500 participants at a time (Akpan 
& Ering, 2010, pp. 147-148). However, due to incidents where some ex-militants left the 
training camps and harassed the local community, the size of the batches were further reduced 
to 600 to better manage the participants (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011, p. 56). The first phase 
of the process was the reorientation and rehabilitation of ex-militants while the second phase 
was training sessions on intensive non-violence transformation and took a minimum of 14 days 
per batch (Akpan & Ering, 2010, pp. 147-148).  
Ex-militants were given the opportunity to get vocational training and further their education. 
These trainings were to empower the transformed militants for employment opportunities in 
the labor market (Agbiboa, 2015). Those who undertook vocational training, were trained in 
fields like agriculture, agro allied processing, transportation, cold-room management, 
information and communication technology, maritime services, building and construction 
professionals, oil and gas, and environment and sanitation management. Ex-militants whose 
interests were to continue their studies were given the opportunity to pursue their education in 
disciplines such as law, political science, business management, mass communication, 
international relations, public administration, medicine, engineering, applied sciences, building 
and construction, and information and communications technology (Ebiede, 2017, p. 21).  
By December 2011, 7556 ex-militants were placed in skills acquisition training centers in 33 
training locations within Nigeria. They were trained both at home and abroad. Some of the 
foreign countries where ex-militants were enrolled included South Africa, The United States, 
Russia, Israel, Poland, India, Cyprus, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, France, Italy, and United kingdom etc. (Ushie, 2013, p. 34; Punch, 2018). 
According to official accounts from the Amnesty office, 17,323 ex-militants have been trained 
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and it was envisaged that by the end of 2018, 12,677 ex-militants were supposed to complete 
their training (Ebiede, 2017, p. 22). One of the officials interviewed for this study argued that 
such positive figures indicate that the training element of the program have had an impact on 
human capacity development in the Niger Delta. He further highlighted that those who so far 
have been trained have secured employment in various vocational activities90. A recent report 
from the government states that, the program succeeded to fully reintegrate over 13,000 ex-
militants into the society (Sowole, 2019).Yet, the position of some ex-militants that were 
interviewed, contradicts the views of the state as some of them complained that they have not 
gone for training. Those who completed their vocational training and education also reported 
they were not able to find jobs91. Additionally, the few who managed to get jobs, got employed 
only on a temporary basis. Fields such as commercial piloting, marine technology, pipeline 
welding, underwater welding, ocean diving, crane operations, oil drilling, automobile 
technology, fish farming and entrepreneurship, where some ex-militants completed training are 
fields where it has proven difficult to gain employment opportunities92. This is one of the 
challenges which relates to the perspective of a Niger Delta scholar who argued that the training 
component comprised of “skills mismatch”. To him, ex-militants were not given appropriate 
orientation on the job market and the fields that are easily employable during the career fair 
sessions at the Obubra camp. This is connected to the nature and character of the type of 
institutions that were contracted by the government to provide services, as they were more 
interested about their agendas, priorities and interest and not that of the ex-militants93. However, 
according to the narratives of the ex-militants, they continue to survive through their 
engagement in illegitimate economic activities as educational and vocational training has not 
succeeded to integrate them into long-term employment in different sectors of the economy94. 
A few of the ex-militants that showed interest in the entrepreneurial sector, have not been able 
to start up their own small scale businesses or engage in the sector because money that was 
budgeted to finance and buy their start-up material was either misappropriated or embezzled by 
government officials, the elites and those who ran the program95. Corruption characterized the 
entire content of the reintegration process of the program. Initially at the conception of the 
program, the government had projected that the entire NDA and DDR program would cost 
approximately USD 361 million. However, in 2011, the yearly budget for the program was 
                                                 
90 Respondent 16, July 2018, Nigeria. 
91 Respondents 05 and 08, July 2018, Nigeria. 
92 Respondents 06 and 08, July 2018, Nigeria. 
93 Respondent 40, July 2018, Nigeria. 
94 Respondents 07 and 09, July 2018, Nigeria. 
95 Respondents 06 and 08, July 2018, Nigeria. 
  
151 
increased. This change of tides was driven by the administration of President Goodluck that 
initiated a more extensive educational program for ex-militants and other beneficiaries (Ebiede, 
2017, p. 22). Below is a projection of the yearly budget of the program. 
    Table 5. 1: NDA and DDR Program Budget Allocation (2009-2018) 
Year Amount budgeted in USD 
2009 141 million 
2011 532 million 
2012 479 million 
2013 428 million 
2014 408 million 
2015 379 million 
2016 281 million 
2017 213 million 
2018 213 million 
 Source: Author’s compilation from varied sources 
The new Special Adviser of the Amnesty Program (SAAP) Prof. Charles Dokubo, on 13 March 
2018, established a committee led by Prof. Ayibaemi Spiff to review operations of the Amnesty 
program. In their findings, the Committee found out that out of the five vocation/reintegration 
centers the OSAPND was to construct, only two were completed in Ondo and Bayelsa states 
and even these two were still not operational. Possible reasons include the inability of the 
Amnesty Office to pay the total amount of contracts; lack of proper supervision and demand 
for variations by some contractors (OSAPND, 2019). Furthermore, the Committee discovered 
that out of the 30,000 beneficiaries of the program, 11,297 ex-militants are still to get vocational 
or formal educational placements (OSAPND, 2019; Vanguard, 2019). Following the 
outrageous invoices that the office received to pay outstanding tuition fees and stipends for 
students, the Committee in its investigation revealed that out of 1,061 beneficiaries for the 
educational programs for the 2017/2018 academic year, only 314 existed on the OSAPND’s 
database (OSAPND, 2019). Thus, such corrupt practices have had a negative impact on the 
outcome of the project. 
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5.6 Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Process: A Shift from a Neoliberal Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) Principles to 
a Neopatrimonial DDR Practice 
The early 1990s saw a shift in peacekeeping spearheaded by the UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali’s ‘An Agenda for Peace’ with DDR becoming a predominant concern in this respect 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). DDR programs have been carried out as a part of internationally 
mandated peacebuilding operations responding to civil war or some other form of intrastate 
violence (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis, 2010). Traditionally, DDR operates as part of a 
broader peace process that includes other socioeconomic, political, and security reforms 
(United Nations, 2014, p. 24). In such circumstances, the key aim of the DDR process is to 
contribute to security and stability in post conflict settings so that recovery and development 
can start (UNDDR Resource Centre, 2005). This implies that planning, design, and 
implementation programs are expected to be within the wider recovery and development 
framework (Steenken, 2017, p. 16). These interventions have been championed by the UN 
particularly the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and the World Bank, 
together with other international donors and multilateral agencies to secure the peace in the 
aftermath of war (Muggah, 2005, p. 239; Rufer, 2005, p. 7). These institutions place emphasis 
on establishing liberal values such as the protection of individual rights, rule of law, a free 
market economy and democracy as well as building a liberal state in war-torn societies (Mac 
Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Paris, 1997, p. 4). Hence, DDR programs are an integral part of a 
global project of neoliberal peacebuilding to promote the consolidation and stabilization of 
fragile ceasefire and peace agreements with the goal to ensure human rights, the establishment 
of democratic institutions and a market economy as preconditions for a sustainable liberal peace 
(Paris, 2004, p. 152; Rufer, 2005). To ensure the effective implementation of DDR, the UN in 
December 2006 introduced standardized templates and comprehensive best practices for DDR 
articulated as the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards 
(IDDRS) (Muggah, 2005, p. 244). The IDDRS provides direction and guidance to actors 
preparing, implementing and supporting DDR programs (United Nations, 2014, p. 13). Against 
this backdrop, there are five overarching principles that guide the UN approach to DDR 
including: people centered; flexible, transparent and accountable; nationally owned; integrated; 
and well planned (United Nations, 2014, p. 26). I argue that the IDDRS serves as guiding 
principles for the neoliberal peace doctrines. In this vein, using the above five principles, this 
section will look at the extent to which the DDR process in the Niger Delta comply in relation 
to the UN principles as defined in the IDDRS. The objective is to show the contractions of the 
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DDR process in the Niger Delta with the government shifting positions from a neoliberal 
IDDRS doctrine to a neopatrimonial DDR practice. 
5.6.1 From a people centered approach to a patron-client driven approach 
According to the IDDRS, DDR is expected to be people centered. This approach emphasizes 
an all-inclusive DDR process void of discrimination in terms of gender, age, religion, ethnicity 
and political affiliation (United Nations, 2014, p. 26). The people centered approach stresses 
the importance of respect of human rights and humanitarian law in implementing DDR 
programs (Berdal & Ucko, 2013). Neoliberal values such as equality and fairness are key in the 
process. It places priority on the needs of the participants and beneficiaries and with a focus on 
sensitive individual case handling (based on gender, age and physical abilities) instead of a 
group approach (Molly, 2011, p. 119). In the case of the Niger Delta, the DDR process was 
government driven from a patron-client perspective (Okonofua, 2016, p. 5). The argument is 
that the primary objective of the state at the time was not governance but security as it wanted 
to quickly disarm the militants and allow the control of oil. This pushed a narrow elite of varied 
interests who for years have benefited from the rentier state to influence the status quo (Molly, 
2011, p. 119). Also, the government was pressured by the demands of the international 
community particularly oil capitalist partners to respond to the disruption on the world oil 
market stability perpetrated by militia activities in the Niger Delta (Tantua & Kamruzzaman , 
2016, pp. 2-3). The government however picked and chose what was easy at the time to be 
achieved. The interest was to quickly disarm the militants and allow the production of oil. 
Commenting on the conduct of the DDR process at Obubra camp, an NGO expert in the Niger 
Delta whose organization was part of the service providers, highlighted that the needs of 
beneficiaries were not provided on an individual basis, instead, the beneficiaries were all put 
under one cluster (group). The program was gender insensitive as women, men and children 
were all kept in the same camp and the process was haphazardly done because of the urgency 
to achieve short-term conflict reduction to allow a stabilization the region (Ikelegbe, 2010, p. 
72). Furthermore, data from the field work showed that the issue of human security was far-
fetched in the process. Thus, implementing the program from a patron-client practice creates 
challenges to evaluate the prospect of the program and even the level of engagement. 
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5.6.2 From a flexible, transparent and accountable doctrine to a non-transparent and 
unaccountable DDR process 
Within the context of international standards of transparency and accountability and IDDRS, 
the program implementers are expected to promote and observe the liberal culture of 
accountability and transparency in information as well as financial matters to ensure proper 
efficiency (United Nations, 2014, pp. 27-28). Implementers are expected to be accountable to 
partners, beneficiaries and participants. However, such values are absent and obscured in 
Nigeria due to the high level of corruption that permeates the political, economic and social 
spheres particularly the oil industry in the country (Itodo & O’Regan, 2018). In implementing 
the DDR in the Niger Delta, the government of Nigeria has shown a high level of adaptability 
to shifting circumstances. Compliance to the IDDRS standard was obscured, as the programs 
were not adapted to fit the region’s needs. In other words, they did not suit the realities on the 
ground to address fragile situations in the region96. A holistic analysis of both the conflict and 
security dynamics were neglected as concerns were more focused on security dynamics. In 
addition, proper reporting of the process was absent as media presence was highly restricted by 
the state and its elites, with very little monitoring and evaluation97 . Observation from the field 
revealed that information was distorted at the bottom levels. Ex-militants did not really 
understand the meaning of amnesty. Their interpretation of the program was more economic. 
This shows that they were not properly educated. This gap in communication is due to the fact 
there was no inclusive dialogue including all parties. Agreements were brokered mostly 
between top commanders and the government and the ex-militants were only informed by their 
commander on the outcome98. In this regard, they had no role to play in the process. The entire 
process was characterized by a high degree of corruption related to the misappropriation of 
funds for the program (Ikelegbe & Onokerhoraye, 2016, p. 12).There were extensive payments 
and patronage involved in the process as well as fake contracts awarded to non-accredited 
institutions (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 51). The fact that political patronage and material benefits 
were offered through the award of fake contracts to non-accredited institutions by various (in) 
formal actors also contributed to obscure the prospects of the program to effectively deliver 
(Tantua & Kamruzzaman, 2016, p. 9). Such behaviors provided the avenue for the state and its 
elites along with petro-capitalist allies to still maintain their monopoly over oil governance, and 
for some ‘militia leaders’ to bargain and negotiate with the authority often motivated by self-
                                                 
96 Respondent 37, July 2018, Nigeria. 
97 Respondent 14, July 2018, Nigeria. 
98 Respondents 06, 07, 09, July 2018, Nigeria. 
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interest (Barma, 2012; Folami, 2016, p. 6; Schultze-Kraft, 2017, p. 619). It indicates that the 
Nigerian state prioritized the state, its institutions, and state elites, more than people in the Niger 
Delta (Richmond, 2005, p. 215). Given the above, to adhere fully to such a principle would 
have meant that corruption would be minimized and checked. Since the state is built on 
patronage, curtailing transparency and accountability would ensure that checks and balances 
are avoided (Ugwuanyi, Nworji, & Oruebuor, 2015, p. 15). Thus, such an approach does not 
only portray the agency of the state but highlights the existence and functioning of various 
patronage and clientele networks among state, MNOCs and militia leaders. This has created 
fragility in the program and is possibly the reason why the program has not fully delivered its 
outcome. 
5.6.3 Nationally Owned 
Looking through the lens of IDDRS guidelines, implies genuine national ownership that 
includes the participation of a wide range of state and non-state actors at the national, regional, 
and local levels, involving NGOs and CSOs (UNSC, 2006, pp. 9-10). Although the Niger Delta 
process was nationally owned, it was government driven therefore community involvement and 
engagement was very superficial (Donais, 2009; Jerve, 2002). The process left out non-state 
actors and the government insisted on minimum foreign interference right to the point of 
rejecting observation or relevant expert support (Molly, 2011, p. 122). Whereas, the IDDRS 
lists inclusive national framework (bringing together a broad spectrum as society to include the 
former militias, government, civil society, private sector, as well as regional and international 
guarantors of the peace process) as key to positive outcomes (UN IAWG on DDR, 2006). 
Against this background, post-liberal peacebuilding, does not only place the responsibility on 
the government but on the broader community, which should be included and allowed to 
provide input at all stages of the process (UN IAWG on DDR, 2006). As mentioned earlier, the 
state embraced the first two phases i.e. disarmament and demobilization and brought in NGOs 
and CSOs during the reintegration process. The process failed to include the local. National 
ownership in the Nigerian context was in theory (i.e. neoliberal) but, the kind of ownership that 
took place in practice was patrimonial (Karbo, 2012, p. 4). This is possibly why the government 
refers to the program as home grown (OSAPND, 2019). A full representation of all actors in 
the process would have been detrimental to the states neopatrimonial character as this would 
have implied opening access to other groups to gain access to the resources as well as ensured 
accountability (North et al., 2011, p. 9). Using such a strategy undermined critical levels of 
initiation and strategy, which led to an unsustainable application of the concepts (Mackuliaková, 
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2013). Thus, there was need to shift position to ensure that the full engagement of national 
actors in the planning, design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation is limited access 
to certain groups. 
In addition, the DDR is essentially a top-down project and contributes to a wider project of 
securing legitimate control of forces from above which is key to neoliberal forms of power and 
governability (Muggah, 2008, pp. 2-3). The method reinforced the influence and control of the 
national elites deviating the goals of the program and the outcome of the process (Martin & 
Moser, 2012). The potential lack of political will of the Nigerian government to include local 
voices in peacebuilding and inclination of the elites to pursue self-interest and the needs of their 
allies and political objectives has limited the program’s success (Van Brabant, 2010). This 
relates to the reason why after the disarmament and demobilization stages, the reintegration 
phase took a while to start (Oluwaniyi, 2018, p. 11). The nationally owned process in Nigeria 
remains on the level of government/elite ownership instead of being emancipatory and enabling 
a wider participation (Paris, 2002; Thiessen, 2011, p. 121). The government failed to apply the 
program the way in which it has been prescribed by the IDDRS. This is because, a 
neoptrimonial approach was more suitable for the government because it worked as a political 
tool from the top which inherently was contradictory to the neoliberal practices of a DDR 
program. Bending the rules in implementing the DDR from a clientele perspective allows the 
state to leverage more control over the process and failed in delivering a longer-term reduction 
of violence (Ikoh & Ukpong, 2013, p. 146). Hence, these representations show the paradox that 
the DDR process in the Niger Delta co-opted practices that were unfit for the realities on the 
ground as well as its practical success are contradictory. All these have increased in complexity 
as new threats and circumstances emerge. 
5.6.4 From an Integrated IDDRS Norm to a non-integrated approach 
A core focus of international intervention of DDR is to enhance maximum collaborations of 
multifaceted interventions which could address the complexities that exist in most post-conflict 
settings (Molly, 2011, p. 123; World Bank, 2018). This means the program needs to be coherent, 
inclusive and should emphasize on programs related to recovery and the rule of law (United 
Nations, 2014, pp. 29-30). Emphasis is placed on institutional; sectorial, chronological; national 
and regional integration. Concerning institutional integration, there was not much evidence, 
which showed that the entrusted amnesty institutions worked in an integrated manner, although 
there was some sort of bricolage among those institutions. It was realized that many of the 
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institutions came with their agendas, priorities, and views on how the program should be 
implemented. Instead of working in synergy to complement each other, the institutions finally 
end up competing among themselves creating a more fragile and complex environment99. In 
addition, many of the institutions lacked the capacity to carry out the reintegration process. 
Official accounts have noted that the program was solely funded by the Nigerian government100. 
One justification for self-funding as noted by some state officials was to restrict the influence 
of international donors, which usually come with their agendas, priorities and doctrines imposed 
on the state. As such, the state did not want any funding that would come with conditions101. 
Thus, they preferred to fund the program and run it from a patrimonial perspective. Proper 
integration would ensure short-term security stabilization as well as long-term recovery so that 
development can begin (Martin & Moser, 2012). The Niger Delta case was rather contradictory, 
and it gave more preference to security stabilization than long-term recovery and 
development102. Also, at the national and regional level, integration was more top-down instead 
of a blend of both top-down and bottom-up approach (Campbell, 2011, p. 39). No consultations 
were made with local communities. In fact, local chiefs and elders were completely sidelined 
in the entire process103. Relating to the issues of reintegration, the program left the communities 
and ex-militias even more economically disintegrated as many of them were unable to get jobs 
in their various fields of training and also because of the program’s incentive structure (Ebiede, 
2018, pp. 113-114). Although the program helped to end overt violence and established basic 
security and order, the integrated approach would have broken the command and control 
structures of militias. Instead, they were given more legitimacy, and this could be a future 
potential spoiler (de Vries & Wiegink, 2011, pp. 39-41). An integrated approach would have 
contributed to restore public security, law and order in the region (Berdal & Ucko, 2013). 
5.6.5  From a well-planned IDDRS to a haphazard DDR 
The guidelines of the IDDRS requires that DDR is well planned to guarantee quality in the 
delivery of services. The DDR process in the Niger Delta was conducted in a fractured way, 
resulting from poor coordination (Sayne, 2013, p. 4). Just like in Mozambique, in certain 
respects in the Niger Delta DDR, there was an element of competition between implementing 
actors that often seemed to prelude coordination (Alden, 2002, p. 348). The process requires 
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prioritizing on issues related to safety; security; coordination; assessment, monitoring and 
evaluation; information and sensitization; and a transition and exit strategy (United Nations, 
2014, p. 30). As of today, the state is still groping with the challenges of an exit strategy for the 
program due to poor timely planning and budgeting on reintegration from the very beginning 
of the DDR process (Financial Times, 2016). Coupled with this was the barriers to early 
integration, prioritization and a systematic way of impact assessment resulting in a poor 
planning process surrounding the economic, social/psychosocial, and political and security 
reintegration of ex-combatant (UN, 2014, p. 158). That is why any attempt to exit the program 
has been met with violent attacks by ex-militants (Africa News, 2016; Reuters, 2017). 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter offered a critical reflection on the Amnesty and DDR program established in 2009 
by the Nigerian Government. It examined the successes and failures of the program as a 
peacebuilding strategy. Empirical evidence showed that it was conceived, negotiated, planned 
and implemented as a minimalist (security stabilization) approach instead of a maximalist 
(integrated development and security stabilization) approach. Empirical evidence further shows 
that it was not an integrated initiative as it excluded certain factions of the Niger Delta 
community such as children, women, other community members and the international 
community who have been affected in one way or the other by the conflict. Both data and 
literature revealed that the program did not address the wider socio-economic grievances. These 
include the lack of social development in local oil communities, environmental pollution and 
the exclusion of local communities from the governance of oil production in the Niger Delta 
region. Thus, the initiative was a top-down approach. This is part of the reason for the 
reemergence of violence in the region in 2016 by new armed groups. The nature of 
conceptualization, negotiation, planning and implementation determined the possible 
limitations and impact of the program. Finally, an analysis of the socio-political contradictions 
that undermined the effectiveness and credibility of the program was discussed. This analysis 
is situated within the political economy framework. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
6 Introduction 
The key objective of this chapter is to show the validity of the research question or rather, the 
extent to which the research has achieved its aim of answering the principal research question. 
The chapter underlines the theoretical and empirical contributions in the field of political 
economy and DDR, the theoretical and empirical literature on the Niger Delta conflict, 
peacebuilding as well as elements of political economy such as interest, institutions and 
incentives and the Nigerian state. Furthermore, the chapter illuminates key relevant and 
significant concerns and potential areas of future research on the Niger Delta. The first part of 
the chapter discusses and answers the principal research question of the dissertation as well as 
the primary empirical findings connected to the research question. The second part summarizes 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of the dissertation while the last part concludes by 
proposing some key aspects that would be significant for further research in the Niger Delta. 
6.1  Main Research Questions and Empirical Findings 
This thesis is an analytical case study that critically interrogates the extent to which the 2009 
Federal Government Amnesty and DDR program in the Niger Delta has been implemented as 
a political economy approach. The main research question for this thesis was: ‘how has the 
political economy shaped the implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program 
and its prospect for sustainable peace in the region? Specifically, how have elements of political 
economy such as interests, incentives and institutions helped or hindered the peacebuilding goal 
of the Amnesty Program?’ 
In this vein, empirical evidence revealed that the program was guided by varying agendas, 
perspectives, priorities, and perceptions of the conditions of conflict which resulted in security 
versus development agendas for the NDA and DDR program (Inuwa, 2017, p. 288). A 
maximalist DDR approach was proposed by the TCND to the government. The TCND 
maximalist DDR perspective was believed to concurrently tackle the fundamental security 
problem of the region within a wider socio-economic transformation context (Inuwa, 2017, p. 
288). From a maximalist perspective, “the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to 
security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin’’ 
(Steenken, 2017, p. 21). A maximalist DDR ensures that national capacity is built to facilitate 
the reintegration of ex-combatants and support communities receiving ex-combatants to work 
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for their peaceful and sustainable reintegration (Jennings, 2008, p. 6). Nevertheless, the NDA 
and DDR program was designed and implemented as a minimalist over a maximalist agenda. 
The minimalist approach was a short-term agenda that focused on the security stabilization of 
the ex-militants instead of a maximalist approach that envisioned a holistic long-term security 
stabilization and development of the region. This was not an oversight, rather, the political 
economy framework influenced the approach of the government to choose a minimalist strategy 
over a maximalist. Basically, political economy elements such as interests, institutions and 
incentives influenced the strategies that were deployed for minimalist over maximalist 
strategies. Research evidence and empirical literature showed that the use of a short-term 
agenda rather than a long-term and sustainable implementation of the DDR program can be 
analyzed from the lens of the internal political economy of the militias and from the perspective 
of the wider political economy of the Nigerian State. 
From the perspective of the internal political economy of the youth militia groups, I argue that 
the behavior and activities of armed militants disrupting oil production in the Niger Delta 
sparked the government to opt for a minimalist short-term approach. The demands of the 
militias competing fiercely to control and distribute oil assets, and emancipating for 
environmental justice, and infrastructural development pressured the government to respond 
with a quick fix minimalist approach (Imongan & kelegbe, 2016, p. 63). It is this internal 
political economy among the militia groups where militia youth continued to harass and abduct 
expatriate workers and even citizens in the Niger Delta region precipitated the government to 
seek a minimalist agenda which dealt with security stabilization of the region. In addition, the 
findings observed that the core cause of the conflict is the deprivation of the poor communities 
who are not benefiting from the dividends of oil proceeds. The desire to control resources 
transformed into feelings of deprivation, frustration and discontent of the poor communities 
and militant youth. This hastened tensions that resulted in out blown violence and militancy in 
the entire region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, pp. 564-565). This led to wanton destruction of 
lives and properties with a very negative implications on the oil sector and the country’s 
economy (Osagie, Funmilayo, Adegoke, & Ezeani, 2010, p. 84). Thus, the magnitude of 
antagonistic events, motives, purposes, behaviors, and impulses of the internal PE of militias 
compelled the government to choose a minimalist approach which would deal with the 
immediate security and stability concerns of the region. 
In a similar vein, the wider political economy of the Nigerian State motivated the government’s 
option for a minimalist DDR over a maximalist strategy. Evidence has shown that a core 
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characteristic of the wider political economy of the Nigerian State is its rent seeking nature 
where institutions are fragmented and the few (composed of the ruling class and governing 
elites) reap the benefits of resource abundance at the expense of others (Elsenhans, 1984; Yates, 
1996). As a rentier state, governing elites make policy decisions and build institutional 
arrangements in and around the oil sector (Barma, 2014, p. 257). The wider political economy 
of Nigeria is comprised of political elites who have access to the oil economy and revenue in 
the absence of institutional checks and balances on their accountability. The rentier seeking 
behavior of the elites is predatory to the entire economy as rents are generated and distributed 
via patronage networks (Auty, 2010, p. 412). A rent seeking state is characterized by a 
disproportionate or inequitable distribution of resources whether abundance or scarcity. This is 
appropriate with the disaggregating rentier effect on how governments generate and distribute 
resource rents (Barma, 2014, pp. 257-258). Such is evident in the wider political economy of 
the Nigerian State where rent seeking features prevail with disproportionate distribution of 
resources over equitable distribution of resources.  
Moreover, evidence from this case study revealed that in a rentier state like Nigeria, the 
generation and distribution of resources is very exclusive. This is buttressed by North et al. 
(2011) who have discussed issues of how natural states or low access order societies (LAOs) 
have their violence capacity ‘dispersed among government organizations, such as police, secret 
security, and branches of the military, each with a way to extract rents through corruption or 
monopolies’ (p.12). This is connected to Fukuyana’s (2014) variation between liberal 
democratic and patrimonial orders where natural states access to organizations is limited to elite 
groups and the capability to use violence is dispersed among a number of elites that form a 
dominant coalition that lies on personal relationships and limits the access of others to both 
public and private institutions (Schultze-Kraft, 2018b, p. 481-482). The political economy 
analysis gives a deeper appreciation of how the State Security institution in limited order 
societies engage in economic and political activities in order to survive from the impact of 
economic downturn. Findings showed that in implementing the NDA and DDR, the Nigerian 
state used monopolies and deployed some institutions like the army, police and JTF to suppress 
dissent by the militias. Looking at the wider political economy of the Nigerian State, it is 
apparent that the rent seeking nature will not allow access to other members of the society. This 
implies that the rentier nature of the state overshadows the sustainable distribution of resources 
which is not the core interest of the state. As such, it is unexpectable for the state to engage in 
equitable distribution of resources across different constituencies. Such a stance must have 
pressured the government to engage a minimalist approach. 
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From an empirical perspective, the minimalist NDA and DDR approach helped to restore 
stability and safety in the region. It succeeded to end tensions and violence between the militants 
and the Nigerian security forces (Imongan & kelegbe, 2016, p. 63). Hence, the decline and 
reduction of illegal militant activities like oil theft and kidnapping of oil workers. Also, this 
short-term approach enabled the country’s economy to gradually get back on its feet as the 
country immediately witnessed an increase in oil prices. Evidence showed that before the 
declaration of the NDA and DDR program, crude production drastically declined from 2.6 
million barrels per day to 700,000 barrels per day. However, with the kickoff of the program, 
oil production increased from 1.9 to 2.4 barrel per day in 2013 and between 2014 to 2015, there 
was a rise from 2.6 to 2.7 barrel per day respectively (Vanguard, 2016). This is an indication 
that the program achieved its goal of stabilizing the security conditions in the region. 
Despite the acclaimed successes, further evidence revealed that the program did not completely 
deal with the command and control structures of the militants such that the capacity for ex-
militants and warlords to remobilize in the future would be possible. The approach taken 
strengthened and increased the potential for ex-militant leaders to become legitimate, more 
powerful and even enter a new class of elites in the general political landscape of the country. 
Results also show that the command and control structures of the militias are undamaged 
because the government’s interest at the time was to pay off top commanders to subdue violence. 
A possible reason is that the government was driven by its firefighting to pacify the ex-
militants/rebels and disrupt rebellion. Also, oil production was central as the state was more 
concerned with engaging rebels to allow the flow of oil as the rentier nature of the state was at 
stake. Thus, a new form of government-warlords/ex-commanders alliance was established, and 
the latter became new billionaires in the economy. Another possible reason why the command 
and control structures were not broken is because from a minimalist perspective, the state was 
interested to silence the guns. 
In addition, empirical findings clearly state that the use of a minimalist agenda did not 
completely break bad habits and dismantle the violent culture in the region. Due to this failure, 
other groups have been able to restructure. Evidence that the program failed to break the culture 
of violence from ex-militants can be seen in the relapse of violence and militancy in 2016 with 
the emergence of a new militia group the “Niger Delta Avengers” (Allafrica, 2018; BBC, 2016; 
The Economist, 2016). The group is responsible for the recent oil pipeline disruption in the 
Niger Delta region. In such a dispensation sustainable implementation of the program will be 
hampered. I argue that the stakes were too high for the government to risk using a maximalist 
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approach. The rationale is that it was going to open access to the country’s resources and as a 
result, it would not only weaken the state’s monopoly and power but bring an end to corruption. 
Thus, by the state’s character which is rentier- neopatrimonial, this would have worked against 
the state’s interest. As a result, the DDR minimalist strategy brought about negative effects 
upon the implementation of the program. The implication of the collusion of the pressures and 
the short -term response has led to an unsustainable program. Consequently, there is every 
indication that the peace might not be sustainable. Although it is now relative, yet the peace is 
explosive. 
6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contribution 
A pivotal significance of this dissertation is the broader contributions to several ongoing 
scholarly debates and research fields in the political economy of peacebuilding and Amnesty 
and DDR programs. First, this dissertation contributes to the debate on the political economy 
of peacebuilding in Africa (Paris, 2002; Pugh et al., 2008; Salih, 2009). Against this backdrop, 
the study contributes to the discussion on how political economy particularly, its elements, such 
as interests, incentives and institutions have shaped the implementation of the Niger Delta 
Amnesty and DDR program as a peacebuilding project and the prospect for sustainable peace 
in the region. Empirical evidence has shown that many of the practitioner and scholarly 
literature reviewing Amnesty and DDR programs as peacebuilding processes have only 
superficially touched upon the issue of political economy (Jennings, 2008; 2009; Munive, 2014; 
Spear, 2008). However, this contributes to a broader and more complex relationship between 
political economy and the Amnesty and DDR in the Niger Delta as an architecture of 
peacebuilding. Specifically, looking at the role of elements of political economy like interests, 
incentives and institutions in framing the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the 
NDA and DDR program and the prospect for sustainable peace in the region. The study 
emphasizes the need to theorize the agency of diverse actors, the institutions and structures in 
which they operate as well as the incentives both actors and institutions create for themselves 
in every peacebuilding setting (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014).  
As such, in relation to the discourse on interest, evidence shows that actors in the Niger Delta 
are rational beings who make rational decisions whether to engage in violence or seek peace 
based on the perceived costs and benefits and expected outcomes of these different courses of 
action (North, 1990; Varshney, 2003). Actors’ interests influence opportunity costs for renewed 
rebellion, either through repression or by offering alternative channels for expressing 
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opposition (Walter, 2004).The findings illustrate that strategic interests shaped the government, 
MNOCs and militias actions in the Niger Delta region. This shows how the interests and 
influence of different groups as well as their power is exerted within institutions. This 
perspective is used to elaborate on the incentives that elites gain for making decisions in 
different institutions. In the Niger Delta region, personal interest is aligned with group interests. 
The research also provides a deep understanding of how power is contested and the ways in 
which wealth in Nigeria is distributed (Udoh & Chijioke, 2017). This is very key to effective 
policy implementation as political economy was used to conceive, design and implement the 
DDR program as a means to address the conflicts in the Niger Delta (Gerring, 2007). 
Sollenberg (2012) argues that oil rents produce certain incentive structures for economic and 
political preferences and behavior in Nigeria. Findings further show that oil produces incentives 
for rent-seeking behaviour and distributional conflict- a scramble for rents among elites which 
under certain conditions may increase the probability of conflict (Ostrom et al., 2002). Also, 
empirical evidence reveals that NDA and DDR institutions acted as instruments of 
accumulation. It revealed that economic processes produce wealth and thereby influence how 
political choices are made in the country (Selby, 2008). This illuminates our understanding of 
the motivations of the actors involved in the Amnesty and DDR program (Djoumessi, 2009). 
Both institutions and their actors/operators operated as spoilers of the NDA and DDR program 
as the government does not adhere fully to international standards of implementing a DDR 
program although it was framed as neoliberal peacebuilding strategy (Molly, 2011, p. 111). 
This obstructs and threatens the effective implementation of the program. Some state and non-
state actors running the NDA and DDR institutions acted as inside spoilers as they do not want 
to jeopardize the benefits they have already secured from the program. It revealed that in a 
country like Nigeria where few institutions regulate government behaviour, an abundance of 
oil allows for escalating competitive rent-seeking behaviour between elites and militia groups 
(Mähler, 2010, pp. 7-8; Ogbonna & Ebimobowei, 2013, p. 214). Thus, this dissertation claims 
that these elements of political economy (interests, incentives and institutions) should not be 
ignored in peacebuilding environments. 
A second major contribution of this dissertation relates to the field in DDR. This research is 
anchored on how DDR programs are conceptualized, designed and implemented. Evidence 
from the Niger Delta DDR has been supported and reinforced by theoretical perspectives of 
scholars like (Berdal & Ucko, 2009; 2013; de Vries & Wiegink, 2011; Muggah, 2005; Munive, 
2013). These findings represent contributions to several ongoing theoretical debates. First, that 
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Amnesty and DDR programs are a global project of neoliberalization (Doyle, 1986; Mac Ginty, 
2006; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015; Tom, 2017). This dissertation links critical literature on 
neoliberal peacebuilding to study in the Niger Delta particularly one that examines the DDR 
program. The paradigmatic shift in conflict resolution, supported by several UN documents 
such as the UNIDDRS is consistent with the taking shape of a liberal peace agenda. This 
dissertation contributes to the theoretical debate that the NDA and DDR program was inspired 
and framed from a neoliberal perspective that is dominant in peacebuilding operations 
(Richmond, 2009). Liberals believe that peace is achieved through political, economic and 
social liberalization (Lidén, Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2009; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007). 
Therefore, the DDR program is a reproduction of the neoliberal peacebuilding. 
The study validates this theoretical thesis which shows how economic relationships are 
significant and highlights the ways liberalization programs have the tendency to benefit leaders 
by giving them the avenues to strengthen their grip of power at the expense of the entire society 
(Taylor, 2009).The case of Nigeria illustrates that the NDA and DDR peacebuilding has 
reinforced the existing political culture by re-establishing the ‘Big Man’ in Nigeria (Kalu, 
Yacob-Haliso, & Falola, 2018). Political leaders in Nigeria rule through patronage and 
personalized power although they are advocating for liberalization (Taylor, 2009, p. 169). 
Empirical evidence has indicated that although the DDR were framed as a neoliberal 
peacebuilding strategy, the program was implemented in a way that undermines the 
consolidation of peace in the region just like the cases in Kosovo, Bosnia or East Timor or 
Cambodia (Newman et al., 2009). Hence, the Niger Delta case suggests that the neoliberal peace 
approach might not be the right ingredient that will bring about sustainable peace because it 
neglects social needs, fails to incorporate local voices and exacerbates the challenges of 
underdevelopment (Richmond, 2010; 2011). 
In addition to the qualitative evidence, this study argues that DDR is part of the neoliberal peace 
doctrine that installs state legitimate monopoly of violence because a modern state according 
to Weber (1978) is supposed to have a monopoly of violence and DDR is in line with that. This 
is because the objective is to restore peace and ensure that the instruments of violence is not 
retrieved from combatants as they undermine the security of the state. Despite the years that the 
program has been implemented, the Nigerian government is still groping with the challenge of 
fragility instead of stability in the region. Findings show that neoliberal DDR did not viably 
construct a stable region although it somehow reduced violence in the region. 
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 Furthermore, the DDR was implemented as a short-term neoliberal peacebuilding strategy and 
not a strategy for ensuring long-term peace (Paris, 1997). The neoliberal DDR promotes hugely 
the absence of local connection (Talentino, 2010). The approach paid little attention to local 
voices, to ownership, or equitably distribute incentives across the whole society even though, 
building local authority is recognized in the peacebuilding process (Mac Ginty, 2008). The 
Nigerian government ignores significant socioeconomic needs, and by doing so reinforces 
inequalities that helps to prevent political participation and instil social division. The peace in 
the Niger Delta was a top-down approach instead of a bottom-up approach (Mac Ginty, 2010). 
The Nigerian government ignored local tenets of peacebuilding which constitute the indigenous 
traditions, institutions and mechanisms for peacebuilding and instead chose to import a 
neoliberal (international) peace model (such as the amnesty program and DDR) and apply it to 
a local context (the Niger Delta) as a solution to overarching problems (Richmond, 2009). 
Lederach (1997) stresses the critical importance of addressing a conflict within its specific 
situational context. People within a conflict milieu should be treated as a vital resource not 
recipients.What the example from Nigeria illustrates is that the application of a neoliberal 
peacebuilding approach was not well suited to tackle socio-economic grievances and instead 
became part of the factors that influence the re-emergence of violence in early 2016 (Pugh, 
2011; Tantua & Kamruzzaman, 2016). In the Niger Delta, subjugation rather than emancipation 
continues to be injected into the politics of peacebuilding (Doyle, 1986). A detailed 
investigation of the Nigerian political economy suggests that peacebuilding in the Niger Delta 
is for the most part interest-driven (Eriksson & Kostic, 2013, p. 18). This is indicative for 
another important aspect that becomes evident that neoliberal peacebuilding in Nigeria has not 
promoted the democratic institutions and norms it advocates for, yet it promotes the shared 
interests of the African political elites and external free market entrepreneurs (Mac Ginty, 2010). 
The Niger Delta is rife with contradictions and this becomes a critique of neoliberal thinking 
and peacebuilding.  
This relates to the literature surrounding the privilege predatory elites (Collier, 2000; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2000; 2005; Dunn & Shaw, 2001; Newman et al., 2009, p. 159). This contributes to 
the theoretical debate on neopatrimonialism in Africa (Bach & Gazibo, 2012; Bayart, 1993; 
Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Erdmann & Engel, 2006). The practice of neopatrimonialism in 
most African states is seen through the vertical distribution of resources that has given rise to 
patron-client networks based around an individual or party (Kalu et al., 2018, p. 29). The 
discussion on neopatrimonialism in Nigeria, shows a growing gap between the rich and poor 
not only in the Niger Delta but the entire polity (Bøås, 2001, p. 700). Findings show that leaders, 
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and ruling elites adjust agreements to their personal preferences with little concern for 
accountability. This results to an outcome completely opposite of what is intended (Talentino, 
2010). In Nigeria, political elites want to stay longer in office so that they can distribute 
resources and, if possible, retain resources for their personal interest and use (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003, p. 24). 
In addition to the theoretical contribution, this dissertation confirmed that Nigeria is a 
neopatrimonial state that suffers from the rentier-curse (Birks & Sinclair, 1984; Holsinger, 1986; 
Omeje, 2006). To gain more leverage on the claim of rentier-curse, findings indicate that 
elements of rentier-neopatrimonial politics informed the entire DDR process. The rentier nature 
and the neopatrimonial character of the Nigerian state played out through the whole DDR 
process and this was manifested in the design and implementation of the program. In describing 
the way the program was implemented, Inuwa (2017) asserts that there is nowhere in the world 
where DDR programs were conceived, designed and implemented from a neopatrimonial 
approach like Nigeria. This assertion is supported by findings from empirical analysis that the 
rentier sate was about to collapse as sources of patronage was decreasing and the honey pot (i.e. 
oil) was being depleted (Obi, 2010, p. 490). At this point, the incentive was to grant amnesty 
and stabilize the region so that optimum oil production could be restored. The empirical 
investigation also considers that patronage was used to reward the militants. For instance, top 
commanders were given huge oil contracts as incentives for accepting amnesty. The state also 
accepted to extend the patronage to top militia commanders especially those they believed have 
the capacity to perpetrate violence and threaten the political survival and legitimacy of the state. 
These top commanders have now become part of the elite club in Nigeria. In fact, Schultze-
Kraft (2017) argues that the Amnesty and DDR represented a renegotiation of the prevailing 
political settlement geared at protecting the economic and political interests of the federal and 
regional elites, whom now also included a group of powerful militant leaders and not an 
illustration of peacebuilding (p. 621). To strengthen the debate on neopatrimonialism, further 
evidence suggest that it affects policy making, especially the DDR program, and is responsible 
for the misuse of the program’s budget. The process was characterized by spending. This is 
seen in the way the DDR was implemented as it was one of the most extravagant programs. In 
this vein, elites use the program as means for extravagance and accumulation. The program was 
characterized by sending people abroad for studies whereas there are accredited universities, 
colleges and vocational institutions in Nigeria that could train and award degrees and 
certificates. Also, there were many instances where officials of the amnesty Office flew abroad 
in the pretext of monitoring and evaluation. It has developed the capacity of being able to divert 
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the resources of the program for private and lucrative gain, undermining the successful 
implementation of the DDR program (Cromwell & Chintedza, 2005, p. 103). The 
implementation of the DDR program fosters the phenomenon that Morris (2003) and Hyden 
(2006) describe as ‘economies of affection’ where the usage of patron-client networks based on 
kin, community and other affinities were in indispensable in the entire process. Suffice to say 
that the neopatrimonial approach contradicts the neoliberal peace in the Niger Delta. This is 
because the economy was more at stake for the government and elites than the peacebuilding 
itself. Although, the program was adopted as a neoliberal peace, patrimonialism was significant 
in its design and implementation. A holistic approach would have entailed that the program 
benefited the entire society and not the elite. Unfortunately, the program was very exclusive as 
it neglected significant groups in the region. This is indicative that neopatrimonialism shaped 
the program. 
Overall, evidence provides support for my argument that neoliberal and neopatrimonial 
practices perhaps undermined the entire DDR process in the Niger Delta region, even though it 
recorded some successes in reducing crime and violence in the region. In other words, given 
that by using neopatrimonial and neoliberal doctrines, the DDR program has not actually 
worked out because they are essentially top-down approaches (Bollen, 1993; Duffield, 1999; 
Richmond, 2010). As a result, the deal was not emancipatory, and it failed to address welfare 
and social justice and instead favored microeconomics (Fukuyama, 1989; Tom, 2017, p. 83). 
In using a neoliberal and neopatrimonial practices, investigations illustrated patterns of alliance 
building and networks and breaking common in conflict and peacebuilding with the example 
of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. It showed how during the implementation of the NDA and 
DDR, tactical alliances and synergies were brokered. However, clashes of interest, agendas, 
priorities etc. also led to the defection/split of such alliances. 
6.3  Potential Concerns for Future Research 
This dissertation offers some insights that can contribute to further scholarship on the economy 
of violence. It would be important to further investigate the future patterns of violence and 
agitations in the Niger Delta. Although the neoliberal-neopatrimonial DDR successfully 
sustained stability in the short-term, it would be significant to further research on how short-
term policies could shape subsequent political and violent behaviour. The way incentives were 
distributed in the program has produced some sort of latent positive consequences in terms of 
future remobilisation of violence in the region. Taking into cognizance the way the elements of 
  
169 
political economy such as interests, institutions and incentives play out in the Niger Delta. DDR 
ultimately resulted in a situation whereby the dividend for peace went to the top ex-militant 
commanders. This was at the expense of the ex-militants and the entire community and could 
spark up another spectre of grievance resulting in a relapse of violence. This scenario may 
mobilize a new phase of grievance against settled top commanders who have been co-opted 
into the local, state and subnational level of the neopatrimonial state. There is a potential conflict 
that will erupt between former allies (ex-militants and their former commanders) rather than 
between the ex-militants and the government. A new conflict may emerge, and this could be 
dissatisfied ex-militants who are not only frustrated about the outcome of the program but, are 
unhappy with the behaviour of their former commanders who have robbed them of their 
legitimacy. There is a high probability that discontent ex-militants will remobilize and push 
their violence, hostilities and aggression towards their former leaders and no longer the 
government and MNOCs. For instance, there was a consensus among ex-militants that the 
government had good intention for the amnesty and DDR however, their commanders are the 
ones who have marred such moves. They argued and regretted why they trusted their 
commanders in the first place and have realised that their commanders were more interested in 
the incentives they will get and did not represent their group interests. Those who fought for 
justice were not compensated. Rather, family members and girlfriends were the one 
compensated and selected for the program. Given that the Niger Delta has suffered from 
protracted violence that contributed to the fragmentation of the socioeconomic, security, and 
political structures of the country, it would be possible to acquire more analytical leverage for 
understanding post-conflict mobilization process. There is great need for future research to 
focus on the internal politics of ex-militants and their command and control structures after the 
end of fighting. As such, it would be useful to undertake further study to look at what the 
outcome of violence will look like in the future. It would be interesting to see who will the 
violence be directed towards? Is the future pattern of violence likely to be directed against the 
state or the former top commanders who are have now taken the dividends of peace as against 
the militants and the community? What is the likely future of violence? Is there likely to be an 
organized violence against the state as we have seen before or will it take a different dimension? 
Thus, there is the necessity to advance further study in post-conflict violence in the Niger Delta 
region. 
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